Summary
ChestnutCMS v1.5.10 contains a SQL injection flaw where the content parameter of the cms_content tag in the admin backend is directly injected into a SQL query during template rendering.
An attacker with access to the admin interface can manipulate this parameter to run arbitrary SQL statements against the underlying database, potentially leading to data theft, modification, or full application compromise.
Affected context
The vulnerability exists in the ChestnutCMS template rendering pipeline when admin users configure or edit templates that use the cms_content tag.
The content parameter is treated as trusted input and incorporated into a SQL query used to fetch or manipulate CMS content.
Deployments where administrators or elevated users can supply unvalidated or template-driven parameters that end up in SQL queries without sanitization are affected.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Admin backend interface and any feature allowing configuration of the
cms_contenttag or itscontentparameter. - Required access: Authenticated access with permissions to create or modify templates, blocks, or widgets that use the
cms_contenttag. - Trigger point: Rendering of a template that includes a
cms_contenttag whosecontentparameter has been crafted with malicious SQL. - Why exploitation is possible: The
contentparameter is interpolated into a SQL statement without proper parameterization or escaping, allowing attacker-controlled values to alter the query structure.
Why this happens
The core issue is that user-controllable data from the admin backend (content parameter of cms_content) is concatenated or embedded into a SQL query instead of being passed as a bound parameter.
This aligns with the SQL injection bug class: data is treated as executable SQL syntax rather than as data, enabling an attacker to escape the intended query context and append arbitrary SQL operations.
Abstractly, any pattern where template- or configuration-driven values are used to dynamically build query strings without strong separation between code and data falls under this vulnerability category.
Potential impact
- Extraction of sensitive data from CMS tables (users, content, configuration).
- Modification or deletion of content, including defacement or data loss.
- Creation or elevation of user accounts and roles at the database level.
- Bypassing application-level authorization by manipulating query predicates.
- In some environments, potential execution of OS-level commands via database-specific features or functions.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating string-based query construction and enforcing strict separation between SQL code and data:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database access paths influenced by template or configuration data.
- Introduce strict validation and whitelisting for tag parameters like
content, allowing only expected patterns (e.g., identifiers, enums, or constrained filters) rather than arbitrary expressions. - Provide a higher-level, declarative API for templates to request content so that templates cannot directly influence raw SQL.
- Apply least-privilege to the database account used by ChestnutCMS, restricting its ability to perform dangerous operations (e.g., DDL, OS interaction) where possible.
- Treat admin-supplied template content as untrusted input and subject it to the same security controls as front-end user data.
How teams detect issues like this
Effective detection usually combines code-centric and operational approaches:
- Static analysis rules to flag string concatenation or interpolation used to build SQL queries, especially where template or tag parameters are involved.
- Code review checklists that call out dynamic query construction in template engines and CMS plugin/tag systems as a high-risk pattern.
- Centralized database query logging and anomaly detection to identify unusual or complex queries originating from template rendering paths.
- Security testing (including automated scanners and targeted penetration tests) focusing on admin template configuration features and custom tags.

