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CVE-2026-36539

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Information Disclosure in Netis AC1200 Router NC21

CVE-2026-36539

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Credential and Sensitive Configuration Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Netis AC1200 Router NC21 exposes a CGI endpoint that returns the full router configuration as JSON without requiring any authentication.

An attacker on the local network can issue a single HTTP GET request to this endpoint and obtain administrator credentials, WiFi passwords, PPPoE and DDNS credentials, and an inventory of connected devices.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Netis AC1200 Router NC21 devices running firmware V4.0.1.4296 where the /cgi-bin/skk_get.cgi endpoint is reachable on the LAN interface.

The issue manifests in environments where:

  • The router's web management interface is accessible from the local network (wired or wireless)
  • No additional access controls (such as management VLANs or IP filters) restrict access to the CGI endpoint
  • Default device behavior allows unauthenticated access to CGI handlers for configuration retrieval

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface of the router exposed on the LAN (typically TCP port 80/443)
  • Required access: Network-level access to the local segment or WiFi network where the router is reachable
  • Trigger point: Sending an unauthenticated HTTP GET request to /cgi-bin/skk_get.cgi
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint is implemented to return comprehensive configuration data without enforcing authentication, authorization, or data minimization, resulting in direct exposure of sensitive information.

Why this happens

The root cause is an information disclosure flaw where a management API endpoint exposes sensitive configuration data without any authentication or access control.

This maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, as the design allows arbitrary LAN clients to retrieve credentials and other configuration details intended only for administrators.

The insecure pattern is a management or diagnostic handler that:

  • Aggregates highly sensitive data (admin login, wireless keys, WAN credentials, device inventory)
  • Returns it in a single response for convenience or internal tooling
  • Does not apply authentication, session validation, or role checks before servicing the request.

Potential impact

  • Compromise of the router's administrative interface using disclosed admin credentials
  • Unauthorized access to WiFi networks using exposed WiFi passwords
  • Hijacking or spoofing of WAN connectivity via PPPoE credentials
  • Takeover or impersonation of DDNS records, enabling traffic redirection
  • Complete mapping of all connected devices for targeted attacks on internal hosts
  • Use of the router as a foothold for further lateral movement inside the LAN
  • Facilitation of credential reuse attacks if leaked passwords are reused on other services

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on reducing the exposure of sensitive configuration data and enforcing strict access controls on management interfaces.

General defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing mandatory authentication for all configuration and diagnostic endpoints, with strong session management
  • Applying least-privilege principles so that no endpoint returns more data than strictly required for its purpose
  • Segregating management traffic onto dedicated admin VLANs or IP ranges, inaccessible to untrusted clients
  • Restricting the router's web management interface to wired interfaces or specific trusted subnets only
  • Implementing output filtering / redaction to avoid returning raw credentials where not absolutely necessary
  • Providing secure-by-default configurations where sensitive APIs are disabled or heavily restricted unless explicitly enabled by an administrator

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally involves testing and auditing the management interface for unauthorized data exposure:

  • Black-box testing: Use network scanning and HTTP probing from an unprivileged LAN host to discover undocumented or unauthenticated endpoints that return configuration data.
  • Configuration review: Examine router or firmware configuration for CGI handlers and API routes that provide configuration export or diagnostics, ensuring they require authentication.
  • Static / firmware analysis: When firmware images are available, inspect web server scripts, CGI binaries, and routing tables for handlers that dump configuration structures without access checks.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish internal security requirements that no management endpoint may return credentials or full configuration exports without authentication, and verify compliance during product development and QA.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/sir3ns/cve-disclosure/blob/main/CVE-2026-36539/readme.md

Frequently asked

questions

By default it is typically exploitable from the local network only. However, if remote management is enabled or the HTTP interface is exposed directly to the internet (for example via port forwarding or misconfiguration), attackers on the internet could potentially exploit it as well.

An attacker must be able to reach the router's LAN-facing web interface, which usually means being connected to the local wired or wireless network, or otherwise having L3 reachability to the LAN interface.

Require robust authentication and authorization for all endpoints that return configuration or diagnostic data, and minimize what those endpoints return so that credentials and other secrets are never exposed in plaintext responses.

Adopt a secure-by-design approach for management interfaces: design APIs under the assumption that any unauthenticated network client may attempt access, apply strict access control to all configuration endpoints, avoid including credentials in responses wherever possible, and include security testing for information disclosure in the development and QA lifecycle.

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