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CVE-2026-38567

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in HireFlow v1.2 Login and Search Endpoints

CVE-2026-38567

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Data Exfiltration via SQL Injection

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

HireFlow v1.2 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /login and /search endpoints, where user input is directly concatenated into database queries without parameterization.

An unauthenticated attacker can bypass authentication or extract database contents, including stored user credentials, by crafting malicious input values.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in web deployments of HireFlow v1.2 where the /login and /search HTTP endpoints accept user-supplied parameters that are interpolated into SQL statements.

It is most relevant in environments where:

  • The application connects to a relational database using dynamically built SQL strings
  • Input from login forms and search fields is not sanitized or parameterized
  • The database user account used by the application has broad read access to sensitive tables such as users, applicants, and possibly administrative data

The risk is higher when the database server is reachable from the public-facing application tier and when verbose error messages or search results reveal query output.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing /login and /search endpoints over HTTP/HTTPS
  • Required access: No prior authentication; the issue is exploitable by anonymous users
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted username, password, or search parameters that are concatenated into SQL queries
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The application constructs SQL statements by string concatenation with untrusted input
  • No use of prepared statements or bound parameters for affected queries
  • The database executes the resulting query exactly as constructed, allowing attackers to alter query logic, introduce comments, or append UNION clauses

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from unsafe construction of SQL queries in application code.

Instead of using parameterized statements, the /login and /search handlers build SQL strings by concatenating user-supplied values directly into query text.

This pattern maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where metacharacters such as quotes, comment markers, and operators are not neutralized or separated from query logic.

As a result, attackers can inject arbitrary SQL fragments that the database parses as part of the query, enabling them to bypass authentication checks or retrieve arbitrary data.

Potential impact

  • Bypass of login authentication by manipulating credential checks
  • Extraction of sensitive data, including user tables and credential records, via UNION-based or stacked queries
  • Exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) stored in application databases
  • Enumeration of database schema, table names, and column metadata
  • Potential modification or deletion of records if the database account has write privileges
  • Use of compromised credentials for further lateral movement in connected systems

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating all SQL inputs as untrusted and separating data from query logic:

  • Refactor database interactions to use parameterized queries (prepared statements) with bound variables for all user-supplied values
  • Introduce a data access layer or ORM that enforces parameterization by default and discourages raw string concatenation
  • Apply strict input validation and whitelisting for search parameters (e.g., limiting to expected patterns, lengths, and fields) to reduce injection surface
  • Minimize database privileges for the application account, granting only the specific operations required for business logic
  • Centralize query construction patterns and code reviews so that any direct SQL string assembly is rare and scrutinized

These patterns reduce the likelihood that user-controlled text can influence SQL control structures.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar SQL injection issues through a combination of code-level and behavior-based approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag dynamic SQL construction using string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting functions in request handlers
  • Code review: Look for login and search-related code paths where user input is inserted into SQL text without placeholders or binding APIs
  • Security testing: Use automated scanners or manual testing to send input containing quotes, comment markers, and UNION clauses and observe changes in responses or error messages
  • Database monitoring: Enable logging of executed SQL statements and alert on anomalous patterns, such as unexpected UNION queries or stacked commands originating from web traffic

Applying these checks in CI/CD and pre-production environments helps surface vulnerable patterns before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/StratonWebDesigners/HireFlow
github.comgithub.com/hijackedamygdala/CVE-Disclosures/tree/main/HireFlow/CVE-2026-38567
sourcecodester.comsourcecodester.com/python/18688/hireflow-%E2%80%93-complete-interview-management-system.html

Frequently asked

questions

It is broadly exploitable because it affects public-facing endpoints (/login and /search) and does not require prior authentication, allowing remote attackers to attempt injection with only HTTP access.

No prior credentials are required. The vulnerable login and search functionality can be reached anonymously, and the attack relies solely on sending crafted input values.

The safest approach is to replace all dynamic string-built SQL in the affected endpoints with prepared statements that use placeholders and bound parameters, ensuring that user input is always treated as data, not executable query syntax. Where possible, leverage a database abstraction layer or ORM that defaults to parameterization.

Establish secure coding standards that forbid direct concatenation of user input into SQL, enforce parameterized access patterns via libraries or frameworks, and integrate static analysis and security reviews into the development lifecycle to flag any deviations from these patterns early.

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