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CVE-2026-39907

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

External Control of File Path in Unisys WebPerfect Image

CVE-2026-39907

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

External Control of File Path

CWE:

CWE-73

Impact:

Credential Exposure and Network Authentication Relay

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Unisys WebPerfect Image Suite exposes an unauthenticated WCF SOAP endpoint that accepts attacker-controlled file paths in the ReadLicense action without proper validation.

By sending crafted SOAP requests containing UNC paths, a remote attacker can coerce the server into making outbound SMB connections and leak NTLMv2 machine-account hashes, which can then be relayed for privilege escalation or lateral movement.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Unisys WebPerfect Image Suite installations that:

  • Deploy the WCF SOAP service listening on TCP port 1208
  • Expose the service to untrusted networks or internal segments without strict access control
  • Allow the ReadLicense SOAP action to accept LFName parameters that are not constrained to local or trusted paths

Under these conditions, the service may interpret UNC paths as valid file locations and initiate outbound SMB connections using machine-account credentials.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible WCF SOAP endpoint on TCP port 1208
  • Required access: No authentication required; attacker only needs network connectivity to the service
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the ReadLicense action with a crafted LFName value pointing to an attacker-controlled UNC path (e.g., \\attacker-host\share\file)
  • Why exploitation is possible: The service trusts the LFName parameter as a file location, performs file access operations on remote paths, and automatically uses NTLMv2 machine-account credentials when initiating SMB connections to those paths.

Why this happens

This issue stems from the service's reliance on externally supplied file paths without enforcing strict validation or normalization.

The ReadLicense action accepts the LFName parameter and passes it into file-handling logic that implicitly supports UNC paths, enabling outbound SMB connections.

Because the code does not restrict LFName to safe, expected locations (such as local directories) or apply robust allow-listing, an attacker can control where the server attempts to read a "license" file.

This design maps to CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where untrusted input is used as a file path, leading here to credential exposure via network file access.

Potential impact

  • Coerced outbound SMB connections from the victim server to attacker-controlled hosts
  • Exposure of NTLMv2 machine-account hashes that may be captured and cracked offline
  • NTLM relay attacks against other internal services that accept the machine account, leading to privilege escalation
  • Lateral movement within the network using the compromised or relayed machine-account credentials
  • Expanded attack surface for further compromise, including access to file shares or management interfaces trusting the server account

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on reducing trust in externally provided paths and limiting where the service can reach over the network.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Strong path validation and allow-listing: Restrict the LFName parameter to a small set of predefined, local directories or filenames. Reject or normalize any input that resolves outside allowed locations, including UNC paths or network shares.
  • Disable remote path handling: Configure file access logic to disallow network paths entirely for license reads, treating any \\host\share or similar forms as invalid input.
  • Least-privilege service accounts: Run the service under a dedicated, low-privilege account that has minimal network authentication privileges, reducing the value of any captured credentials.
  • Network egress controls: Use host-based firewalls or network segmentation to block or tightly control outbound SMB traffic, especially towards untrusted or Internet-facing addresses.
  • Harden authentication protocols: Where possible, minimize reliance on implicit NTLM authentication and prefer more robust, constrained protocols; disable NTLM where it is not strictly required.

These measures help ensure that even if an attacker can influence file-path parameters, the server cannot be coerced into leaking valuable credentials or making risky outbound connections.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus both on code-level patterns and runtime telemetry.

Code and configuration review:

  • Look for WCF service methods that accept file path parameters (e.g., LFName) and pass them directly into file I/O APIs or license loading routines.
  • Flag logic that permits UNC paths, relative paths that traverse directories, or other remote file references without strict validation/allow-listing.
  • Examine service bindings and endpoint configurations to identify unauthenticated SOAP endpoints exposed beyond strictly necessary network scopes.

Static and automated analysis:

  • Use static analysis rules to detect external input influencing file APIs such as File.Open, File.ReadAllBytes, or similar, especially where inputs are not normalized or restricted.
  • Incorporate secure coding checks in CI/CD pipelines that highlight CWE-73 patterns and require manual review before deployment.

Runtime and network monitoring:

  • Monitor Windows event logs and security logs for unexpected outbound SMB connections originating from the WebPerfect Image Suite host.
  • Analyze network traffic for SMB sessions targeting unusual internal or external destinations, particularly when correlated with SOAP traffic to port 1208.
  • Implement intrusion detection or network monitoring rules that flag repeated attempts to access remote shares immediately following SOAP requests.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/VAMorales/be3e4ed472c51794493c1256cce16129
unisys.comunisys.com/solutions/cai/applications/
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/unisys-webperfect-image-suite-ntlmv2-hash-leakage-via-wcf-soap

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any attacker who can reach the WCF SOAP service on TCP port 1208 can send crafted SOAP requests without authentication and attempt to coerce outbound SMB connections.

The attacker only needs network access to the vulnerable endpoint; no valid credentials for the application or Windows domain are required to trigger the outbound SMB connections and capture NTLMv2 hashes.

The most robust fix is to treat all externally supplied file paths as untrusted and enforce strict allow-listing to constrain them to known-safe, local locations. Reject any UNC or remote paths, apply canonicalization to prevent bypasses, and avoid using user-controlled values in low-level file I/O operations wherever possible.

Adopt a secure design pattern where network-exposed APIs never directly accept raw file paths or resource identifiers from clients. Instead, use abstract identifiers that are mapped server-side to vetted resources, couple this with input validation, least-privilege service accounts, and egress controls, and enforce these rules through secure coding guidelines and automated security checks in the development pipeline.

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