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CVE-2026-36959

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Brute-Force Protection in U-SPEED N300 Router

CVE-2026-36959

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Brute-Force Protection

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Administrative Interface

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

The U-SPEED N300 router's /api/login endpoint fails to implement rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms, allowing unlimited login attempts.

An attacker on the local network can repeatedly guess administrator credentials, enabling brute-force attacks and potential unauthorized access to the router management interface.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects the web management interface of the U-SPEED N300 router (V1.0.0), specifically the /api/login endpoint used for administrator authentication.

It is relevant in environments where:

  • The router's management interface is reachable from the local network (wired or wireless)
  • Default or weak administrator credentials may still be in use
  • No upstream network controls limit access to the management interface

The issue stems from the absence of server-side protections against repeated failed login attempts, not from a flaw in the authentication protocol itself.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/HTTPS access to the router's /api/login endpoint on the management interface
  • Required access: Network-level access to the local segment where the router's admin interface is exposed (e.g., connected to the router's LAN or Wi-Fi)
  • Authentication state: No prior authentication is required to reach the login endpoint
  • Trigger point: Repeated submission of login requests with different password guesses
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint does not enforce rate limiting, progressive delays, CAPTCHA, or account lockout after multiple failed attempts, allowing automated tools to perform high-speed credential guessing without penalty.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

The authentication workflow relies solely on static credentials (e.g., username and password) but does not implement controls to detect or throttle repeated failures.

There is no server-side tracking of failed login attempts per account, source IP, or session, nor any policy that temporarily locks accounts or introduces delays under suspicious behavior.

As a result, the system treats high-volume, automated login attempts the same as normal user behavior, making credential-guessing attacks practical and scalable.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may gain unauthorized administrative access to the router if the administrator password is weak or guessable.
  • The attacker could modify router configuration (DNS, routing, firewall, port forwarding) to intercept or redirect traffic.
  • The router's firmware configuration may be altered, including enabling remote management or disabling security features.
  • The attacker could create or modify Wi-Fi SSIDs and keys, disrupting connectivity or enabling broader access to the local network.
  • Compromised router control can facilitate further attacks against devices on the internal network.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on introducing robust authentication abuse protections and hardening the management interface:

  • Implement server-side rate limiting on /api/login, such as capping failed attempts per source and per account over a time window.
  • Introduce progressive delays or backoff after consecutive failed attempts to significantly slow down automated guessing attempts.
  • Enforce temporary account lockout or challenge mechanisms (e.g., secondary verification steps) after a threshold of failures, with clear and secure recovery processes.
  • Apply credential hardening practices: enforce strong password requirements and discourage or technically prevent use of default credentials.
  • Segment and restrict management access to trusted networks only (e.g., wired LAN or dedicated admin VLAN), reducing exposure to untrusted clients.
  • Design the management interface to be secure-by-default, with minimized public exposure and management features disabled on guest or untrusted networks.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can leverage both code-level and operational monitoring approaches:

  • Static analysis / code review:
  • Identify authentication endpoints that lack logic around failed-attempt counters, lockout policies, or delay mechanisms.
  • Look for login handlers that simply validate credentials and return a response without checking request frequency or prior failure history.
  • Review configuration and middleware layers for absence of rate limiting policies on authentication routes (e.g., /api/login).
  • Runtime and log analysis:
  • Monitor authentication logs for high volumes of failed login attempts from single IPs or across many accounts in short time windows.
  • Set alerts for anomalous patterns such as steady, incremental password attempts or bursts of login traffic.
  • Security testing:
  • Include automated tests in QA or security assessments to simulate repeated login attempts and verify enforcement of throttling or lockout behavior.
  • Automated scanning tools or custom scripts can be integrated into CI/CD pipelines or firmware QA to flag authentication endpoints that do not enforce brute-force protections.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/kirubel-cve/CVE-2026-36959

Frequently asked

questions

In typical deployments, the vulnerability is exploitable from the local network where the router's management interface is exposed. If remote management is enabled and exposed to the internet, then it may become remotely exploitable over WAN as well.

The attacker needs network access to the router's management endpoint, usually by being connected to the same LAN or Wi-Fi network. No existing credentials are required to begin the brute-force attempts.

The safest pattern is to combine strong authentication hygiene with abuse rate controls: implement server-side rate limiting and lockout policies, add progressive delays after failures, and enforce strong, non-default administrator credentials, while limiting where the management interface can be reached from.

Treat authentication endpoints as high-risk interfaces and apply security requirements early in design: define explicit brute-force protection policies, adopt standard authentication frameworks that include rate limiting and lockouts, enforce strong password policies by default, and routinely test login flows under simulated attack conditions as part of security and QA processes.

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