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CVE-2026-38891

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Input Validation Flaw (CWE-20) in Gazebo ROS DiffDrive

CVE-2026-38891

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20

Impact:

Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An improper input validation vulnerability in gazebo_plugins v3.9.0's gazebo_ros_diff_drive.cpp component allows crafted geometry_msgs::Twist messages to disrupt normal operation.

When malicious or malformed velocity commands are processed without adequate checks, attackers can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) in systems using the affected plugin.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in ROS-based robotics or simulation environments that integrate the Gazebo ROS diff-drive plugin from gazebo_plugins v3.9.0.

It manifests when the plugin accepts and processes geometry_msgs::Twist messages from topics or nodes without enforcing strict bounds, sanity checks, or rate limits on incoming control data.

Systems that expose command topics to untrusted publishers, external networks, or loosely authenticated components are more likely to encounter this issue.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: ROS topics or interfaces that accept geometry_msgs::Twist commands for the diff-drive controller.
  • Required access: Ability to publish Twist messages to the relevant command topic within the ROS network.
  • Trigger point: Submission of specially crafted or extreme control values in Twist messages that the plugin fails to validate.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The component relies on incoming control data without robust validation of ranges, structure, or rate, allowing unexpected values to degrade performance or halt the node.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is insufficient validation of externally supplied control messages, mapping to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation.

The gazebo_ros_diff_drive component processes geometry_msgs::Twist messages and assumes they are well-formed and within acceptable limits.

Without enforcing constraints on velocity, angular values, or message frequency, the plugin can enter error states, resource exhaustion, or unstable behavior when confronted with malicious or malformed inputs.

This reflects a broader pattern where components trust upstream data sources instead of treating them as potentially hostile and verifying them against defined operational bounds.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may cause the affected node or plugin to crash or become unresponsive.
  • Systems could experience degraded performance or instability in the simulation or robot control loop.
  • Critical robotics operations can be disrupted, leading to temporary loss of control or interruption of automated tasks.
  • In multi-robot or large simulations, cascading failures could occur if the DoS propagates through dependent components.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing rigorous validation of control inputs and reducing trust in external publishers.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Validating geometric and kinematic ranges in Twist messages before applying them, rejecting values outside safe operational bounds.
  • Implementing rate limiting and sanity checks to detect abnormal message frequency or extreme control patterns.
  • Separating trusted and untrusted command sources via topic remapping, namespaces, or dedicated gateway nodes that filter and validate data.
  • Applying least-privilege principles in ROS networks so only authorized nodes can publish to critical command topics.
  • Designing the plugin to fail gracefully when encountering unexpected inputs, avoiding crashes or resource exhaustion.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a combination of runtime monitoring and code-level review:

  • Static analysis or manual review to identify message handlers that lack bounds checking or validation on Twist fields.
  • Logging and observability around command topics to surface unusually high velocities, message rates, or malformed data patterns.
  • ROS network policies or automated checks that flag nodes with unrestricted publish rights to critical control topics.
  • Use of security-focused ROS analysis tools or plugins that inspect topic interactions and enforce validation rules on control messages.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/REYu6/ROS-vul/blob/main/Gazebo%20CVE/260328211736.mp4
github.comgithub.com/REYu6/ROS-vul/blob/main/Gazebo%20CVE/gazebo_ros_diff_drive.md

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on ROS network exposure. If attackers can publish to the relevant command topic, they can potentially trigger a DoS; in tightly controlled, isolated networks, the risk is reduced.

An attacker needs the ability to send geometry_msgs::Twist messages to the diff-drive command topic, which could be possible from any node with publish rights or from a compromised upstream component.

The safest pattern is to enforce strict validation and bounds checking on all incoming Twist messages, combined with rate limiting and graceful error handling to prevent crashes or resource exhaustion.

Treat all inter-node messages as untrusted, define clear operational ranges for control inputs, enforce validation at boundaries, and use ROS security controls to restrict who can publish to critical command topics.

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