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CVE-2026-37453

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Insecure Pipe Permissions (CWE-200) in MSI Service

CVE-2026-37453

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Exposure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Information

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An insecure permissions vulnerability in the MSI NBFoundation Service allows a remote attacker to access sensitive information through the MSI_SERVICE_2 named pipe.

When the pipe is exposed with overly permissive access controls, untrusted clients can connect and read data intended only for the service or privileged users.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in environments where the MSI NBFoundation Service is installed and exposes the MSI_SERVICE_2 inter-process communication pipe.

The risk increases when the pipe is reachable by non-privileged or remote users, and when it carries sensitive system, user, or device information without additional access control or encryption.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MSI_SERVICE_2 named pipe used by NBFoundation Service
  • Required access: Ability to connect to the pipe from a local or remote context permitted by service configuration
  • Trigger point: Initiating a connection and issuing read or service-specific requests over the pipe
  • Why exploitation is possible: The pipe is configured with insecure or overly broad permissions, allowing untrusted clients to read data not intended for them

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-200: Information Exposure, where a component unintentionally makes sensitive data accessible due to weak access controls.

In this case, the NBFoundation Service appears to create or manage the MSI_SERVICE_2 pipe with permissive security descriptors, failing to enforce strict authorization or isolation for connecting clients.

This insecure permission model allows information flows that bypass intended trust boundaries between the service and remote or unprivileged users.

Potential impact

  • Remote actors can read sensitive diagnostic or configuration data from the service
  • Exposure of system or user-specific information that could aid further attacks
  • Leakage of device or environment details that can be used for profiling or targeting
  • Increased risk of privilege escalation when combined with other vulnerabilities

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on tightening access control around inter-process communication channels and reducing unnecessary data exposure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Defining strict security descriptors for named pipes and service IPC endpoints
  • Limiting pipe access to specific authenticated principals or local-only connections
  • Minimizing sensitive data sent over IPC channels and segmenting information by trust level
  • Applying least-privilege principles to services that expose remote access points
  • Auditing IPC interfaces for overbroad permissions and undocumented access paths

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection strategies often combine configuration inspection with behavioral monitoring:

  • Reviewing service code and configurations for named pipes or IPC endpoints with wide-open access control lists
  • Using static analysis or policy-based checks to flag insecure security descriptors or missing authorization checks
  • Monitoring system logs and IPC connection patterns for unexpected remote or unprivileged access to service channels
  • Incorporating security reviews of Windows services and their IPC interfaces into regular hardening and audit processes

Sources

SourceLink
csr.msi.comcsr.msi.com/global/product-security-advisories
github.comgithub.com/LittleSuRii/CVE-2026-MSIAPService

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation scope depends on how the MSI_SERVICE_2 pipe is configured and exposed. If remote connections are permitted by the environment or service configuration, remote attackers may connect; otherwise, the risk may be limited to local users with pipe access.

An attacker needs the ability to connect to the MSI_SERVICE_2 pipe, which may be granted to unprivileged or remote users if permissions are misconfigured. No direct administrative rights are required if the pipe security allows broad access.

The most robust fix is to enforce strict access control on the named pipe, ensuring only authorized, authenticated principals can connect, and to review what data the service exposes over IPC so that sensitive information is never sent to untrusted clients.

Prevention strategies include designing IPC interfaces with explicit authentication and authorization checks, applying least-privilege ACLs to all communication endpoints, minimizing sensitive data sharing across trust boundaries, and regularly auditing service permissions as part of secure configuration management.

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