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CVE-2026-39358

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

SQL Injection in CubeCart Product and Log Sorting

CVE-2026-39358

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise and Data Integrity Loss

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

CubeCart v6.x prior to 6.6.0 contains authenticated time-based blind SQL injection flaws in the sorting parameters of Products and Logs endpoints.

By manipulating fields such as sort[price], sort_activity, sort_admin, and sort_customer, an authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary SQL commands and potentially access or modify sensitive data in the underlying database.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in CubeCart v6.x installations where authenticated users can access administrative or reporting interfaces that expose the Products and Logs endpoints.

In these contexts, sorting parameters from HTTP requests are incorporated into SQL queries without adequate sanitization or strict whitelisting.

The issue is present when user-controlled sort fields (for example, price or activity-based sort options) are dynamically concatenated into query fragments rather than being mapped through a fixed, server-side enumeration.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application endpoints responsible for listing Products and Logs.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated account with permissions to reach the affected listing views (e.g., admin or staff roles, depending on deployment configuration).
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted sorting parameters (sort[price], sort_activity, sort_admin, sort_customer) via HTTP requests (GET or POST) to the relevant endpoints.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application passes user-supplied sort parameters directly or semi-directly into SQL ORDER BY or related clauses without strict input validation, canonicalization, or parameterization of identifier-like values. Time-based responses allow an attacker to infer query behavior and exfiltrate data even without direct error messages.

Why this happens

The core issue is improper handling of user-controlled input in SQL query construction, mapped to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

Instead of mapping sort options to a fixed set of server-side column names, the code appears to trust the incoming sort parameters and incorporates them into SQL statements, likely via string concatenation.

In a time-based blind SQL injection scenario, the attacker cannot directly see query results or errors but can alter the database's response time (e.g., using database sleep or delay functions) to infer whether injected conditions are true or false.

This pattern reflects a broader bug class where dynamic query building does not distinguish between data values and query structure, allowing attackers to inject additional SQL logic.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive data from the CubeCart database (e.g., customer records, order details, configuration data).
  • Unauthorized modification or deletion of records, potentially affecting product catalogs, orders, or logs.
  • Creation or modification of administrative accounts, leading to further compromise of the ecommerce platform.
  • Interference with application availability by corrupting critical tables or executing disruptive SQL commands.
  • Pivoting to underlying infrastructure if database credentials or other secrets are stored and retrieved from the compromised database.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on ensuring that user input cannot influence the structure of SQL queries, particularly for sort and filter operations.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Mapping all sort parameters to a fixed, server-side whitelist of column identifiers, rejecting or defaulting on any unknown or malformed values.
  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for data values and avoiding direct string concatenation for any query fragments, including ORDER BY logic; for identifier-like fields, apply strict server-side enumeration.
  • Normalizing the design so that only trusted server-side code determines the allowed sort fields and directions, independent of raw client input.
  • Applying centralized input validation for query-related parameters, including checks for unexpected characters, operators, and SQL keywords, while recognizing that validation alone is not a substitute for safe query construction.
  • Enforcing least-privilege database accounts so that, even if injection occurs, the SQL user has minimal rights and cannot perform destructive operations.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Use SAST tools or custom rules to flag dynamic SQL construction that concatenates HTTP parameters or request variables into query strings, especially around sorting, filtering, and search features.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, look for:
  • Use of raw string concatenation when building SQL.
  • Direct usage of request parameters in ORDER BY, GROUP BY, or LIMIT clauses.
  • Lack of mapping from user-supplied sort keys to predefined column names.
  • Dynamic testing: Employ DAST tools and manual penetration testing with time-based payloads in sorting parameters (e.g., sort[price], sort_activity) to identify anomalous response times that indicate blind injection vulnerabilities.
  • Logging and monitoring: Instrument database and application logs to detect unusual query patterns, frequent use of delay functions, or repeated requests with similar sorting parameters that cause significant response-time variance.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cubecart/v6/security/advisories/GHSA-8gj6-9fwc-h4gh

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it is remotely exploitable from the web interface, but only by users who possess valid credentials and can reach the affected Products and Logs endpoints. It is not exploitable by completely unauthenticated visitors under normal configurations.

The attacker must have an authenticated account with permissions to access the product or log listing pages that expose the vulnerable sorting parameters. The exact role required depends on how the CubeCart instance is configured, but this is not a purely public, unauthenticated attack surface.

The most robust fix is to remove any direct influence of user input on SQL structure. Practically, this means whitelisting allowed sort fields on the server side, mapping client-supplied options to known-safe column identifiers, and using parameterized queries for all data values. Any unrecognized or invalid sort input should fall back to a default safe ordering.

Adopting a secure query-building strategy is key: use prepared statements for all data values, never concatenate raw request parameters into SQL, and centralize validation and whitelisting of query-related inputs like sort, filter, and search fields. Complement this with regular security-focused code reviews, automated static analysis rules targeting dynamic SQL construction, and routine penetration testing of input vectors such as sorting, filtering, and search parameters.

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