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CVE-2026-38945

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Command Injection in Raynet rvia Path Search Handling

CVE-2026-38945

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

A command injection vulnerability in Raynet rvia up to version 12.6 Update 8 allows adversaries to execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted path string that is passed into an underlying find command.

When user-controlled path input is concatenated into shell commands without proper termination or sanitization, attackers can break out of the intended search expression and inject additional commands for execution.

Affected context

This issue affects Raynet rvia environments where path-like input is processed by Java code and then delegated to a system find command for search operations.

The vulnerability becomes relevant when:

  • rvia constructs shell commands from path parameters or search criteria,
  • user or external input influences those paths, and
  • command composition relies on simple string concatenation or insufficient quoting rather than robust parameterization.

The problem manifests specifically when the Java-based search logic does not correctly terminate or escape the search criteria before invoking find.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Interfaces or workflows in rvia that accept path or search parameters which are then processed by the Java search functionality.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or control path/search input (e.g., through UI, API, job configuration, or imported metadata) that ultimately reaches the find invocation.
  • Trigger point: Execution of the rvia search routine that builds and runs a shell command using find with the attacker-controlled path as part of the command line.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The Java code constructs shell commands using untrusted input without robust quoting, escaping, or argument separation. Because the search criteria are not properly terminated, special shell metacharacters in the path can alter the command structure and inject additional commands.

Why this happens

The root cause is unsafe construction of shell commands from untrusted input, aligning with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

Instead of treating the path as a single, opaque argument to find, the application appears to concatenate it into a command string executed by the operating system, relying on shell parsing.

This pattern allows shell metacharacters (such as command separators, redirection operators, or subshell constructs) embedded in the path to be interpreted as part of the command itself rather than as data, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the rvia process
  • Unauthorized access to files or system resources on the affected host
  • Installation of additional malware or persistence mechanisms
  • Exfiltration or tampering with configuration and inventory data handled by rvia
  • Pivoting to other systems in the environment, depending on network reach and credentials available to the rvia process

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating string-based shell command construction and treating all external input as untrusted:

  • Use process execution APIs that accept argument arrays (e.g., Java ProcessBuilder with separate parameters) instead of building shell command strings.
  • Treat path and search parameters strictly as data, not as fragments of a command line; avoid passing them through a general-purpose shell where possible.
  • Normalize and validate paths against an allowlist of expected formats and locations (e.g., deny shell metacharacters and unexpected whitespace in path fields).
  • Apply least-privilege principles to the rvia service account so that, even if a command executes, its capabilities are constrained.
  • Isolate search operations in constrained environments (e.g., chroot-like directories, containers, or restricted directories) to limit the blast radius of misuse.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-level analysis with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Flag any occurrences where Java code builds shell command strings that incorporate user-supplied path or search input, especially when invoking find or similar utilities.
  • Code review: Look for patterns such as Runtime.exec(String) or ProcessBuilder used with concatenated command strings, and verify all parameters passed to external processes originate from trusted or validated sources.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish secure coding guidelines that prohibit shell invocation with unescaped user input; enforce via pre-commit hooks or CI pipelines.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use host-based intrusion detection or process monitoring to alert on unusual child processes spawned by rvia, particularly those containing suspicious shell metacharacters or unexpected utilities.
  • Configuration review: Periodically review rvia workflows and integrations to identify externally controlled fields that could reach command execution paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Wise-Security/CVE-2026-38945
support.raynet.desupport.raynet.de/
support.raynet.desupport.raynet.de/hc/en-us/articles/46163206384788-RSEC200967-Java-Detection-Path-Traversal
github.comgithub.com/Wise-Security/CVE-2026-38945/blob/main/CVE-2026-38945.sh

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how rvia is deployed. If remote users or integrated systems can supply or influence the path/search parameters that reach the vulnerable Java search logic, exploitation may occur over the network without direct host access.

The attacker must be able to control the path or search criteria that rvia uses when invoking the find command. This could be via authenticated user input, misconfigured integrations, imported metadata, or any other mechanism that feeds into the search routine.

Replace all string-based shell command constructions with parameterized process execution APIs that separate the executable from its arguments, and treat all externally influenced values as data-only arguments. Combine this with strict validation and normalization of any paths or search parameters before they are used.

Adopt a defensive coding strategy that avoids shell invocation wherever possible, enforces rigorous input validation, and uses secure wrappers or libraries for interacting with the operating system. Integrate static analysis and security-focused code review into the development lifecycle to catch new instances of command construction from untrusted input.

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