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CVE-2026-33507

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CSRF in WWBN AVideo Plugin Import Endpoint

CVE-2026-33507

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

CWE:

CWE-352

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via Cross-Site Request Forgery

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo's plugin import endpoint allows authenticated admins to upload ZIP files containing executable PHP code, but in affected versions it lacks CSRF protection.

Because the application also sets the session cookie with SameSite=None over HTTPS, an attacker can trick a logged-in admin into silently installing a malicious plugin and potentially achieve remote code execution on the server.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in WWBN AVideo deployments (up to and including 26.0) where:

  • The objects/pluginImport.json.php endpoint is exposed to authenticated admin users.
  • Plugin ZIP uploads are allowed and their PHP content is executable once installed.
  • The site is accessed over HTTPS with session.cookie_samesite explicitly set to None, allowing cookies to be sent in cross-site requests.

In this context, a visiting admin's browser can be induced to perform authenticated plugin uploads to their AVideo instance from a malicious third-party page.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The objects/pluginImport.json.php HTTP endpoint that accepts plugin ZIP uploads and initiates installation.
  • Required access: The victim must be logged in as an administrator in their browser; the attacker themselves does not need direct access to the application.
  • Trigger point: The admin visits an attacker-controlled web page or embedded content that automatically submits a crafted cross-site request to the plugin import endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens or use any robust anti-CSRF mechanism.
  • Session cookies are sent in cross-site contexts due to SameSite=None, so the forged request is treated as authenticated.
  • The endpoint accepts and installs arbitrary plugin ZIPs whose PHP code is executed by the application.

Why this happens

The core issue is missing CSRF defenses on a state-changing, high-privilege endpoint that accepts executable plugin uploads.

Under CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery), the application trusts any browser-sent request carrying a valid session cookie, without verifying user intent through tokens, double-submit cookies, or same-origin checks.

Combined with an explicit SameSite=None cookie configuration, the browser automatically includes the admin's authenticated session on cross-origin POST requests, allowing attacker-controlled pages to invoke privileged plugin import actions without the admin's knowledge.

Potential impact

  • Installation of a malicious plugin containing a PHP webshell, which could allow remote command execution on the server.
  • Full compromise of the AVideo application, including access to configuration, stored media, and user data.
  • Use of the compromised instance as a pivot for further network attacks within the hosting environment.
  • Tampering with platform behavior, content workflows, or authentication logic via malicious plugin code.
  • Persistence of backdoors via hidden or obfuscated plugins that survive routine administrative actions.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing robust CSRF protections and tightening the plugin execution surface:

  • Require strong CSRF tokens on all state-changing, authenticated endpoints, especially those involving file uploads and code execution paths.
  • Align cookie policies with least-privilege principles: avoid SameSite=None unless strictly necessary and pair it with other defenses such as CSRF tokens and origin checks.
  • Introduce server-side validation to ensure plugin uploads are expected, including checks on plugin metadata, digital signatures, and allowed file types, and avoid automatic execution paths when possible.
  • Consider segregating plugin code execution and limiting what uploaded plugins can do by using least-privilege permissions, hardened PHP configuration, and, where feasible, isolation techniques such as separate processes or containers.
  • Provide administrative controls to review, approve, and audit plugin installations rather than allowing blind imports triggered by a single HTTP request.

How teams detect issues like this

To detect and manage this class of issue:

  • Use static analysis or security linters to flag endpoints that:
  • Modify server state or accept file uploads, and
  • Lack CSRF token checks, origin validation, or other anti-CSRF mechanisms.
  • During code review, pay special attention to administrative controllers and upload handlers, verifying that:
  • Forms include anti-CSRF tokens and server-side validation.
  • Critical actions cannot be triggered via simple GET or unauthenticated POST requests.
  • Deploy application-level monitoring and logging to:
  • Record plugin installation attempts, including source IPs, user agents, and referring URLs where available.
  • Alert on unusual patterns, such as multiple plugin imports, uploads from unexpected admin accounts, or imports followed by abnormal file creation in plugin directories.
  • Incorporate automated security testing in CI/CD (e.g., dynamic scanners or custom integration tests) that attempt cross-site requests to privileged endpoints to ensure CSRF defenses are enforced.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d1bc1695edd9ad4468a48cea0df6cd943a2635f3
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-hv36-p4w4-6vmj

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the AVideo admin interface is reachable and an administrator browses attacker-controlled content, an attacker can trigger a cross-site request from anywhere on the internet. The attacker does not need direct access to the AVideo server, only the ability to get an admin to load a malicious page.

The attacker does not need valid credentials on the AVideo instance. They rely on the presence of a logged-in admin in their own browser and the lack of CSRF protection on the plugin import endpoint, combined with cookies being sent cross-site.

Protect all authenticated, state-changing endpoints with CSRF defenses, including server-side token validation and strict origin or referer checks, and avoid using SameSite=None unless there is a clear, justified requirement. For plugin upload endpoints, also treat uploaded content as untrusted code and apply additional safeguards such as validation, review workflows, and constrained execution.

Adopt a security-by-design approach where any new privileged action—especially those involving file uploads, configuration changes, or extensibility mechanisms—is required to:

  • Implement CSRF tokens and origin checking by default,
  • Use conservative cookie and session settings,
  • Enforce least-privilege execution for any code introduced via plugins or extensions,
  • Undergo security-focused code review and automated checks to verify that user intent is explicitly confirmed before performing critical operations.
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