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CVE-2026-32808

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Path Traversal in pyLoad 7z Password Verification Enables

CVE-2026-32808

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Arbitrary File Deletion

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A path traversal flaw in pyLoad's handling of certain encrypted 7z archives allows archive entry names to be treated as filesystem paths outside the intended extraction directory.

When verifying passwords for 7z archives with encrypted contents but unencrypted headers, an attacker-controlled entry name can lead to arbitrary file deletion on the host system.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects pyLoad deployments that handle encrypted 7z archives where file contents are encrypted but the headers (file names) remain visible.

The issue manifests during password verification, when pyLoad parses the 7z listing output and derives an archive entry name that it then interprets as a local filesystem path.

If this name contains directory traversal sequences or absolute paths, and the application does not enforce confinement to the extraction directory, deletion operations may target files outside the intended location.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Archive processing pipeline in pyLoad when handling encrypted 7z files with non-encrypted headers.
  • Required access: Ability to cause pyLoad to download or process a crafted 7z archive (e.g., by supplying a link or archive under user control).
  • Trigger point: Password verification step for the 7z archive, where pyLoad uses the 7z listing output to derive a file path.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The derived entry name is treated as a filesystem path without normalization, validation, or enforcement that it resides within the designated extraction directory, enabling directory traversal.

Why this happens

The core issue is improper restriction of file paths derived from external input, aligning with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

pyLoad consumes 7z listing output, which may include attacker-controlled file names, and uses those names directly as filesystem paths during password verification.

Because these paths are not sanitized or constrained to the extraction directory, traversal tokens (such as parent directory segments) or absolute paths can redirect file operations to arbitrary locations on the host, leading to deletion of unintended files.

Potential impact

  • Deletion of arbitrary files accessible to the pyLoad process on the host system.
  • Removal of configuration files, logs, or other application data, potentially causing denial of service.
  • Targeted deletion of user data managed by pyLoad, such as downloaded content.
  • In some environments, interference with other applications sharing the same filesystem, depending on permissions.

General mitigation guidance

Risk reduction generally focuses on enforcing strict path handling and treating archive metadata as untrusted input.

Useful defensive patterns include:

  • Normalizing and validating any archive-derived file paths before use, rejecting paths that escape the designated extraction directory.
  • Constructing file paths by joining a fixed, trusted base directory with a validated relative name, and verifying the result remains under that base.
  • Ignoring or rewriting archive entry names that contain directory traversal sequences, absolute paths, or other disallowed patterns.
  • Running pyLoad with least-privilege filesystem permissions so that even if traversal occurs, the process cannot delete sensitive system files.
  • Isolating extraction and temporary directories (e.g., dedicated data partitions, chroot/jail, or containerized environments) to minimize blast radius.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis: Search for code paths where archive listing output or file names are used directly to construct filesystem paths for deletion or modification, without normalization or base-directory checks.
  • Code review: Flag any logic that:
  • Parses command-line tool output (such as 7z listing) and reuses it as a file path.
  • Performs file operations (delete, move, overwrite) based on unvalidated names extracted from archives.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish guidelines that all filesystem operations must validate paths against a trusted root directory, and enforce these via linting rules or pre-commit hooks.
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor for unexpected deletion patterns (e.g., multiple deletions outside known pyLoad data directories) that may indicate exploit attempts.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if an attacker can cause pyLoad to download or process a crafted 7z archive, for example by providing a malicious download link handled by the service.

The attacker must be able to influence which 7z archives pyLoad processes and ensure that password verification is triggered; no direct shell or filesystem access is required beyond the application's normal execution context.

The robust fix is to treat all archive-derived file names as untrusted, normalize and validate them, and enforce that all file operations are confined to a predefined extraction directory, rejecting any paths that attempt to traverse outside it.

Adopt consistent path-handling utilities, codify a rule that all filesystem operations must verify paths against a trusted base directory, include tests for malicious archive names (with traversal sequences), and integrate static checks to detect direct use of unvalidated external paths.

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