Summary
A privilege escalation vulnerability in the Protegent 360 security suite allows a local attacker to abuse the pgsecdl.sys kernel driver to gain higher system privileges.
When a non-admin user can interact with the vulnerable driver interface, this flaw may enable them to execute actions in the context of the operating system kernel, bypassing standard access controls.
A privilege escalation vulnerability in the Protegent 360 security suite allows a local attacker to abuse the pgsecdl.sys kernel driver to gain higher system privileges.
When a non-admin user can interact with the vulnerable driver interface, this flaw may enable them to execute actions in the context of the operating system kernel, bypassing standard access controls.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs within Windows environments where Protegent 360 v2.0.0.4 is installed and its pgsecdl.sys driver is loaded into the kernel.
It becomes relevant when non-privileged local users or code are able to send requests or I/O operations to the driver.
Systems that expose the driver's capabilities without strict access checks, or that allow untrusted applications to interact with it, are more likely to be affected.
This vulnerability occurs within Windows environments where Protegent 360 v2.0.0.4 is installed and its pgsecdl.sys driver is loaded into the kernel.
It becomes relevant when non-privileged local users or code are able to send requests or I/O operations to the driver.
Systems that expose the driver's capabilities without strict access checks, or that allow untrusted applications to interact with it, are more likely to be affected.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Local Windows host running Protegent 360 v2.0.0.4 with the pgsecdl.sys kernel driver loaded.
- Required access: Ability for a low-privileged user or process to open a handle to the driver or otherwise issue driver-specific I/O control operations.
- Trigger point: Sending crafted requests to the driver that cause it to perform privileged operations on behalf of the caller.
- Why exploitation is possible: The driver implements security-sensitive functionality without correctly enforcing access control (CWE-269) and exposes privileged operations through an interface that can be reached from lower-privileged contexts (CWE-782).
- Attack surface: Local Windows host running Protegent 360 v2.0.0.4 with the pgsecdl.sys kernel driver loaded.
- Required access: Ability for a low-privileged user or process to open a handle to the driver or otherwise issue driver-specific I/O control operations.
- Trigger point: Sending crafted requests to the driver that cause it to perform privileged operations on behalf of the caller.
- Why exploitation is possible: The driver implements security-sensitive functionality without correctly enforcing access control (CWE-269) and exposes privileged operations through an interface that can be reached from lower-privileged contexts (CWE-782).
Why this happens
At its core, the issue stems from improper privilege management within a kernel-mode driver.
The pgsecdl.sys driver appears to provide privileged capabilities—such as direct system access or manipulation—without robust validation of the caller's permissions.
This maps to CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where software performs sensitive actions on behalf of untrusted or insufficiently authorized users.
Additionally, the driver likely exposes functionality that should not be directly invoked by regular user-mode processes, aligning with CWE-782: Exposed Unsafe Control of System Operations, where an interface allows low-privileged code to trigger high-impact system operations.
At its core, the issue stems from improper privilege management within a kernel-mode driver.
The pgsecdl.sys driver appears to provide privileged capabilities—such as direct system access or manipulation—without robust validation of the caller's permissions.
This maps to CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where software performs sensitive actions on behalf of untrusted or insufficiently authorized users.
Additionally, the driver likely exposes functionality that should not be directly invoked by regular user-mode processes, aligning with CWE-782: Exposed Unsafe Control of System Operations, where an interface allows low-privileged code to trigger high-impact system operations.
Potential impact
- A local attacker could escalate from a standard user account to full system or kernel-level privileges.
- Malicious software running under user-level accounts may gain persistence with elevated rights.
- Attackers could disable or tamper with security controls and monitoring agents.
- System-level data and configuration could be modified, leading to broader compromise of the host.
- A local attacker could escalate from a standard user account to full system or kernel-level privileges.
- Malicious software running under user-level accounts may gain persistence with elevated rights.
- Attackers could disable or tamper with security controls and monitoring agents.
- System-level data and configuration could be modified, leading to broader compromise of the host.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on tightening privilege boundaries and hardening driver interfaces.
Useful defensive patterns include:
- Enforcing strict access control checks in kernel drivers so that only trusted, privileged callers can invoke sensitive operations.
- Minimizing exposed driver functionality to the least set required, removing or gating high-risk operations behind stronger authorization mechanisms.
- Applying least-privilege principles across security products, ensuring that auxiliary components do not introduce broader attack surfaces than necessary.
- Designing drivers to validate all user-mode inputs, including I/O control parameters, and fail safely when conditions or permissions are not explicitly met.
- Restricting interaction with security-related drivers to trusted processes and services, reducing opportunities for untrusted code to reach low-level interfaces.
Mitigation generally focuses on tightening privilege boundaries and hardening driver interfaces.
Useful defensive patterns include:
- Enforcing strict access control checks in kernel drivers so that only trusted, privileged callers can invoke sensitive operations.
- Minimizing exposed driver functionality to the least set required, removing or gating high-risk operations behind stronger authorization mechanisms.
- Applying least-privilege principles across security products, ensuring that auxiliary components do not introduce broader attack surfaces than necessary.
- Designing drivers to validate all user-mode inputs, including I/O control parameters, and fail safely when conditions or permissions are not explicitly met.
- Restricting interaction with security-related drivers to trusted processes and services, reducing opportunities for untrusted code to reach low-level interfaces.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves both code-level and system-level approaches:
- Static analysis of driver source (where available) for missing access checks, unsafe IOCTL handling, and direct privileged operations callable from user mode.
- Focused code reviews of kernel drivers and security product components, looking for paths where user input drives high-impact system calls without authorization.
- Host-based monitoring to identify unusual access patterns to the pgsecdl.sys driver, such as non-standard applications opening driver handles or issuing custom IOCTLs.
- Policy-based controls that flag or restrict installation of drivers which expose generic or undocumented interfaces to user-mode processes.
- Integration of automated security testing tools that simulate non-admin interactions with driver interfaces to surface privilege escalation conditions.
Detection typically involves both code-level and system-level approaches:
- Static analysis of driver source (where available) for missing access checks, unsafe IOCTL handling, and direct privileged operations callable from user mode.
- Focused code reviews of kernel drivers and security product components, looking for paths where user input drives high-impact system calls without authorization.
- Host-based monitoring to identify unusual access patterns to the pgsecdl.sys driver, such as non-standard applications opening driver handles or issuing custom IOCTLs.
- Policy-based controls that flag or restrict installation of drivers which expose generic or undocumented interfaces to user-mode processes.
- Integration of automated security testing tools that simulate non-admin interactions with driver interfaces to surface privilege escalation conditions.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| dreadsec. | dreadsec.co/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
