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CVE-2026-40030

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

OS Command Injection in parseusbs Volume Listing Path

CVE-2026-40030

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary Command Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

parseusbs before version 1.9 contains an OS command injection flaw where the volume listing path argument provided via the -v flag is passed directly into an os.popen() call that shells out to ls without sanitization.

By supplying a crafted volume path containing shell metacharacters, an attacker can inject and execute arbitrary system commands during volume content enumeration.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in environments where parseusbs is used to enumerate or inspect USB volumes and the -v flag is available to specify a volume listing path.

Risk is elevated when:

  • User-supplied or externally controlled values are passed to the -v flag
  • The application runs with elevated privileges (e.g., root)
  • Input validation or sanitization on command-line arguments is absent or minimal

In such setups, the program builds a shell command with ls and executes it using os.popen() with the provided path as part of the command string.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Command-line interface or any wrapper (GUI, script, service) exposing parseusbs with a controllable -v argument
  • Required access: Ability to invoke parseusbs or influence its -v parameter (local user, automated job, or indirectly through another component)
  • Trigger point: Execution of the volume content enumeration logic where -v is interpolated into an os.popen() command using ls
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs a shell command string that includes the raw -v argument and passes it to a shell via os.popen(), allowing shell metacharacters and command separators in the path to be interpreted as additional commands

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing shell commands by concatenating untrusted input into a command string that is executed through a shell.

Instead of invoking ls (or equivalent functionality) via a non-shell API with properly separated arguments, the program uses os.popen() with a formatted string that includes the volume path from the -v flag.

This pattern maps directly to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, where shell metacharacters in user input (such as ;, &&, |, backticks, or $() syntax) are interpreted as part of the command, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the parseusbs process
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting files accessible to the affected user or service account
  • Planting or executing malware and persistence mechanisms on the host
  • Lateral movement by using injected commands to access other systems or services
  • Exfiltration of sensitive data present on local or mounted file systems

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on avoiding shell invocation with untrusted input and constraining how external commands are executed:

  • Prefer APIs that do not invoke a shell, such as using subprocess with argument lists or native directory listing functions rather than os.popen() and ls.
  • Treat all command-line parameters, including the -v path, as untrusted and validate them against a strict allowlist of expected formats or directories.
  • Encode or escape shell-sensitive characters only if shell usage is absolutely unavoidable, while still minimizing the surface of shell interaction.
  • Run utilities like parseusbs with the least privileges required, avoiding root or highly privileged accounts whenever possible.
  • Separate concerns between user input handling and command execution, ensuring that input cannot directly influence the structure of OS commands.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar OS command injection risks by:

  • Static analysis rules that flag uses of os.popen, system, or shell-based subprocess calls where user input contributes to command strings.
  • Code review checklists that require examining any code paths constructing shell commands, particularly for tooling that consumes command-line arguments.
  • Grep- or query-based searches for concatenation of user-controlled variables with shell-sensitive APIs in the codebase.
  • Runtime monitoring and logging of command executions initiated by parseusbs, looking for unusual arguments or unexpected chained commands.
  • Incorporating security linters or automated review tools into CI pipelines to enforce policies around safe command execution patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/khyrenz/parseusbs/commit/99f05996494e7e41ea0c7e13145ba20eb793e46b
github.comgithub.com/khyrenz/parseusbs/pull/10
mobasi.aimobasi.ai/sentinel
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/parseusbs-command-injection-via-volume-path-argument

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how parseusbs is exposed. If it is invoked directly by local users, exploitation is typically local. However, if a remote service or application calls parseusbs and passes through user-controlled values to the -v flag, remote exploitation becomes possible via that service.

An attacker needs the ability to supply or influence the value of the -v argument when parseusbs is executed. This may be through direct shell access, scheduled jobs, wrapper scripts, or higher-level applications that pass user input to parseusbs.

The safest approach is to eliminate shell-based command construction entirely: use non-shell APIs (such as direct directory listing functions or subprocess calls with argument lists) and ensure that user-supplied paths are treated strictly as data, not as part of executable command strings.

Adopt a development standard that forbids building shell commands with untrusted data, enforce strong input validation and canonicalization for all external inputs, and integrate static analysis or linting rules that automatically flag unsafe command execution patterns during code review and CI.

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