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CVE-2026-37525

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Improper Privilege Management in AGL afb-daemon Supervision

CVE-2026-37525

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Privilege Management

CWE:

CWE-269

Impact:

Privilege Escalation via Authorization Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A privilege escalation issue in the AGL app-framework-binder (afb-daemon) supervision "Do" command clears request credentials before dispatching an attacker-controlled API call.

When APIs depend on a non-NULL credential context for authorization, they may treat the missing credentials as implicitly trusted or skip checks, allowing attackers to invoke privileged operations via crafted JSON input.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs within AGL afb-daemon deployments that expose the supervision "Do" command and register APIs whose authorization decisions rely on context->credentials.

The issue manifests when:

  • The on_supervision_call handler is reachable by an attacker-controlled client,
  • The handler clears the credential context before dispatching,
  • Downstream APIs assume that context->credentials is valid and non-NULL when making authorization checks.

In such setups, APIs may execute privileged operations even for untrusted callers if they are invoked through the supervision mechanism.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The afb-daemon supervision "Do" command endpoint, typically exposed over the daemon's configured IPC or remote interface.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted JSON payloads that control the api and verb parameters to the supervision call.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of on_supervision_call in afb-supervision.c, which:
  • Calls afb_context_change_cred(&xreq->context, NULL) to clear credentials.
  • Dispatches the request via xapi->itf->call(xapi->closure, xreq) to any registered target API/verb.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The credential context is explicitly set to NULL and propagated through afb-context.c and afb-cred.c, resulting in a zeroed credential pointer. APIs that interpret NULL as "no restriction" or that fail to handle the NULL case correctly can perform sensitive actions without verifying the caller's actual privileges.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper privilege management and incorrect handling of credential context in the supervision path.

Specifically, on_supervision_call intentionally replaces the request's credential context with NULL (afb_context_change_cred(&xreq->context, NULL)) before forwarding the request to an arbitrary API and verb chosen by the attacker-controlled JSON input.

This design assumes that downstream APIs will robustly handle the absence of credentials, but many authorization checks are implemented under the assumption that context->credentials is present and valid.

As a result, authorization logic can fail open when credentials are NULL, mapping directly to CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where privilege checks are bypassed due to mismanaged or missing security attributes.

Potential impact

  • Execution of privileged API endpoints without proper authentication or authorization.
  • Escalation from a low-privilege client to roles or capabilities reserved for trusted components.
  • Modification of protected configuration or system state via internal management APIs.
  • Access to sensitive data or operations that were intended to be restricted to authenticated users.
  • Indirect compromise of other parts of the AGL system that rely on afb-daemon enforcement.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on ensuring that authorization decisions never silently accept missing credentials and that supervision paths cannot strip or weaken identity information:

  • Treat a NULL or empty credential context as an explicit failure condition in all APIs, returning an authorization error instead of proceeding.
  • Centralize authorization logic so that privilege checks occur before dispatching to target APIs, not within each API in an ad hoc fashion.
  • Avoid clearing or downgrading credential contexts when forwarding requests; instead, preserve the caller's identity or explicitly substitute a well-defined, least-privileged service identity.
  • Introduce strict role/permission mapping for supervision features so they can only invoke a constrained, well-audited subset of APIs.
  • Design APIs defensively with fail-closed behavior: if credentials or roles cannot be resolved, deny access rather than assuming a default.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code scanning:
  • Flagging calls that nullify or overwrite credential or security-context structures before request dispatch.
  • Detecting authorization checks that do not handle a NULL or "anonymous" credential path and may default to allow.
  • Focused code review:
  • Reviewing supervision or administrative pathways that can call arbitrary APIs or verbs, ensuring they enforce explicit policy constraints.
  • Ensuring all APIs that use context->credentials check for presence, validity, and required privileges, and fail closed when ambiguous.
  • Runtime and logging strategies:
  • Logging all supervision invocations with their target API/verb and effective credential context to detect anomalous usage patterns.
  • Enforcing security policies that alert on privileged operations executed with a NULL or anonymous credential context.
  • Automated policy enforcement:
  • Using CI/CD hooks or security linters to prevent changes that introduce credential-clearing behavior before authorization boundaries.

Sources

SourceLink
gerrit.automotivelinux.orggerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/src/app-framework-binder
gist.github.comgist.github.com/sgInnora/8526eedcfd826d05ef1fc45d8f405643

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how afb-daemon is exposed. If the supervision "Do" command is reachable over a network or IPC interface accessible to untrusted clients, an attacker can send crafted JSON requests to abuse the issue. In more restricted deployments, exploitation may be limited to local or already-authenticated actors.

The attacker needs the ability to invoke the supervision "Do" command and supply JSON parameters that control the target api and verb. No additional privileges are required if that interface is available, because the vulnerability arises when credentials are cleared before the authorization checks of the target API.

The safest pattern is to ensure that supervision calls preserve or explicitly validate the credential context and that APIs treat NULL credentials as unauthorized. Centralized, fail-closed authorization checks should occur before any arbitrary API is dispatched, and supervision features should be constrained to a limited set of operations.

Prevent similar problems by designing security-sensitive code around clear, consistent privilege models: never weaken or discard identity information before access checks, enforce strict handling of NULL or anonymous credentials as access-denied, and subject administrative or "meta-dispatch" features (like supervision commands) to additional security review and automated checks.

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