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CVE-2026-33419

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Authentication and Account Enumeration Weakness

CVE-2026-33419

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication and Account Enumeration Weakness

CWE:

CWE-204, CWE-307

Impact:

Account Compromise and Unauthorized Data Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MinIO AIStor's STS AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity endpoint previously exposed distinguishable error messages and lacked rate limiting on LDAP authentication attempts.

An unauthenticated network attacker could first enumerate valid LDAP usernames and then perform unlimited password guesses to obtain temporary STS credentials, potentially accessing S3-compatible buckets and objects.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in MinIO AIStor deployments that:

  • Use the STS AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity endpoint for authentication
  • Rely on an LDAP directory for user identities
  • Expose the STS endpoint over a network accessible to untrusted or semi-trusted clients

In such setups, application-layer responses allowed attackers to distinguish between valid and invalid usernames, and repeated authentication attempts were not constrained by rate limits or lockout policies.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-exposed STS AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity endpoint.
  • Required access: No prior authentication; ability to send repeated authentication requests.
  • Trigger point: Submitting crafted LDAP authentication attempts with varying usernames and passwords to the STS endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The endpoint emits different error responses for valid vs. invalid LDAP usernames, enabling username enumeration (CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy).
  • The endpoint does not enforce rate limiting, throttling, or lockout on failed authentication attempts, allowing unrestricted password guessing for enumerated accounts (CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts).

Why this happens

The core issue stems from how the STS AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity endpoint handles and reports LDAP authentication failures, combined with insufficient controls on repeated login attempts.

From a CWE perspective:

  • CWE-204 (Observable Response Discrepancy): The system leaks information about account existence through different error messages or response characteristics when a username is valid but the password is wrong versus when the username does not exist. This creates a side-channel that lets attackers build a list of real LDAP accounts.
  • CWE-307 (Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts): The authentication flow does not include meaningful limits on failed attempts—such as per-identity, per-IP, or global throttling, lockout, or exponential backoff—so attackers can perform high-volume brute-force password guessing without encountering technical barriers.

Together, these patterns represent a design flaw in the authentication and error-handling logic rather than a low-level implementation bug, reducing resistance to automated credential-stuffing and brute-force attacks.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can enumerate valid LDAP usernames used by the MinIO AIStor deployment.
  • Enumerated accounts can be subjected to large-scale password guessing or credential stuffing.
  • Successful guesses may grant temporary AWS-style STS credentials tied to LDAP identities.
  • With valid STS credentials, attackers can gain unauthorized access to S3-compatible buckets and objects.
  • Compromised access can lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized modification, or deletion of stored objects.
  • Valid account compromise may be used to pivot to other systems that trust MinIO-issued credentials.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation is best approached by hardening authentication behavior and minimizing information leakage from error handling.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Normalize authentication responses:
  • Return uniform error messages and status codes for all authentication failures, avoiding distinctions between "user not found" and "wrong password."
  • Avoid timing or structural differences in responses that reflect underlying LDAP lookups.
  • Enforce rate limiting and throttling:
  • Apply per-identity and/or per-source rate limits on failed authentication attempts.
  • Introduce exponential backoff or temporary bans after repeated failures.
  • Consider global caps on concurrent or aggregate authentication attempts to reduce brute-force feasibility.
  • Introduce adaptive risk controls:
  • Trigger additional verification (e.g., step-up checks) after unusual login patterns or high failure rates.
  • Prefer short-lived STS tokens and tightly scoped policies to minimize the damage from any compromised credentials.
  • Strengthen identity and password hygiene:
  • Enforce strong password policies in the backing LDAP directory.
  • Encourage multi-factor protection at higher layers wherever feasible, even if STS remains password-based.
  • Harden exposure of the STS endpoint:
  • Restrict access to known networks or intermediating API gateways where possible.
  • Terminate TLS and apply application firewall rules that detect abnormal authentication patterns.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection focuses on both design review and runtime monitoring:

  • Static and configuration analysis:
  • Inspect authentication code paths for:
  • Different error messages or codes for distinct failure modes (user vs. password).
  • Lack of rate-limiting logic, lockout thresholds, or backoff mechanisms.
  • Use static analysis or linting rules that flag conditional branches leaking authentication state and missing protections around login endpoints.
  • Code review signals:
  • Error handling that constructs user-facing messages from LDAP or identity provider failures.
  • Authentication endpoints that accept unlimited retries without explicit throttling.
  • Token issuance flows tied directly to LDAP authentication without additional safeguards.
  • Runtime and log-based detection:
  • Monitor STS login logs for:
  • High volumes of failed attempts from single IPs or IP ranges.
  • Sequential attempts across many usernames (username spraying).
  • Rapid, repeated attempts against specific usernames (password brute forcing).
  • Employ SIEM or intrusion detection systems to alert on abnormal authentication patterns.
  • Synthetic testing and policy enforcement:
  • Integrate automated tests in CI that probe authentication endpoints for distinct failure responses.
  • Use security scanning tools or DAST that simulate brute-force attempts to confirm rate limiting behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-jv87-32hw-hh99

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As long as the STS AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity endpoint is reachable over the network, an unauthenticated attacker can remotely probe it to enumerate usernames and attempt password guessing.

No. The attacker does not need existing credentials. The weaknesses enable remote username discovery and unrestricted password guessing purely through repeated unauthenticated requests.

The most robust fix is to normalize all authentication failure responses to avoid leaking account validity, and to introduce strong rate limiting or lockout controls on the STS authentication endpoint. Combined with short-lived, least-privilege STS tokens, this significantly reduces the impact of guessing attempts.

Adopt a standard authentication design that:

  • Treats all login failures as indistinguishable at the client interface.
  • Enforces rate limiting, backoff, and alerting for failed logins by default.
  • Subjects authentication components to security-focused design reviews and automated tests that check for information leakage and brute-force resilience.
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