Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in SchemaHero 0.23.0 affects the mysqlColumnAsInsert function, where the column parameter is incorporated into SQL statements without sufficient sanitization.
If an attacker can influence the column definition data processed by this function, they may be able to inject arbitrary SQL into MySQL operations performed by SchemaHero, potentially leading to data exposure, modification, or disruption of database operations.
Affected context
This vulnerability arises in environments where SchemaHero 0.23.0 is used to manage MySQL schemas and migrations.
The issue is localized to the MySQL plugin (plugins/mysql/lib/column.go), specifically when mysqlColumnAsInsert is invoked to generate SQL for column-related operations.
The risk manifests when untrusted or loosely validated input can shape the column parameter (for example, through configuration, manifests, or higher-level automation that accepts external data) and is then translated directly into SQL statements executed against the MySQL database.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Schema/migration operations targeting MySQL via SchemaHero.
- Required access: Ability to supply or modify data that becomes the
columnparameter formysqlColumnAsInsert(e.g., manipulating schema definitions, manifests, or configuration feeding into SchemaHero). - Trigger point: Execution of SchemaHero workflows that call
mysqlColumnAsInsertto construct and run MySQL queries. - Why exploitation is possible: The
columnparameter is incorporated into SQL without robust parameterization or strict validation, allowing crafted values to break out of expected syntax and inject arbitrary SQL.
Why this happens
The core problem is that user-controllable or externally sourced column metadata is treated as trusted and embedded directly into SQL text.
Instead of using parameterized queries or a constrained, encoded representation of identifiers and expressions, the implementation in mysqlColumnAsInsert assembles SQL strings from the column parameter.
This pattern maps to CWE-89: SQL Injection, where untrusted input is concatenated into SQL commands, enabling attackers to modify the structure or intent of database queries.
Potential impact
- Execution of attacker-controlled SQL statements within the MySQL database context
- Unauthorized reading of sensitive tables, including configuration or application data
- Unauthorized modification or deletion of schema objects or data rows
- Disruption of migration processes, leading to failed deployments or corrupted schemas
- Potential pivoting through database-level privileges to impact other applications sharing the same database
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on treating all schema and column metadata as untrusted unless explicitly constrained:
- Prefer parameterized query construction for any dynamic values that can be represented as parameters.
- Where parameters are not possible (e.g., identifiers), enforce strict allowlists and canonical validation of column names and types, rejecting unexpected characters or patterns.
- Use dedicated escaping/quoting routines for SQL identifiers and literals provided by the database driver or a trusted library, instead of manual string concatenation.
- Introduce a clear separation between internal code-driven schema definitions and any definitions that may come from users or external sources; keep untrusted input out of low-level SQL construction layers.
- Apply least privilege to the MySQL account used by SchemaHero so that, even if injection occurs, the range of destructive operations is reduced.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can combine code-level and behavior-level approaches:
- Static analysis: Search for string concatenation or
fmt.Sprintfpatterns that build SQL fragments using column-related fields, especially inplugins/mysql/lib/column.goand similar modules. - Code review: Flag any call paths where external configuration, manifests, or user-defined schema elements flow into SQL-building functions without validation or escaping.
- Policy enforcement: Adopt coding standards that require parameterized queries or vetted identifier-escaping functions, and enforce them via pre-commit hooks or CI checks.
- Runtime monitoring: Enable database logging for schema changes and unusual SQL structures, and analyze for anomalous or overly complex statements that might indicate injection attempts.
- Automated security scanners or SAST tools can be configured with rules targeting CWE-89 patterns, focusing on dynamic SQL assembly in database integration layers.

