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CVE-2026-34948

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Information Disclosure (CWE-200) in Combodo iTop OQL

CVE-2026-34948

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Unauthorized data exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Combodo iTop versions before 3.2.3 may apply silo-based access checks only to classes explicitly included in an OQL SELECT clause. Under conditions where a user can submit or influence such queries, this gap could expose records or related data outside the user's intended visibility scope.

Affected context

The issue occurs in iTop's OQL query processing when silo access controls are evaluated only for classes present in the SELECT clause. Deployments using silo restrictions and query paths that reference additional classes may be affected, particularly where users can construct, modify, or invoke OQL queries through exposed application functionality.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: iTop web application functionality that processes OQL queries
  • Required access: Access to an authenticated or otherwise permitted feature that accepts or invokes affected OQL queries
  • Trigger point: Evaluation of an OQL statement involving classes not directly represented in the SELECT clause
  • Why exploitation is possible: Silo authorization checks may not be applied consistently to all classes contributing data to the query result

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an incomplete authorization check in OQL query evaluation. Access control is applied based on the classes in the SELECT clause rather than comprehensively covering all classes involved in the query, allowing silo restrictions to be bypassed for certain referenced data. This behavior maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor because information may be returned beyond the requesting user's authorized scope.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized users may view records restricted by silo policy
  • Sensitive IT service, asset, or organizational data could be disclosed
  • An attacker could correlate exposed records to infer additional business information
  • The incident could increase privacy, compliance, and operational risks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization consistently across every class and relationship participating in an OQL query.

Defensive patterns include:

  • Applying silo and object-level access checks to all query-referenced classes, not only selected fields
  • Using centralized authorization enforcement after query parsing and before result delivery
  • Restricting user-controlled query construction and exposing narrowly scoped query interfaces where possible
  • Returning only the minimum data required for the requested operation
  • Running security tests for cross-silo access and relationship-based data exposure
  • Applying least privilege to application roles and data access paths

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static and architectural review of OQL authorization paths, with attention to checks derived solely from SELECT targets. Code review should examine whether joins, subqueries, relationship traversals, and referenced classes receive equivalent silo enforcement. Dynamic testing can use separate test identities and attempt cross-silo queries, while policy enforcement can require authorization tests for every query execution path. Automated security review tools may help identify incomplete object-level authorization patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Combodo/iTop/commit/e467ca83cfcfc5ba1f1d78a99d4805e595f114ba
github.comgithub.com/Combodo/iTop/security/advisories/GHSA-cm4j-52rf-whgc

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the iTop web application when a user can access functionality that processes affected OQL queries. Exploitability depends on the deployment's exposed features and authorization model.

Usually, some level of application access is expected because silo checks operate within user-facing query functionality. The exact requirement depends on which OQL interfaces are exposed and how they are protected.

Enforce silo authorization for every class and relationship involved in query evaluation, then return only data that the requesting identity is permitted to view.

Use centralized object-level authorization, test cross-tenant and cross-silo query behavior, restrict query flexibility, and include authorization coverage in code review and automated security testing.

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