Summary
OpenHarness contains an authorization bypass in its permission checking logic, where incomplete path normalization allows sensitive filesystem locations to be accessed through built-in grep and glob tools.
If an attacker can invoke these tools with crafted root directories, they may be able to read sensitive local files, key material, configuration data, or directory listings despite configured path restrictions.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in OpenHarness deployments that expose the built-in grep and glob functionality and rely on configured path rules to restrict which parts of the local filesystem can be accessed.
The issue lies in how the permission checker normalizes and evaluates the root directory paths passed into these tools.
When certain path forms are not fully normalized before access control is applied, they may fall outside the intended enforcement logic, enabling reads from sensitive directories even in environments that appear tightly locked down by configuration.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Interfaces (CLI, API, or UI) that allow users or integrations to invoke OpenHarness grep/glob operations and specify root directories or search paths.
- Required access: Ability to run or trigger these built-in tools under an account or context that is meant to be constrained by path rules (e.g., a restricted project user, automation token, or integration).
- Trigger point: Passing specially crafted root directories or path arguments to grep/glob so that the permission checker's incomplete normalization fails to match configured restrictions.
- Why exploitation is possible: The authorization logic evaluates paths using incomplete or inconsistent normalization, so certain representations of sensitive directories are not correctly compared against the allow/deny rules, resulting in an authorization bypass for file read operations.
Why this happens
The underlying problem is an authorization decision made on inadequately normalized resource identifiers, aligning with CWE-863.
The permission checker attempts to enforce path-based access control but does so before or without fully normalizing the filesystem paths (e.g., not resolving all relative segments, symbolic forms, or equivalent representations).
As a result, the system treats different textual representations of the same underlying directory as distinct for authorization purposes, allowing requests that should be blocked to pass through when routed via the built-in grep and glob tools.
Conceptually, this is a broken access control pattern where policy evaluation depends on string comparison of paths rather than on canonical, resolved resources.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reading of sensitive local files that are intended to be protected by path rules.
- Disclosure of private key material and secrets stored on the host filesystem.
- Exposure of configuration files containing credentials, endpoints, or internal topology details.
- Enumeration of directory contents within restricted areas, assisting further attacks or lateral movement.
- Leakage of internal logs or operational data that may reveal business or security-sensitive information.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on robust, canonical path-based authorization and minimizing the trust placed in user-supplied file paths:
- Normalize and canonicalize all filesystem paths before evaluating them against access control rules, ensuring that equivalent paths resolve to a single canonical form.
- Base authorization decisions on resolved filesystem objects (e.g., real paths) rather than on raw user input strings.
- Apply a strict allowlist model for accessible directories, and treat all other locations as denied by default.
- Isolate OpenHarness operations into constrained environments (such as chroot-like jails, containers, or dedicated service accounts) with limited filesystem visibility.
- Avoid passing user-controlled paths directly into powerful file-inspection utilities; wrap them with validation and boundary checks.
- Limit the privileges of the process executing grep/glob so that even if path checks are incomplete, underlying OS-level permissions restrict damage.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine code-centric and operational approaches:
- Static analysis and review:
- Look for permission checks that compare raw path strings against configuration rules without explicit normalization or canonicalization steps.
- Flag uses of grep/glob or similar utilities where user-provided paths are passed through with minimal validation.
- Examine authorization modules for duplicated or inconsistent path handling logic between different code paths.
- Configuration and policy checks:
- Enforce internal policies requiring canonical path resolution before access checks in filesystem-related components.
- Use pre-commit or CI pipelines with linters or security analysis tools to detect non-canonical path comparisons.
- Runtime monitoring:
- Log and monitor grep/glob access patterns, especially attempts to reach high-value directories (e.g., keys, configuration, or system paths).
- Alert on unexpected file reads initiated from restricted or low-privilege accounts, particularly when targeting sensitive directories.

