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CVE-2026-32760

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Authorization in File Browser Self-Registration

CVE-2026-32760

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authorization

CWE:

CWE-269, CWE-284

Impact:

Privilege Escalation to Administrator

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

File Browser incorrectly grants full administrator privileges to any self-registered user when public signup is enabled and the default user template has admin permissions.

Under these conditions, an unauthenticated visitor can create a new account that inherits administrative rights, gaining full control over files, users, and server configuration.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in File Browser deployments that:

  • Run version 2.61.2 or below
  • Have public self-registration enabled (signup = true)
  • Configure default user permissions with administrative rights (defaults.perm.admin = true)

In this configuration, the application treats all new self-registered accounts as if they were created by an administrator, inheriting the admin permission bit from the global defaults without restriction.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public signup endpoint exposed over HTTP/HTTPS
  • Required access: None; any unauthenticated visitor can reach the registration page
  • Trigger point: Submission of the user registration form while self-registration is enabled and default permissions include perm.admin = true
  • Why exploitation is possible: The signup handler applies default user permissions verbatim to new accounts without clearing or overriding the Admin permission for self-registered users, so misconfigured defaults directly grant administrative privileges.

Why this happens

The bug stems from relying on shared default permission templates for all new users without enforcing a privilege boundary between administrator-created accounts and self-registered accounts.

Specifically, the signup handler reuses defaults.perm and does not explicitly reset or deny the Admin permission when accounts are created through the public registration flow.

This maps to:

  • CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management — the system fails to enforce appropriate privilege levels for a given operation, allowing untrusted users to obtain administrative roles.
  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control — access to administrative capabilities is granted based solely on configuration defaults, without additional server-side checks tied to authentication level or creation context.

Conceptually, this is an authorization model error where configuration convenience (default admin template) overrides the principle of least privilege for public signups.

Potential impact

  • Any internet visitor could create an account with full administrative access to the File Browser instance.
  • Attackers could read, modify, delete, or exfiltrate all files managed by the service.
  • Adversaries could create, modify, or delete other user accounts, including legitimate administrators.
  • Malicious configuration changes could enable further compromise, such as pointing storage paths to sensitive directories, weakening security settings, or establishing persistent backdoors.
  • The File Browser host system could be exposed to broader compromise if sensitive files (e.g., keys, configuration secrets, scripts) are accessible and manipulated.

General mitigation guidance

Robust mitigation focuses on enforcing least privilege for self-registered users and separating administrative roles from configuration defaults:

  • Design signup flows so that self-registered accounts are always created with the lowest reasonable permissions, regardless of global defaults.
  • Introduce explicit server-side guards that clear or ignore administrative flags for any account created through unauthenticated or semi-trusted paths.
  • Use dedicated role/permission profiles for administrators that cannot be applied via public registration endpoints.
  • Treat configuration options that affect privilege (like defaults.perm.admin) as protected, internal settings, and avoid coupling them directly to user-facing workflows.
  • Require an authenticated administrator action (or out-of-band approval) to grant or elevate any account to admin, potentially via a separate, restricted interface.
  • Apply the principle of defense in depth by limiting what an administrative account can reach on the underlying host (e.g., directory scoping, OS-level file permissions, and network segmentation).

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection combines configuration review and behavioral monitoring:

  • Configuration review: Periodically audit File Browser configuration for risky combinations, such as signup = true together with defaults.perm.admin = true or equivalent admin flags in default roles.
  • Static/config analysis: Use configuration scanning tools or policy-as-code (e.g., Open Policy Agent, custom linters) that flag deployments where public signup is enabled and default accounts possess high-privilege permissions.
  • Access review: Regularly review user lists and role assignments for unexpected administrator accounts, especially those created recently or from unknown IP ranges.
  • Log analysis: Monitor authentication and registration logs for spikes in new accounts or suspicious patterns (e.g., multiple admin-like accounts from the same IP or short time frames).
  • Automated checks in CI/CD: For infrastructure-as-code managed deployments, add automated checks that prevent promotion of default roles to admin while public signup is enabled.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/a63573b67eb302167b4c4f218361a2d0c138deab
github.comgithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.62.0
github.comgithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. When the File Browser instance exposes the signup page over the network and the affected configuration is in place, any remote visitor can register an account that becomes an administrator.

No existing account is required. The flaw specifically affects the unauthenticated self-registration flow; an attacker only needs network access to the signup endpoint.

Ensure that self-registered or otherwise untrusted accounts are always created with minimal, non-admin permissions, regardless of global defaults. Administrative privileges should only be assigned through explicit, authenticated workflows that require an existing administrator to grant or approve elevated roles.

Architect the permission model with clear separation between default user templates and administrative roles, enforce server-side guards that deny privilege escalation in public flows, and adopt least privilege as a design constraint. Combine this with configuration validation, policy checks in CI/CD, and routine audits to catch dangerous combinations like public signup plus admin-level defaults.

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