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CVE-2026-33482

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

OS Command Injection in WWBN AVideo FFmpeg Sanitization

CVE-2026-33482

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Encoder Server

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo up to and including version 26.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the sanitizeFFmpegCommand() function used to build ffmpeg commands.

Because $() command substitution is not stripped and the command is later executed via sh -c in execAsync(), an attacker able to supply a crafted encrypted payload can execute arbitrary system commands on the standalone encoder server.

Affected context

This issue arises in WWBN AVideo deployments that use the standalone encoder and rely on sanitizeFFmpegCommand() in plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php to clean user-influenced ffmpeg parameters.

The vulnerable flow occurs when:

  • User-controlled or remotely supplied values are embedded in an ffmpeg command line,
  • The application calls sanitizeFFmpegCommand() to filter shell metacharacters,
  • The resulting string is passed into execAsync(), which invokes sh -c with a double-quoted command.

Under these conditions, shell features like $() command substitution remain available to attacker-controlled input despite partial sanitization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Standalone encoder API endpoints or workflows that accept encoded or encrypted payloads which ultimately influence ffmpeg command arguments.
  • Required access: Ability to submit a valid, correctly encrypted payload that the encoder accepts as input for ffmpeg processing.
  • Trigger point: Construction of the ffmpeg command string using sanitizeFFmpegCommand() followed by execution through execAsync() using sh -c "...".
  • Why exploitation is possible: The sanitizer removes some shell metacharacters (e.g., &&, ;, |, backticks, <, >), but leaves $() intact. Inside a double-quoted sh -c context, $() is interpreted by the shell as command substitution, allowing embedded commands in attacker-controlled segments to run with the encoder process privileges.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an incomplete input neutralization problem when constructing shell commands, aligning with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.

Instead of avoiding the shell entirely or using strict argument escaping, the code attempts to build a single shell command string and "sanitize" it by stripping a subset of dangerous metacharacters.

This blacklist-based approach fails to account for $() command substitution, which remains a powerful shell feature within the double-quoted sh -c environment, enabling attackers to smuggle arbitrary commands through seemingly cleaned ffmpeg arguments.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary commands on the standalone encoder server.
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting files accessible to the encoder process.
  • Abuse of the encoder host to pivot within the network or scan internal services.
  • Exfiltration of sensitive configuration, logs, or media assets.
  • Deployment of additional malware, cryptominers, or backdoors on the encoder system.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation for this class of vulnerability focuses on eliminating shell interpretation of untrusted data rather than trying to filter shell syntax.

Conceptual defensive patterns include:

  • Avoid building shell command strings with concatenation; use APIs that pass arguments as arrays (e.g., exec/proc_open with separate parameters) so the shell is not invoked.
  • If shell invocation is unavoidable, apply strict whitelisting of allowed characters and tokens, rejecting or encoding anything outside a conservative set rather than stripping known-bad patterns.
  • Treat all user-influenced ffmpeg parameters as data, not templates; avoid allowing arbitrary flags or filters unless they can be validated against a known safe schema.
  • Run encoder processes with least-privilege system accounts, restricted filesystem access, and minimal network permissions to limit blast radius in case of command execution.
  • Centralize command construction logic and subject it to security review, reducing ad-hoc string building across the codebase.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for similar vulnerabilities using:

  • Static analysis rules targeting:
  • Use of sh -c or similar shell invocation patterns.
  • String concatenation of variables into command lines.
  • Custom "sanitization" routines that blacklist a small set of shell metacharacters.
  • Code review cues, such as:
  • Functions named *sanitize*Command* that still produce a single shell string.
  • Places where ffmpeg or other CLI tools are invoked with user-derived input.
  • Reliance on regular expressions or simple replaces to filter complex shell syntax.
  • Policy enforcement, for example:
  • Mandating argument-array execution APIs by default and flagging shell-based execution for manual approval.
  • CI checks that search for sh -c usage and require justification or security review.
  • Optional use of automated SAST/linters configured to detect command injection antipatterns and suspect sanitization functions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/25c8ab90269e3a01fb4cf205b40a373487f022e1
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability is limited to contexts where an attacker can provide a payload that the standalone encoder accepts and processes into an ffmpeg command. In typical deployments, this is exposed via encoder APIs or integrations that handle user-submitted media or job definitions.

That depends on how the encoder endpoints are exposed. If the encoder API requires authenticated or trusted communication from the main platform, an attacker must first obtain that level of access or compromise the integration. The key requirement is the ability to submit a valid encrypted payload that influences the ffmpeg command construction.

The most robust approach is to stop passing user-influenced values through a shell command string. Instead, invoke ffmpeg using APIs that pass arguments as separate array elements so the shell is never invoked, and validate allowed options against a fixed schema or whitelist before execution.

Adopt a design principle that untrusted data is never interpreted by a shell. Prefer high-level libraries or direct system-call wrappers over sh -c; enforce strict validation or whitelisting for any user-controlled command parameters; and add static analysis and code review checks specifically focused on shell invocation and command construction patterns.

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