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CVE-2026-33297

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Authorization Bypass / Insecure Direct Object Reference

CVE-2026-33297

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass / Insecure Direct Object Reference

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Authentication/Authorization Bypass for Channel Access Control

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo's CustomizeUser plugin contains a logic flaw in the setPassword.json.php endpoint that coerces any non-numeric channel password to the integer value 0 before storage.

As a result, channel-level access control can be trivially bypassed because visitors can simply use 0 as the password to unlock protected channels, regardless of the administrator's intended password.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects WWBN AVideo instances using the CustomizeUser plugin where administrators set per-channel passwords via the setPassword.json.php endpoint.

It manifests when an admin configures a channel password containing any non-numeric characters (letters, symbols, spaces), causing the server-side logic to coerce that password to the numeric value 0.

In these conditions, the effective password for the channel is no longer what was configured but the predictable value 0, weakening channel-level protection.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or semi-public channel password prompts in the WWBN AVideo platform.
  • Required access: Ability to reach the channel access form; no valid user account or special privileges are necessarily required.
  • Trigger point: Attempting to view a channel that has been configured with a password containing any non-numeric characters.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic coerces the submitted channel password to an integer, so any non-numeric password configured by an administrator is stored as 0. Attackers can simply enter 0 as the password to gain access, bypassing the intended access control.

Why this happens

The core issue is a flawed authorization control tied to incorrect data handling in the channel password-setting logic.

Instead of preserving the original password string, the implementation converts the submitted value to an integer before storage.

Under PHP-like weak typing semantics, any string containing non-numeric characters is converted to the integer 0, meaning the channel's effective password is always 0 if the admin chose any non-purely-numeric password.

This aligns with CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because the check that guards channel access relies on a weakly-typed, predictable key value derived from user input rather than a robust, faithfully stored secret.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized viewing of channels that administrators intended to protect with non-numeric passwords.
  • Exposure of sensitive or restricted video content to unauthenticated or untrusted visitors.
  • Undermining of paywall or subscription-like protections implemented via channel passwords.
  • Erosion of user trust if supposedly private channels are easily accessible.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening how authorization secrets and access control keys are handled:

  • Treat channel passwords as opaque strings and avoid implicit type coercion when storing or comparing them.
  • Use strong, one-way hashing functions for password storage instead of saving raw passwords or weakly-typed values.
  • Validate and normalize inputs without altering their semantic meaning; avoid numeric casting when the value represents a secret.
  • Implement explicit, clearly separated authorization checks that do not depend on loosely typed keys or side effects.
  • Consider replacing ad hoc channel passwords with a standardized authentication and authorization model (e.g., roles, access tokens, or ACLs) managed via a centralized access control layer.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting similar issues generally involves reviewing both business logic and type handling around access control:

  • Static analysis / code scanning: Flag locations where passwords or access tokens are cast to numeric types or otherwise coerced (e.g., (int)$password) before storage or comparison.
  • Code review cues: Examine endpoints that set or validate passwords or keys (like setPassword.json.php) for:
  • Implicit type casting of user-provided secrets.
  • Use of weakly typed equality in comparisons.
  • Authorization logic that relies on simple numeric identifiers or predictable values.
  • Unit and integration tests: Add tests that set passwords or access keys containing mixed characters and verify that:
  • The stored value matches the original secret semantics.
  • Access control behaves correctly for both valid and invalid inputs.
  • Policy enforcement: Incorporate security review requirements for any changes touching authentication or authorization paths, supported by automated tooling to highlight risky patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/7a6a94631a0a18c313894395e6eb6703cca4abd0
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-6547-8hrg-c55m

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the instance is exposed over the network and channels are protected using the affected password mechanism, a remote user can exploit the flaw by simply entering 0 as the channel password.

Typically no. The vulnerability exists at the channel access boundary. As long as the channel is reachable and its password prompt is exposed, an unauthenticated visitor can attempt to unlock it with the value 0.

Ensure that channel passwords are treated as strings, stored securely (e.g., hashed), and compared using strict, type-safe equality checks. Avoid numeric casting or any transformation that alters the meaning of the password before storage or comparison.

Adopt a consistent, centralized access control design, enforce strict typing around security-sensitive fields, and subject any password or token-handling logic to focused security review and automated testing. Additionally, incorporate static analysis rules to flag risky type coercions and weak comparison patterns in authentication and authorization code.

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