Summary
A flawed password reset flow in Coolify's invitation endpoint allows a GET request with a known invitation UUID to perform a state-changing password reset.
If an attacker can trick a logged-in user into visiting a crafted invitation URL, they can reset the victim's account password to a predictable value and potentially take over the account.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in Coolify deployments that expose the /invitations/{uuid} endpoint and allow it to trigger password reset logic via a simple GET request.
It becomes risky when users are authenticated in the Coolify interface and can be induced to follow attacker-controlled links, such as through phishing emails, chat messages, or embedded content.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web interface, specifically the
/invitations/{uuid}endpoint. - Required access: Ability to obtain or guess a valid invitation UUID and deliver a crafted URL to a logged-in Coolify user.
- Trigger point: Victim's browser issuing a GET request to the attacker-crafted invitation URL while the victim is authenticated.
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint performs a state-changing password reset on GET without adequate CSRF protections or strong confirmation of user intent, enabling cross-site request forgery.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a CSRF-prone design where a state-changing operation (password reset) is bound to a GET request on /invitations/{uuid}.
Because the operation relies primarily on knowledge of the invitation UUID and does not enforce robust CSRF defenses or explicit user confirmation, an attacker can leverage the victim's authenticated session to trigger a password reset.
This maps to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), where a web application allows an unintended command to be executed through a user's browser without verifying that the request originated from a trusted interaction.
Potential impact
- An attacker may reset a victim's account password to a predictable value.
- An attacker could gain full access to the victim's Coolify account if they can log in with the reset password.
- Attackers can potentially pivot to managing servers, applications, or databases accessible through the compromised account.
- Administrative accounts could be targeted, enabling broader system misuse or configuration tampering.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on treating state-changing operations as sensitive and requiring explicit, verified user intent.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Ensuring that password reset actions use POST requests with strong CSRF tokens and are not triggered via simple GET requests.
- Introducing multi-step confirmation flows for password resets, such as explicit user interaction and secondary verification channels.
- Binding password reset operations to time-limited, single-use tokens that are hard to predict and tied to specific accounts.
- Applying least-privilege principles to password reset logic, reducing implicit reliance on ambient authentication and requiring deliberate actions.
- Designing invitation URLs so that they cannot directly cause authentication or credential changes without additional safeguards.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves analyzing how password reset and invitation flows are implemented:
- Static analysis rules or manual code review to flag state-changing logic attached to GET endpoints and missing CSRF protections.
- Reviewing routes that manipulate credentials, sessions, or invitations to ensure they require POST and include CSRF tokens and confirmation steps.
- Implementing security-focused test cases that attempt cross-origin or embedded requests (e.g., from iframes or image tags) to see if sensitive actions can be triggered without user intent.
- Using automated application security testing tools to scan for CSRF risks on endpoints related to authentication and password management.

