/

CVE-2026-32292

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Authentication Rate Limiting / Brute-Force Protection

CVE-2026-32292

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Rate Limiting / Brute-Force Protection Failure

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Management Interface

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The GL-iNet Comet (GL-RM1) KVM web interface does not enforce limits on repeated login attempts, allowing attackers to systematically guess credentials.

When exposed to untrusted networks, this weakness can enable brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks that may lead to unauthorized access to the device's management console.

Affected context

This vulnerability exists in the GL-iNet Comet (GL-RM1) KVM product's web-based login interface.

It is relevant when the administration panel is reachable from networks where attackers can freely send HTTP requests (e.g., the internet, shared corporate segments, or exposed management VLANs).

The issue manifests in deployments where:

  • The management interface is accessible without additional network-level controls, and
  • Authentication relies solely on username/password without additional rate-limiting or multi-factor protections.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) login endpoint of the GL-RM1 KVM web interface.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the management interface (no prior authentication required).
  • Trigger point: Repeated submission of login requests with different passwords and/or usernames.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server does not enforce practical controls on the number, frequency, or origin of failed login attempts.

As a result, attackers can automate credential guessing at scale without being blocked, delayed, or locked out.

Why this happens

The underlying issue corresponds to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

The authentication logic accepts an unlimited sequence of failed login attempts without:

  • Per-account or per-IP lockout mechanisms,
  • Backoff or throttling based on failure patterns, or
  • Centralized detection of anomalous login behavior.

In abstract terms, the design assumes that password complexity alone is sufficient for protection and omits controls that limit the rate and volume of authentication trials.

This creates a predictable, machine-targetable interface where brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks are practical.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized access to the KVM management console if credentials can be guessed or reused.
  • Full remote control over connected systems via the KVM capabilities, depending on deployment.
  • Change of device configuration, including network or access settings.
  • Pivoting into attached or managed infrastructure using the compromised management console.
  • Creation of persistent access by adding new accounts or altering authentication settings.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation efforts generally focus on hardening authentication flows and reducing the effectiveness of automated guessing:

  • Introduce rate limiting on login endpoints, such as capping attempts per IP, user, or session over a time window.
  • Implement progressive delays or backoff after several failed attempts to slow down automated attacks.
  • Apply temporary or step-up lockouts after repeated failures, requiring additional verification (e.g., local console, admin intervention, or out-of-band confirmation).
  • Encourage strong, unique passwords and, where possible, additional authentication factors or trusted network restrictions around the management interface.
  • Use network-level protections, such as firewall rules, ACLs, VPN-only access, and administrative jump hosts, to limit who can reach the management interface.
  • Design authentication flows to minimize informative error messages that enable efficient username enumeration or targeted guessing.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for excessive authentication attempts using a combination of logging and analysis:

  • Enable detailed logging of login events, including timestamp, username, source IP, and success/failure status.
  • Establish alerting thresholds for repeated failed login attempts from the same IP, subnet, or against the same account.
  • Use intrusion detection or web application firewalls to identify and block known brute-force patterns (e.g., high-rate POSTs to the login endpoint).
  • Apply log correlation across central SIEM platforms to spot distributed or low-and-slow credential-guessing activity.
  • During code or configuration review, look for authentication flows lacking:
  • Rate-limiting middleware,
  • Account or IP lockout logic,
  • Any mention of throttling or abuse-prevention design.

Sources

SourceLink
dl.gl-inet.comdl.gl-inet.com/release/kvm/release/RM1/1.7.2
eclypsium.comeclypsium.com/blog/your-kvm-is-the-weak-link-how-30-dollar-devices-can-own-your-entire-network/
raw.githubusercontent.comraw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/IT/white/2025/va-26-076-01.json
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-32292

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the GL-RM1 KVM web interface is reachable from an attacker's network (for example, exposed to the internet or an untrusted corporate segment), brute-force attempts can be conducted remotely.

The attacker only needs network access to the web interface. No prior credentials are required; they simply need to be able to send repeated HTTP requests to the login endpoint.

Implement layered defenses on authentication:

  • Enforce rate limiting and lockout or backoff mechanisms on failed logins.
  • Restrict which networks can reach the management interface.
  • Add additional verification steps when suspicious login behavior is detected.

Incorporate secure authentication design by default:

  • Treat login endpoints as high-risk and always pair passwords with rate-limiting and anomaly detection.
  • Validate that all new products or interfaces include abuse-prevention mechanisms before deployment.
  • Regularly review authentication logs and security requirements as part of change management and security testing processes.
Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.