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CVE-2026-33879

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Brute Force Protection in FLIP Authentication

CVE-2026-33879

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Brute Force Protection

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Account Takeover and Unauthorized Access

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Federated Learning and Interoperability Platform (FLIP) login page in versions 0.1.1 and earlier lacks rate limiting and CAPTCHA protections, leaving it exposed to automated password guessing.

Because FLIP users typically originate from external organizations with higher credential reuse risk, this weakness can enable large-scale brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks that may lead to account takeover.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of FLIP (≤ 0.1.1) where the web-based login page is exposed to users over the network, including internet-facing instances.

It manifests in the authentication component of the web application, which accepts repeated login attempts without imposing throttling, lockout, or bot-detection challenges.

The risk is heightened in environments where:

  • Users are external to the hosting healthcare organization
  • Credentials are likely to be reused across multiple services
  • Network access to the login endpoint is broadly available (e.g., public internet, partner networks)

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: FLIP web authentication endpoint (login form or equivalent API).
  • Required access: Network-level access to the login page; no prior authentication is needed.
  • Trigger point: Submitting arbitrary numbers of login attempts with different username/password combinations.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authentication logic does not enforce rate limiting, progressive delays, account lockouts, or CAPTCHA/bot checks.

This allows automated tools to perform high-volume credential guessing or credential stuffing using known or leaked username/password pairs.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

The authentication subsystem treats each login attempt independently and fails to implement controls that recognize and slow or block repeated failed attempts from the same client, IP range, or account.

Conceptually, this is an authorization boundary that assumes user behavior will be benign and human-paced, and does not apply layered defenses such as:

  • Per-username and per-IP attempt counters
  • Sliding-window rate limits
  • Temporary or permanent account lockouts
  • Challenges that distinguish humans from automated scripts

In absence of these controls, the login endpoint becomes a reliable oracle for testing large numbers of candidate credentials at machine speed.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may gain unauthorized access to FLIP user accounts through brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks.
  • Compromise of federated learning sessions, including the ability to access or influence model training and evaluation workflows.
  • Exposure of sensitive metadata, configuration, or project information associated with medical imaging AI models.
  • Potential manipulation of training contributions, which could bias or degrade model performance and reliability.
  • Use of compromised accounts as a foothold for further attacks against integrated systems or partner institutions.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on hardening the authentication workflow and reducing the value of stolen credentials.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Implementing rate limiting on login attempts per IP, per account, and per device or session token.
  • Introducing incremental backoff or delays after consecutive failed attempts for a given account or client.
  • Applying temporary account lockout or step-up verification (e.g., email or out-of-band confirmation) after repeated failures.
  • Enforcing strong password policies and encouraging or requiring unique credentials for FLIP, distinct from other services.
  • Supporting multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce reliance on passwords alone.
  • Integrating bot-detection mechanisms such as CAPTCHAs or behavioral analysis for suspicious login patterns.
  • Centralizing authentication via standards-based identity providers (e.g., SSO, SAML, OIDC) that already enforce robust brute-force protections.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both design-time and run-time indicators:

  • Static and configuration review:
  • Review authentication and routing logic to confirm the presence of rate limiting, lockout rules, and challenge mechanisms.
  • Use security-focused code scanning or linting rules that flag missing or disabled brute-force protections on login endpoints.
  • Validate that web server, reverse proxy, or API gateway configurations include throttling policies for authentication paths.
  • Logging and monitoring:
  • Instrument detailed logging of login attempts, including timestamps, IPs, user agents, and outcomes.
  • Deploy anomaly detection to identify spikes in failed logins, repeated attempts against specific accounts, or sequential username enumeration.
  • Use SIEM or log analysis tools to generate alerts on thresholds indicative of automated attacks.
  • Security testing:
  • Incorporate authentication abuse scenarios into penetration tests and red-team exercises.
  • Run automated security tests that probe for missing rate limits, e.g., by simulating high-volume login attempts and observing server behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/londonaicentre/FLIP/security/advisories/GHSA-p34f-488j-5cwv

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the FLIP login page is reachable over the network—especially if it is internet-facing—an attacker can remotely perform high-volume login attempts without needing any prior access.

Only network access to the authentication endpoint is required. The attacker does not need a valid account or any special permissions to begin brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks.

The most robust approach is to combine multiple layers of protection: implement per-account and per-IP rate limiting, introduce progressive delays or temporary lockouts after repeated failures, and add human verification (such as CAPTCHAs or step-up authentication) for suspicious login patterns. Where possible, delegating authentication to a hardened identity provider that enforces these controls by default can simplify implementation.

Treat brute-force resistance as a baseline requirement for any login or token-issuing endpoint. During design and code review, explicitly verify that rate limiting, account lockouts, anomaly detection, and MFA support are in place. Embed security requirements into development standards, and automate checks through static analysis, configuration validation, and regular security testing of authentication flows.

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