Summary
ALEAPP's NQ_Vault artifact parser trusts a file name value pulled from an Android database and uses it directly as an output filename, enabling path traversal outside the intended report directory.
If an attacker can control the stored file name (for example by crafting database contents), they may write arbitrary files to the analyst's filesystem, potentially overwriting executables or configuration and enabling code execution in some environments.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in the NQ_Vault.py artifact parser within ALEAPP up to version 3.4.0.
It becomes relevant when ALEAPP is run against Android data that includes an attacker-controlled database field used as file_name_from, typically as part of normal forensic processing.
The issue manifests during report generation, when the tool constructs output paths based on this field without constraining it to the report's output directory or sanitizing traversal sequences.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: ALEAPP execution environment (forensic workstation, analysis server, or CI-style pipeline running ALEAPP).
- Required access: Ability to inject or manipulate the database contents parsed by the NQ_Vault artifact so that
file_name_fromcontains malicious path components. - Trigger point: Running ALEAPP against the crafted dataset and invoking the NQ_Vault parser, which writes output files for parsed artifacts.
- Why exploitation is possible: The parser concatenates or uses
file_name_fromdirectly when generating output paths, failing to validate or normalize it against an allowed base directory.
This allows ../ sequences or absolute paths to escape the report output directory and write to arbitrary filesystem locations accessible to the executing user.
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a classic directory traversal issue where untrusted path input is used to construct filesystem paths without normalization or restriction.
In the NQ_Vault.py parser, a database field (e.g., file_name_from) is treated as a safe filename and passed directly into file creation logic, allowing path components such as ../../../target to influence the final output location.
This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the application fails to confine file operations to a designated directory and neglects to filter traversal characters, absolute paths, or other unsafe constructs.
Potential impact
- Arbitrary file creation or overwriting in directories writable by the ALEAPP process user.
- Overwriting of local configuration files, potentially altering application behavior on the analysis host.
- Replacement or modification of scripts and executables in user-writable locations, which could lead to code execution when those binaries or scripts are later run.
- Corruption of other analysis outputs or logs, undermining the integrity of forensic evidence.
- In multi-user or shared environments, potential cross-tenant data exposure or disruption if shared paths are writable.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on constraining file output to a controlled directory and treating all external path components as untrusted:
- Resolve all output paths relative to a fixed, trusted base directory dedicated to ALEAPP reports, rejecting any computed path that escapes this root after normalization.
- Sanitize and validate filenames from data sources by stripping directory separators, traversal sequences (
../,..\), absolute path prefixes, and other filesystem metacharacters. - Use safe filename generation functions (e.g., allowlisting alphanumeric plus a small set of safe characters) and substitute or reject values that do not match the allowed pattern.
- Separate "identifier" fields from filesystem paths in code design; treat database fields as opaque labels and map them to internally generated filenames rather than using them directly.
- Run analysis tools with least-privilege user accounts that have minimal write access outside the intended output directory, reducing the impact of any remaining file-write issues.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect similar directory traversal and arbitrary file write issues through a combination of automated and manual techniques:
- Static analysis: Define rules or patterns that flag file operations (
open,write,save, etc.) where path arguments are derived from external data without clear normalization or validation steps. - Code review: During manual review, pay attention to any use of user-controlled or data-source-controlled fields in path joins, concatenations, or file system APIs, especially when they are not run through a central path-sanitization helper.
- Path constraint checks: Introduce utility functions that compute an output path and then verify it remains under the intended root directory after applying
realpath/abspath; add unit tests that attempt to use traversal payloads and assert they are rejected. - Runtime monitoring in test environments: Run ALEAPP or similar tools against synthetic datasets containing obvious traversal payloads (
../test, absolute paths) and observe where files are written, integrating this into CI security tests.

