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CVE-2026-35675

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Authentication Bypass / Improper Authentication in phpMyFAQ

CVE-2026-35675

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass / Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Account Takeover and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.3 contains an authentication bypass in its password reset endpoint, where password changes are permitted without verifying reset tokens or confirming ownership via email.

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach this endpoint may reset any user's password, enumerate valid usernames, and obtain plaintext passwords via email, leading to full account takeover including administrative access.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in phpMyFAQ deployments that expose the password reset functionality to unauthenticated users and rely on it to verify account ownership.

Because the implementation does not enforce proper reset token validation or email confirmation, any reachable instance where the reset endpoint is accessible over the network is potentially affected.

Environments that reuse passwords or share credentials between phpMyFAQ and other systems face additional risk of lateral account compromise.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web interface of phpMyFAQ, specifically the password reset endpoint.
  • Required access: Network access to the phpMyFAQ application; no prior authentication is required.
  • Trigger point: Submitting crafted password reset requests targeting arbitrary usernames.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The password reset flow does not enforce strong rate limiting or robust token-based verification and permits password changes without confirming the requester controls the associated email address.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, combined with a flawed password reset design.

Instead of treating password reset as a sensitive, multi-step verification flow (request, token validation, and ownership confirmation), the implementation effectively allows untrusted input to drive account changes without strong proof of identity.

This insecure pattern bypasses the intended authentication boundary and treats knowledge or guessing of a username as sufficient to alter credentials, violating standard account recovery requirements.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can reset passwords for arbitrary user accounts, including administrators.
  • Complete account takeover of phpMyFAQ instances, leading to data exposure or modification.
  • Enumeration of valid usernames based on password reset behavior.
  • Receipt of plaintext passwords via email, further weakening overall credential security.
  • Use of compromised credentials to attempt access to other systems where passwords are reused.

General mitigation guidance

A robust mitigation strategy focuses on hardening the account recovery flow and reducing trust in unauthenticated input:

  • Enforce a standard token-based password reset process: generate random, single-use, time-limited tokens bound to specific accounts and validate them before any password change.
  • Require proof of email ownership (e.g., following a link sent to the registered address) before allowing a new password to be set.
  • Introduce strong rate limiting and lockout or challenge mechanisms for repeated reset attempts targeting the same account or IP range.
  • Avoid sending plaintext passwords via email; instead send reset links and store passwords using strong, salted hashing algorithms.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to administrative accounts and separate them from regular user flows where possible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a mix of code-level and operational controls:

  • Static analysis and code review: Look for password reset endpoints that set or email new passwords without validating a cryptographically strong reset token tied to the user and request.
  • Security review patterns: Flag flows where username or email alone is sufficient to trigger credential changes, or where plaintext passwords are constructed or transmitted.
  • Logging and monitoring: Track password reset events, including source IPs and target accounts, and alert on unusual patterns such as multiple resets for different users from the same origin.
  • Automated testing: Integrate security test cases in CI that attempt password resets without valid tokens or email confirmation to ensure they are rejected.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-w9xh-5f39-vq89
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-authentication-bypass-via-missing-password-reset-token-in-api-user-password-update

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any unauthenticated user with network access to the phpMyFAQ password reset interface can attempt to exploit it.

No existing account or special privileges are required. Knowledge or discovery of target usernames is sufficient to attempt password resets.

Implement a standard, secure password reset workflow: generate a random, time-bound reset token; send it to the registered email; and require the user to prove control of that email (by following the link) before allowing a password change, while never sending plaintext passwords.

Treat password reset as a sensitive authentication flow, enforce multi-step verification with strong tokens, apply rate limiting and monitoring, and include explicit security reviews and automated tests for all authentication and account recovery mechanisms.

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