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CVE-2026-34731

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Authentication in AVideo Live Stream Termination

CVE-2026-34731

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Denial of Service against Live Streaming Functionality

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo's Live plugin exposes an unauthenticated on_publish_done.php endpoint that allows arbitrary termination of active live streams.

By combining this with unauthenticated access to stats.json.php for stream key enumeration, an attacker can remotely disrupt any live broadcast, resulting in platform-wide denial-of-service for live streaming.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in WWBN AVideo deployments that use the Live plugin's RTMP integration.

The issue manifests when:

  • The on_publish_done.php callback endpoint is reachable over the network
  • The endpoint is configured to accept RTMP "publish done" events to mark streams as finished
  • The stats.json.php endpoint is exposed without authentication, allowing discovery of active stream keys

In such configurations, termination of streams is decided solely by data in callback requests, without verifying who is making the request.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing web endpoints associated with the Live streaming plugin (e.g., on_publish_done.php and stats.json.php).
  • Required access: Network access to the AVideo instance; no user account or authentication is required if default exposure is present.
  • Trigger point: A crafted POST request sent to on_publish_done.php containing a valid stream identifier or key associated with an active live broadcast.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The on_publish_done.php endpoint trusts incoming RTMP callback parameters to finalize streams but does not enforce authentication or authorization checks. Active stream identifiers can be gathered from the unauthenticated stats.json.php endpoint, providing attackers with sufficient information to target live sessions.

Why this happens

The core issue is the absence of authentication and authorization on a state-changing endpoint that controls the lifecycle of live streams.

This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where critical operations are exposed without verifying the identity or privileges of the caller.

In this design, the Live plugin treats RTMP callback requests as inherently trustworthy, assuming they originate from a legitimate streaming server.

Without enforcing credentials, tokens, or origin checks, any network client can call on_publish_done.php with plausible parameters and force the application to mark arbitrary streams as completed in the database.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can prematurely terminate any active live stream, disrupting broadcasts in progress.
  • Repeated exploitation can effectively disable all live streaming capability on the platform.
  • Broad user-facing service disruption may damage availability guarantees and viewer trust.
  • Potential abuse during high-profile events (webinars, conferences, live announcements) to cause reputational and financial harm.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong access control for critical lifecycle endpoints and reducing the discoverability of sensitive identifiers:

  • Require robust authentication (e.g., API keys, signed tokens, or mutual trust between the RTMP server and application) for all RTMP callback endpoints that change stream state.
  • Introduce authorization checks that verify the caller is permitted to control the specific live stream (for example, tying stream keys to authenticated session context or trusted infrastructure IPs).
  • Treat stream keys and identifiers as secrets; avoid exposing them in unauthenticated endpoints and minimize the amount of information returned by statistics APIs.
  • Apply a default-deny posture for administrative and control endpoints, only allowing trusted origins or networks where feasible.
  • Implement rate limiting and anomaly detection around stream-control operations to dampen bulk termination attempts.

These patterns help ensure that only legitimate streaming infrastructure or authorized users can end live broadcasts.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level issues and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis & code review:
  • Flag any endpoint (e.g., on_publish_done.php) that performs critical state changes without explicit authentication or authorization checks.
  • Look for script files associated with "start/stop", "publish/unpublish", or "terminate" semantics that lack access control wrappers.
  • Review APIs like stats.json.php that disclose live stream identifiers or keys without any access control.
  • Runtime & logging analysis:
  • Monitor logs for frequent or anomalous on_publish_done.php calls, especially those originating from unexpected IP ranges.
  • Correlate sudden spikes in stream termination events with IP and user-agent patterns to identify potential abuse.
  • Policy enforcement:
  • Use web application firewalls or API gateways to enforce authentication/authorization policies centrally for critical endpoints.
  • Integrate automated security checks in CI/CD pipelines to detect new or modified endpoints that lack proper access control controls.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-4jcg-jxpf-5vq3

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the AVideo instance exposes the Live plugin endpoints (on_publish_done.php and stats.json.php) publicly and they are left unauthenticated, an attacker with basic network access can exploit the issue without logging in.

No. The described behavior allows unauthenticated users to enumerate active stream keys and then send crafted POST requests to terminate streams. No user account or broadcaster role is required under the vulnerable configuration.

The most robust approach is to enforce authentication and authorization on all critical stream-control endpoints. This typically involves requiring a strong shared secret or signed token between the RTMP server and the AVideo application, verifying that callbacks are from trusted sources, and ensuring that only authorized principals can terminate specific streams.

Treat any endpoint that starts, stops, or modifies the state of user-visible services as security-sensitive. Enforce authentication by default, carefully design authorization rules per resource (such as per stream or channel), avoid exposing internal identifiers through unauthenticated APIs, and include access control checks as part of code review and automated security testing.

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