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CVE-2026-37460

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Input Validation (CWE-20) in FRRouting BGP UPDATE Processing

CVE-2026-37460

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Input Validation Error

CWE:

CWE-20

Impact:

Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

FRRouting (FRR) versions stable/10.0 through stable/10.6 contain a missing input validation flaw in the rfapiRibBi2Ri() function, which processes BGP UPDATE messages.

An attacker who can send crafted BGP UPDATEs to a vulnerable router may trigger improper handling of malformed data, leading to a denial of service condition such as process crash or routing instability.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in FRRouting deployments that:

  • Run versions between stable/10.0 and stable/10.6
  • Use BGP with RFAPI-related functionality, invoking rfapiRibBi2Ri() in rfapi_rib.c
  • Accept or process BGP UPDATE messages from external or internal BGP peers

The risk is higher in scenarios where BGP sessions are established with untrusted or partially trusted peers, or where route filtering and validation at the edge are limited.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: BGP control plane, specifically UPDATE message handling within FRRouting.
  • Required access: Ability to establish or influence a BGP session toward the target FRR instance (e.g., as a BGP peer or via a compromised/rogue router in the path).
  • Trigger point: Delivery of crafted BGP UPDATE messages that reach the rfapiRibBi2Ri() processing logic.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The function does not adequately validate or sanitize certain fields or structures in the incoming BGP UPDATE, allowing malformed or unexpected data to be processed in ways that lead to an internal failure and service disruption.

Why this happens

The core issue is an input validation error mapped to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation.

When FRRouting processes BGP UPDATE messages, the rfapiRibBi2Ri() function assumes that specific message components conform to expected formats and ranges. Without strict checks on lengths, value ranges, or structural consistency, crafted inputs can drive the function into invalid states, potentially causing crashes, assertion failures, or other unrecoverable errors.

Conceptually, this reflects a broader bug class where protocol parsers and route processing code treat external protocol data as trustworthy, rather than rigorously verifying every field before use.

Potential impact

  • Forced restart or crash of the FRRouting process handling BGP, disrupting routing services.
  • Loss or flapping of BGP sessions, leading to transient or persistent routing instability.
  • Traffic blackholing or rerouting due to withdrawal or loss of critical routes.
  • Cascading availability issues across networks that depend on the affected router for reachability.

General mitigation guidance

Defensive patterns against this type of issue typically focus on tightening validation at protocol boundaries and reducing trust in upstream peers:

  • Enforce strict validation of all protocol inputs within BGP UPDATE parsing and RFAPI logic, including bounds checks, structural verification, and defensive programming for unexpected states.
  • Apply robust route filtering and policy controls so that only well-formed and expected routes are accepted from peers, especially those outside direct administrative control.
  • Isolate critical routing daemons by applying least-privilege principles, resource limits, and watchdog mechanisms to reduce the impact of a single process failure.
  • Design routing architectures with redundancy and failover so that the failure of one FRR instance does not cause a complete loss of routing capability.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can combine code-centric and operational monitoring approaches:

  • Use static analysis or linters to identify protocol-handling code paths that lack boundary checks, length validation, or error handling around external inputs.
  • During code review, treat all protocol parser and RFAPI-related functions as high-risk, looking for assumptions about input structure, unchecked casts, or minimal error handling.
  • Apply runtime monitoring and logging for BGP sessions, including alerts on repeated crashes, abnormal session resets, or bursts of malformed BGP messages.
  • Utilize fuzzing and protocol testing frameworks focused on BGP UPDATE messages to uncover similar input validation weaknesses before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/FRRouting/frr
github.comgithub.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/7676cad65114aa23adde58
github.comgithub.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/21098%2C

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in typical routing environments it is remotely exploitable over the network, provided the attacker can act as or influence a BGP peer that sends UPDATE messages to the vulnerable FRR instance.

The attacker generally needs control over a BGP-speaking device or environment capable of forming or affecting BGP sessions with the target router. Direct shell or administrative access to the FRR host is not required; the attack operates through the BGP control plane.

The most robust fix pattern is to introduce comprehensive validation for all fields in BGP UPDATE messages and related RFAPI data structures before they reach core processing logic. This includes checking lengths, ranges, and structural integrity, and ensuring safe error handling paths that reject malformed inputs without crashing.

Future prevention hinges on treating all external protocol traffic as untrusted, mandating rigorous input validation, and adopting secure coding practices for network daemons. Incorporating systematic code reviews for protocol parsers, static analysis, and regular fuzz testing of BGP and related components can help catch input validation gaps early in the development lifecycle.

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