Summary
Signal K Server exposes an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint that allows remote modification of navigation data source priorities, such as GPS and AIS feeds.
Because the endpoint accepts user-controlled input without authentication or authorization, an attacker on the network can change which data sources are trusted, and these changes persist across server restarts.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects Signal K Server deployments that:
- Expose the HTTP API (especially
/signalk/v1/api/sourcePriorities) over a network interface reachable by untrusted users or devices - Rely on configurable source priorities to determine which GPS, AIS, or other sensor feeds are considered authoritative
- Do not have additional network-layer protections (e.g., strict firewalling, VPN-only access) around the Signal K API
Under these conditions, the server accepts priority changes for navigation data sources from any caller, and the updated configuration is both applied immediately and persisted.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The HTTP API endpoint
PUT /signalk/v1/api/sourcePriorities - Required access: Network-level ability to reach the Signal K Server over HTTP (e.g., same LAN, Wi‑Fi network, or routed segment)
- Authentication state: None required; the endpoint is unauthenticated and lacks authorization checks
- Trigger point: Sending a crafted PUT request with attacker-chosen source priority data
- Why exploitation is possible: The handler trusts inbound HTTP requests, omits authentication and authorization enforcement, and writes user-controlled values directly into the live configuration and persisted settings.
Why this happens
The core issue is a missing authentication and authorization guard on a sensitive configuration endpoint.
This maps to:
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because a configuration operation that directly influences navigation behavior is exposed without any authentication.
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because there is no permission check restricting who can modify source priorities.
At an implementation level, the server accepts request bodies on /signalk/v1/api/sourcePriorities and applies them to internal configuration without verifying the caller's identity or role.
This design assumes all callers are trusted and fails to treat navigation source configuration as a privileged operation.
Potential impact
- Attackers may cause the system to favor incorrect or malicious GPS or AIS sources, leading to inaccurate position, speed, or heading information.
- Navigation displays and downstream systems could rely on falsified or degraded-quality sensor data.
- An adversary could prioritize a failing or noisy sensor, potentially obscuring real-world conditions or creating confusion for operators.
- Persistent alteration of configuration could make recovery harder, as incorrect priorities survive reboots until manually corrected.
- In multi-system setups, manipulated priorities on one hub could propagate misleading data to other connected systems.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong authentication and authorization around configuration changes and treating navigation-related settings as privileged:
- Require robust authentication (e.g., API tokens, TLS client certificates, or session-based login) for all configuration endpoints, especially those affecting data source selection and priorities.
- Implement fine-grained access control so that only designated administrative roles can modify navigation source configurations.
- Treat configuration writes as security-sensitive operations: log them, review them, and optionally require explicit confirmation or additional checks where appropriate.
- Reduce implicit trust in the network topology by limiting API exposure to dedicated management networks or VPNs, and by avoiding direct exposure to guest or public networks.
- Apply least-privilege principles within the application, separating read-only data access from write/configuration capabilities.
- Provide secure-by-default settings where administrative APIs are disabled or locked down until explicit configuration by the operator.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can use several approaches to detect and monitor this class of issue:
- Static analysis and code review:
- Search for HTTP route handlers that mutate configuration or persistent settings and verify that they are consistently wrapped with authentication and authorization middleware.
- Flag endpoints that accept PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE on administrative paths without explicit access control checks.
- Review any API functions that change data source preferences, navigation logic, or critical system behavior to ensure they are not exposed anonymously.
- Configuration and policy enforcement:
- Maintain security requirements that all configuration endpoints must enforce authentication and role checks, validated as part of CI/CD pipelines.
- Use API gateway policies or reverse proxies to require authentication for specific paths (e.g.,
/signalk/v1/api/*) and restrict them to administrative clients.
- Runtime monitoring and logging:
- Log all configuration changes to navigation data sources, including originating IP, authentication context, and timestamps.
- Configure alerts for unusual or frequent changes in source priorities, especially from previously unseen clients or non-admin accounts.
- Use network intrusion detection or API security tools to identify unauthorized attempts to access configuration endpoints.

