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CVE-2026-40576

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

Path Traversal in excel-mcp-server Remote Excel File Handler

CVE-2026-40576

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Arbitrary File Read and Write via Path Traversal

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical path traversal vulnerability in excel-mcp-server allows unauthenticated remote users to read, write, and overwrite arbitrary files on the host filesystem by passing crafted file paths to exposed MCP tool handlers.

The issue arises because the server's path resolution logic fails to enforce confinement to the intended EXCEL_FILES_PATH directory, making remote file system access trivial when the service is exposed over SSE or Streamable-HTTP.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of excel-mcp-server up to and including version 0.1.7 that:

  • Run in SSE or Streamable-HTTP transport mode for remote access
  • Bind to network interfaces (e.g., the default 0.0.0.0)
  • Rely on EXCEL_FILES_PATH to constrain where Excel-related file operations occur

In such setups, the server exposes multiple MCP tools that accept file path arguments, and the path confinement logic does not reliably prevent access outside the designated directory.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-exposed excel-mcp-server running in SSE or Streamable-HTTP mode.
  • Required access: Ability to reach the server over the network; no authentication is required by default.
  • Trigger point: Any of the exposed MCP tool handlers that take user-controlled file path parameters.
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The get_excel_path() helper passes absolute paths through without enforcing that they remain under EXCEL_FILES_PATH.
  • For relative paths, it simply joins them to the base directory without normalizing or validating the resulting path, allowing traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended root.
  • Combined with network exposure and lack of authentication, an attacker can directly supply malicious paths to perform out-of-scope file operations.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper validation of file paths used for filesystem operations, aligning with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

Conceptually, the server attempts to sandbox file operations within a directory defined by EXCEL_FILES_PATH, but the get_excel_path() function:

  • Treats absolute paths as inherently trusted and forwards them without restriction, and
  • Joins relative paths to the base directory without canonicalization, normalization, or post-join checks to ensure the final path remains inside the allowed directory.

This insecure pattern—concatenating user-controlled path fragments and trusting them without bounding checks—breaks the intended directory confinement and allows attackers to navigate the host filesystem.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read arbitrary files accessible to the server process (e.g., configuration files, application logs, or other sensitive data).
  • An attacker may overwrite or corrupt existing files on the host, potentially causing data loss or application malfunction.
  • An attacker could create new files or modify scripts and configuration, which can contribute to further compromise depending on how those files are used.
  • An attacker may gain leverage for privilege escalation or lateral movement if they can tamper with files consumed by other privileged services.
  • An attacker could disrupt normal operations by deleting or corrupting files within the application's working directories.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on robust path handling, strict filesystem boundaries, and minimizing network exposure:

  • Implement canonicalization of user-supplied paths (e.g., via realpath/abspath equivalents) and verify after resolution that the final path is strictly under the intended root directory.
  • Reject absolute paths entirely when operations are meant to be confined to a sandbox directory, or enforce that even absolute paths are remapped and validated within that directory.
  • Avoid simple string concatenation or naive joining of user-supplied path segments; instead, use path utilities that account for .., symbolic links, and platform-specific nuances.
  • Apply least-privilege filesystem permissions so the server process only has access to directories and files strictly required for its role.
  • Restrict network exposure: bind only to trusted interfaces, place the service behind an authenticated proxy or gateway, and limit access to trusted clients.
  • Consider designing tool handlers to operate on logical identifiers rather than raw file system paths, mapping those identifiers to validated, server-side controlled locations.

How teams detect issues like this

High-level detection approaches include:

  • Static analysis: Define rules or patterns to flag code that:
  • Uses user-controlled input directly as a file path.
  • Concatenates or joins untrusted path segments with base directories without enforcing post-join boundary checks.
  • Accepts absolute paths from external inputs without sandboxing or validation.
  • Code review signals:
  • Helper functions intended to implement directory confinement that do not canonicalize the resulting path or check parent-child relationships.
  • Absence of checks ensuring that resolved_path.startswith(allowed_root) (or equivalent safe pattern) after path normalization.
  • Network endpoints or tool handlers which accept raw path arguments and pass them directly to file APIs.
  • Runtime monitoring and policy enforcement:
  • File integrity monitoring to detect unexpected reads and writes outside the intended workspace directories by the server process.
  • System call auditing (e.g., via auditd or similar) focused on the service identity, to highlight access to sensitive system locations.
  • Integration of application-level logging and anomaly detection to surface repeated access attempts using suspicious path patterns.
  • Automated SAST/IAST tools can be configured to scan for path traversal patterns and missing validation as part of continuous integration pipelines.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/haris-musa/excel-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-j98m-w3xp-9f56

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. When excel-mcp-server is running in SSE or Streamable-HTTP mode and exposed on the network (such as binding to 0.0.0.0), an unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the issue by sending crafted requests with malicious file paths.

The attacker only needs network access to the service endpoint; no credentials are required by default. They do not need shell access to the host or local user accounts, only the ability to reach the server over the network.

Enforce strict path confinement by canonicalizing all user-supplied paths, prohibiting absolute paths for sandboxed operations, and verifying that the resolved path stays within the intended base directory before performing any filesystem operation. Additionally, decouple external inputs from raw filesystem paths wherever possible.

Adopt a defensive design that treats all external path input as untrusted, use vetted path-handling utilities with canonicalization, and enforce directory boundaries centrally through well-reviewed helper functions. Combine this with secure defaults—limited network exposure, authentication in front of sensitive services, and least-privilege file permissions—to reduce the impact of any residual flaws.

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