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CVE-2026-35869

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Command Injection (CWE-20) in LB-link Router libshare

CVE-2026-35869

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-20

Impact:

Arbitrary OS Command Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical command injection vulnerability in the bs_SetLimitCli_info function of the LB-link Router AC450M V4.0.0 libshare.so library allows untrusted input to reach a system command execution context without sufficient validation or sanitization.

An attacker who can supply crafted data to the vulnerable parameter may execute arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the affected router process.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the router's libshare.so library, specifically within the bs_SetLimitCli_info function. It becomes risky when attacker-controlled input reaches this function through an exposed management, network, or service interface and is incorporated into a system-level command without strict validation. Exploitability depends on the vulnerable function being reachable and the supplied value being processed by the affected firmware.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A router interface or service that invokes bs_SetLimitCli_info
  • Required access: The ability to submit or influence the vulnerable parameter; authentication requirements depend on the exposed interface
  • Trigger point: Processing the attacker-controlled value in a system command execution context
  • Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient input validation and sanitization allow shell metacharacters or command expressions to alter the intended command

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper input validation, mapped to CWE-20. The affected code appears to treat externally supplied data as a valid command argument without enforcing an appropriate format, character set, or semantic constraint. When that data is passed into a shell-sensitive execution path, command separators and other control characters can change the meaning of the intended operation, creating a command injection condition.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could execute arbitrary operating system commands
  • The router may be fully compromised
  • Network traffic, credentials, or configuration data could be exposed
  • Device settings could be modified or security controls disabled
  • The compromised router could be used for persistence, lateral movement, or further attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from application-controlled operations and reducing trust in external input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer direct, parameterized system APIs over shell-based command construction
  • Apply allowlist validation for expected values, formats, ranges, and character sets
  • Keep command names and fixed arguments separate from user-controlled data
  • Reject unexpected control characters rather than attempting partial sanitization
  • Run network-facing services with the least privileges required
  • Isolate management functions and restrict access to trusted administrative networks
  • Use secure-by-default interfaces that do not expose command execution behavior to untrusted callers

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis for calls that concatenate or format external input into shell commands, process-spawning APIs, or command interpreters. Code review should examine every path from router request parameters to system-like execution functions and verify allowlist validation at the trust boundary.

Runtime monitoring may flag unexpected child processes, unusual command-line arguments, or administrative actions originating from network-facing services. CI and firmware security policies can require parameterized APIs, prohibit shell invocation for untrusted data, and enforce automated review rules for command construction.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Orcust-Automaton/Vulnerability/blob/main/LB-Link/AC450M/bs_SetLimitCli_info.md

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable if a network-accessible router interface or service passes attacker-controlled input to the vulnerable function. The exact scope depends on which interfaces expose the function and how access is controlled.

Authentication requirements depend on the affected management or service interface. Any account or network position that permits control of the vulnerable parameter may be sufficient if additional protections are absent.

Avoid passing untrusted input through a shell. Use direct parameterized APIs and strict allowlist validation for values that must be accepted.

Apply input validation at trust boundaries, prohibit command construction from external data, use least-privilege service accounts, and test firmware code paths for command injection during review and security testing.

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