Summary
A SQL injection flaw in the Free Hotel Reservation System 1.0 admin amenities module allows crafted amenity or room type identifiers to manipulate backend database queries.
When an attacker can send malicious values to the amen_id or rmtype_id parameters in the /hotel/admin/mod_amenities/index.php?view=edit endpoint, they may execute arbitrary SQL commands remotely against the application's database.
Affected context
This vulnerability arises in the administrative amenities management feature of the Free Hotel Reservation System 1.0, specifically in the index.php?view=edit handler under /hotel/admin/mod_amenities/.
It is exposed when the application accepts amen_id or rmtype_id as request parameters and concatenates them directly into SQL queries without proper input handling.
The issue generally manifests in deployments where the admin interface is reachable over the network and database privileges allow modification or reading of sensitive reservation data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the hotel reservation admin panel at
/hotel/admin/mod_amenities/index.php?view=edit. - Required access: Ability to send requests to the vulnerable endpoint; depending on configuration, this may require admin authentication or may be exposed if access controls are weak.
- Trigger point: Supplying crafted values in the
amen_idorrmtype_idparameters that are passed into SQL statements. - Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to interpolate these parameter values directly into SQL queries without using parameterized statements, robust escaping, or centralized query builders, enabling injection of attacker-controlled SQL fragments.
Why this happens
The underlying issue maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') and is closely related to CWE-74: Injection in general.
The code path in the amenities edit function likely constructs SQL queries using string concatenation or interpolation of the amen_id and rmtype_id request parameters.
Because these values are treated as trusted input and not normalized through prepared statements or strict type validation, special characters and SQL syntax are interpreted by the database engine as part of the query logic rather than as data.
This insecure pattern allows an attacker to alter the structure of the query, append additional clauses, or execute entirely unintended SQL commands.
Potential impact
- Extraction of sensitive data such as guest information, reservations, and payment-related metadata.
- Modification or deletion of amenity records, room types, and potentially other related tables.
- Creation of new administrative or application accounts in the database, facilitating persistent compromise.
- Tampering with reservation data, leading to business disruption, overbooking, or fraudulent bookings.
- In some environments, execution of database-specific functions that may assist in further server-side compromise.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on eliminating direct string-based query construction and treating all external input as untrusted:
- Adopt parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring that identifiers such as
amen_idandrmtype_idare bound as parameters rather than concatenated into SQL strings. - Enforce strict server-side validation and type checking, accepting only numeric or whitelisted values for identifier parameters and rejecting any input that does not conform.
- Use a data access abstraction layer or ORM that defaults to safe query APIs, reducing the likelihood of ad-hoc SQL composition.
- Apply the principle of least privilege to database accounts so that the application can only perform the minimal operations required for normal use (e.g., no ability to alter schema or access unrelated tables).
- Centralize input normalization and query construction patterns in the codebase to ensure consistent, secure handling of all user-supplied data.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves a combination of code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:
- Static analysis: Configure static analysis tools to flag raw SQL string concatenation that includes request parameters, especially within admin modules and CRUD handlers.
- Code review cues: During manual reviews, search for uses of
$_GET,$_POST, or equivalent request variables directly embedded into SQL queries without parameter binding or validation. - Dynamic testing: Apply automated or manual SQL injection testing (e.g., fuzzing with special characters and common injection patterns) against endpoints that accept IDs or filter parameters.
- Database monitoring: Configure database logging and monitoring to detect anomalous queries, such as those containing unexpected concatenated conditions, tautologies, or union selects originating from web application accounts.

