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CVE-2026-33288

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

SQL Injection in SuiteCRM Directory-Backed Authentication

CVE-2026-33288

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SuiteCRM's directory-backed authentication flow contains a SQL Injection flaw where the username is not safely handled before being used in a local database query.

An attacker with valid, low-privilege directory credentials can craft a malicious username value to execute arbitrary SQL commands, potentially escalating to full SuiteCRM administrator access.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in SuiteCRM deployments that have directory support (e.g., LDAP/AD integration) enabled and rely on local database checks during the authentication process.

The issue manifests when user-supplied directory usernames are interpolated into SQL queries without robust parameterization or escaping.

It primarily affects login flows and any additional validation logic that reuses the same unsafe query pattern, and is more relevant in environments where directory user accounts are broadly provisioned across the organization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: SuiteCRM login interface (web-based authentication endpoint).
  • Required access: Valid, low-privilege directory credentials and the ability to reach the SuiteCRM login page.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a specially crafted username value during the directory-backed authentication process.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The username is concatenated or improperly embedded into a SQL statement instead of being passed as a typed, parameterized value, allowing attacker-controlled input to alter the structure of the query.

Why this happens

The root cause is a classical SQL Injection pattern where user-supplied input is combined with SQL syntax to form a query string.

In the directory authentication path, the username value originating from the directory login attempt is not strictly validated or bound as a parameter, leading to direct injection into the underlying database query.

This behavior aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where meta-characters such as quotes, comment markers, and logical operators are not neutralized or structurally separated from user data.

Conceptually, the bug is an over-trust in the directory-sourced identity attribute, treating it as safe by default, rather than applying the same rigor as for any other untrusted external input.

Potential impact

  • Bypass of normal authentication logic and forced login as arbitrary CRM users.
  • Complete privilege escalation, including logging in as the SuiteCRM Administrator.
  • Unauthorized read access to sensitive CRM data such as customer records, deals, and activity history.
  • Unauthorized modification or deletion of CRM records, impacting data integrity.
  • Potential creation of backdoor accounts and persistence mechanisms at the application level.
  • Compromise of audit trails and logging information, hindering incident response.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict separation between SQL syntax and user data within authentication code paths, especially where directory attributes are involved.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions that involve user-controlled values, including directory usernames and identifiers.
  • Centralizing authentication-related database access in a well-reviewed data access layer that prohibits ad-hoc string concatenation of SQL.
  • Applying strong validation and normalization to directory attributes before they reach the data layer, enforcing expected character sets, lengths, and formats for usernames.
  • Minimizing the amount of logic and branching in SQL used during authentication, preferring simple existence and mapping checks over dynamic query construction.
  • Ensuring that privileged operations (such as mapping to administrator accounts) rely on explicit, server-side authorization logic rather than any user-controllable parameters.
  • Designing the system so that directory-based login does not implicitly grant or infer elevated roles without separate, tightly controlled mapping rules.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically relies on a combination of code-level analysis and behavioral testing:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag SQL query construction that concatenates variables, especially in authentication and directory-integration modules. Look for raw SQL strings incorporating username, user ID, or directory attributes.
  • Code review: During security-focused reviews, pay close attention to login flows, directory mapping functions, and any custom authentication hooks, checking that all inputs are passed through parameterized queries only.
  • Dynamic testing: Use security testing tools or targeted penetration testing to send crafted username values through the login form and observe for SQL error patterns, unusual responses, or authentication anomalies.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish coding standards that ban ad-hoc SQL string concatenation in application code, backed by automated checks in CI to prevent regression.
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor authentication logs and database queries for suspicious patterns, such as atypically structured usernames or queries containing SQL keywords where only identifiers are expected.

Sources

SourceLink
docs.suitecrm.comdocs.suitecrm.com/admin/releases/7.15.x
github.comgithub.com/SuiteCRM/SuiteCRM/security/advisories/GHSA-7g39-m4fg-vrq7

Frequently asked

questions

It is remotely exploitable as long as the attacker can reach the SuiteCRM login interface over the network. No local system access is required, but valid directory credentials are needed to reach the vulnerable path.

No. The vulnerability is exploitable with low-privilege directory credentials. The flaw lies in how the username is processed, not in the initial privilege level of the account, which can lead to full privilege escalation.

The safest pattern is to use parameterized queries or an ORM that handles parameter binding automatically, ensuring user data is never concatenated into SQL strings. Additionally, simplify and centralize authentication queries, enforce strict server-side validation of directory attributes, and avoid any dynamic query construction tied to user input.

Long-term prevention relies on secure-by-default coding practices: mandate parameterized queries, enforce code reviews for all authentication and directory-integration changes, integrate static analysis into CI, and maintain a clear policy that all external inputs—including those from trusted infrastructure like directories—are treated as untrusted until validated and properly bound.

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