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CVE-2026-40523

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in FrontAccounting Audit Trail

CVE-2026-40523

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

FrontAccounting before 2.4.20 suffers from a SQL injection flaw in the Audit Trail report handler that allows crafted input in specific POST parameters to alter database queries.

Authenticated users with SA_GLANALYTIC permission can inject time-based and UNION-based payloads, potentially causing database denial of service or extracting arbitrary data when report queries are executed.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in FrontAccounting's Audit Trail reporting functionality, specifically when generating analytical reports that rely on dynamic SQL construction.

It is relevant in deployments where authenticated users with SA_GLANALYTIC permissions can submit POST requests containing PARAM_2 and PARAM_3 values that are interpolated into SQL statements without strong validation.

Risk increases when the application shares a database with other systems, runs with elevated database privileges, or lacks query-level resource limits, making injected queries more impactful.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP POST requests to the Audit Trail report handler endpoint.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated account with SA_GLANALYTIC permission.
  • Trigger point: Submission of malicious SQL fragments via PARAM_2 and PARAM_3 fields used in report query construction.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-supplied parameters are concatenated into SQL without proper sanitization or parameterization, allowing attackers to control query structure, operators, and functions.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

The report handler likely constructs SQL statements by embedding user-controlled POST parameters directly into query strings, trusting them as benign filters or conditions.

Without prepared statements, bound parameters, or robust input validation, the database engine interprets crafted input as part of the SQL syntax rather than data, enabling attackers to introduce functions like SLEEP() or UNION clauses.

Abstractly, the insecure pattern is dynamically building SQL from unchecked external input instead of enforcing strict separation between query logic and data values.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may cause database denial of service via time-based payloads (e.g., SLEEP) that tie up connections and processing resources.
  • Attackers can extract arbitrary table contents, potentially including sensitive financial or user information, using UNION-based injection.
  • Attackers could modify or delete accounting data if queries are executed with sufficient privileges.
  • Attackers may pivot to compromise other applications sharing the same database or reuse exposed credentials and configuration data.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct string interpolation and restricting how user input influences SQL:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements so that user-supplied values are treated strictly as data, not executable SQL.
  • Apply strict server-side validation and whitelisting on report parameters (e.g., limiting to known column identifiers, numeric ranges, or enumerated values).
  • Centralize query construction logic to avoid ad‑hoc concatenation patterns in controllers or report handlers.
  • Reduce database account privileges for application users to the minimum required for reporting, limiting the blast radius if an injection occurs.
  • Incorporate secure-by-default APIs or ORM layers that abstract raw SQL composition and enforce safe query building.

How teams detect issues like this

High-level detection approaches can help identify and manage similar SQL injection risks:

  • Static analysis rules that flag dynamic SQL concatenation with HTTP parameter values, especially in reporting and search features.
  • Code review checklists that require verification of prepared statement usage and disallow direct embedding of request parameters in query strings.
  • Centralized logging and monitoring for anomalous query patterns, such as repeated use of SLEEP, UNION across unusual tables, or excessively long queries from report endpoints.
  • Policy enforcement in CI/CD pipelines, where automated tools scan for known insecure query-building idioms and block merges until issues are remediated.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/FrontAccountingERP/FA/commit/647a18196caad27f96ea852e993c9e30f815357f
jivasecurity.comjivasecurity.com/writeups/frontaccounting-sqli-audit-trail-report-cve-2026-40523
sourceforge.netsourceforge.net/p/frontaccounting/news/2026/04/release-2420/
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/frontaccounting-sql-injection-via-reporting-rep710-php

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is limited to authenticated users with SA_GLANALYTIC permission, but within that scope, attackers can significantly influence database queries and impact data confidentiality and availability.

The attacker must log in to FrontAccounting with an account granted SA_GLANALYTIC rights, or compromise such an account through other means, in order to submit malicious POST parameters to the Audit Trail report handler.

The most robust fix is to replace all dynamic SQL concatenation with parameterized queries, enforce strict validation on reporting parameters, and ensure that the database account used for reports has only the minimal read/write privileges required.

Adopt secure query-building practices across the codebase, use frameworks or ORMs that default to parameterized access, establish coding standards that forbid direct inclusion of request data in SQL, and integrate automated security testing into development workflows.

Find out what's already
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