Summary
The Easy PayPal Events & Tickets plugin for WordPress contains a hardcoded authentication bypass in its QR code scanning endpoint, where supplying the literal value test as a hash parameter skips proper verification.
This flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to query the vulnerable action and retrieve sensitive order details, including PayPal transaction IDs, customer emails, purchase amounts, and ticket information for any order with a known or guessed post ID.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects WordPress sites running the Easy PayPal Events & Tickets plugin version 1.3 and earlier, specifically where the QR code scanning feature is enabled or the associated AJAX/action endpoint remains reachable.
The issue manifests in the add_wpeevent_button_qr action handler, which accepts a hash parameter and uses a hardcoded value (test) as a universal bypass token.
Any deployment where that endpoint is exposed to unauthenticated users and order post IDs can be guessed or enumerated is at risk of information disclosure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Publicly accessible WordPress endpoint bound to the
add_wpeevent_button_qraction (e.g., via AJAX or direct URL). - Required access: No prior authentication is required; the attacker only needs network access to the website.
- Trigger point: A crafted HTTP request to the QR-related action, supplying:
- a chosen or guessed order
post_id - the magic
hashvaluetestto satisfy the (broken) verification logic. - Why exploitation is possible: Instead of performing a per-order, secret-based hash validation, the implementation relies on a hardcoded value that functions as a universal "backdoor" credential. Because this value is static and easily discoverable (or guessable), any remote party can bypass hash verification and fetch protected order details.
Why this happens
The root cause is the use of a hardcoded authentication token in security-sensitive logic, which aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials.
The QR code verification routine appears to treat a specific literal string (test) as a valid hash, effectively turning it into a shared secret embedded directly in the code.
This breaks the intended trust model: instead of deriving or validating the hash per order using secret data known only to the server, the application accepts a static, well-known value from any client.
As a result, the endpoint provides access to sensitive order information solely based on knowledge of this embedded magic value and a target post ID, without enforcing user authentication or proper authorization.
Potential impact
- Disclosure of PayPal transaction IDs for arbitrary orders.
- Exposure of customer email addresses associated with ticket purchases.
- Leakage of purchase amounts and ticket details (event names, quantities, and other metadata).
- Privacy violations for event attendees whose information is stored in the order data.
- Facilitation of targeted phishing or social engineering using leaked financial and contact information.
- Potential regulatory and compliance issues related to mishandling of payment and personal data.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on removing hardcoded secrets from security decisions and enforcing proper authentication and authorization around order data:
- Replace any magic values or hardcoded "test" hashes with robust, per-order tokens derived from server-side secrets, using standard cryptographic verification where needed.
- Gate QR scanning and order detail retrieval behind authenticated sessions and clear authorization checks, ensuring that only the rightful purchaser or privileged staff can access order information.
- Treat QR codes and their associated URLs as opaque tokens that do not reveal internal identifiers; avoid exposing raw post IDs when they can be guessed or enumerated.
- Introduce a least-privilege access model for event and ticket management screens, ensuring QR-related endpoints are only usable in legitimate workflows.
- Remove test or debug code paths from production builds and ensure any temporary backdoors used for development are stripped before deployment.
- Apply general secure coding practices for secrets management, such as loading secrets from configuration or environment, and never using them as a sole gate for sensitive endpoints without additional checks.
How teams detect issues like this
Effective detection combines code-level review with behavioral monitoring:
- Static analysis & code review:
- Search for hardcoded secret-like strings (e.g.,
'test','secret','password', etc.) in conditionals controlling access to sensitive data. - Flag controller or AJAX action handlers that:
- Expose order or payment information, and
- Do not enforce capability checks (
current_user_can) or other explicit authorization mechanisms. - Inspect any "hash" or "token" comparisons that do not use per-record validation or server-side secret derivation.
- Automated scanning:
- Configure SAST tools to detect patterns of hardcoded credentials and insecure authorization gates around payment/order data.
- Use DAST scanners or custom scripts to probe QR-related or AJAX endpoints with trivial tokens like
testto detect unintended access. - Operational monitoring:
- Monitor server logs for unusual or high-volume access to the
add_wpeevent_button_qraction, particularly from unauthenticated sources or repeated sequences of post IDs. - Alert on anomalous enumeration patterns over order identifiers or spikes in requests returning order/transaction payloads.

