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CVE-2026-37271

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper BLE Authentication (CWE-287) in Fire-Boltt Watch

CVE-2026-37271

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized Control and Function Invocation over BLE

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Fire-Boltt Smartwatch FB BGS001 firmware MOY-JS14-2.0.4 suffers from improper authentication on its Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) GATT Write operations.

An attacker in radio range who can replay previously captured BLE packets may trigger smartwatch functionality without being a legitimate, authenticated user.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication channel of the Fire-Boltt Smartwatch FB BGS001 running firmware MOY-JS14-2.0.4.

It manifests when the device accepts GATT Write Requests that influence device behavior without enforcing robust authentication or session integrity checks.

The issue is most relevant in scenarios where BLE traffic can be observed or captured in advance, and where users routinely interact with the smartwatch through a paired phone or other controller.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: BLE radio interface exposed by the smartwatch (GATT services/characteristics that accept Write Requests).
  • Required access: Proximity sufficient to capture and later transmit BLE packets (typically a few meters, depending on environment and hardware).
  • Trigger point: Replaying or crafting GATT Write Requests that the smartwatch processes as if they came from an authenticated session.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The device does not enforce strong authentication or session validation on certain GATT Write operations, allowing previously captured packets to be replayed without detection.

Why this happens

The underlying bug stems from treating BLE GATT Write Requests as trusted once a generic connection has been established, without binding actions to a strongly authenticated or time-bound session.

This corresponds to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where the system fails to adequately verify the identity or legitimacy of the requester.

At an abstract level, the smartwatch firmware relies on weak or implicit trust in BLE peers and does not perform robust checks (such as cryptographic challenge–response, sequence validation, or per-session keys) before honoring state-changing write operations.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could replay valid BLE packets to trigger smartwatch functions (e.g., notifications, control commands, or configuration changes).
  • Attackers may cause unauthorized actions that inconvenience or confuse the wearer, such as unexpected alerts or mode changes.
  • Under certain implementations, attackers could alter stored settings or behavior profiles, potentially degrading user privacy or device reliability.
  • If sensitive functions are exposed via GATT, the attacker may gain limited control over device-integrated services or connected workflows.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on enforcing explicit, cryptographically sound authentication for all state-changing BLE GATT operations.

Firmware implementations can:

  • Require authenticated, bonded connections before accepting write requests to security-sensitive characteristics.
  • Tie command acceptance to per-session cryptographic keys and freshness mechanisms (e.g., nonces, sequence numbers, or challenge–response exchanges).
  • Segregate characteristics into security levels, ensuring that only non-sensitive, idempotent data is writable over unauthenticated channels.
  • Apply least-privilege principles by minimizing the set of commands accessible via BLE and limiting their effects.
  • Design device behavior so that critical or irreversible actions require explicit confirmation or stronger trust signals from the paired controller.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts typically focus on reviewing BLE security configuration and protocol flows rather than payload contents.

Useful approaches include:

  • Static analysis or manual code review of BLE stack integration, checking that all GATT characteristics performing state changes are gated by robust authentication and authorization logic.
  • Examination of pairing, bonding, and key management code paths to ensure they are consistently enforced before processing write requests.
  • Protocol-level testing using BLE sniffers and testing tools to capture, replay, and mutate GATT Write Requests, verifying whether the device correctly rejects unauthorized or stale commands.
  • Policy enforcement in firmware development pipelines that flags unsecured characteristics exposing critical functionality or missing checks for connection security flags.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/EmbdCDACHyd/CVE/blob/main/CVE-2026-37271/CVE-2026-37271.pdf
github.comgithub.com/EmbdCDACHyd/CVE/tree/main/CVE-2026-37271

Frequently asked

questions

No. Exploitation requires BLE proximity to the smartwatch; an attacker must be within typical Bluetooth Low Energy range to capture and replay packets.

Not necessarily. Under the described conditions, replayed BLE packets captured from a legitimate session can be accepted without the attacker being a valid, authenticated peer at the time of the attack.

The most robust fix pattern is to enforce strong, cryptographic authentication and per-session validation on all state-changing GATT Write operations, ensuring they only execute within an authenticated, non-replayable session.

Future designs should treat BLE traffic as untrusted by default, use secure pairing and bonding with proper key management, bind sensitive commands to authenticated sessions, incorporate replay protections (such as nonces or sequence numbers), and regularly review GATT services for inadvertent exposure of sensitive functionality.

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