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CVE-2026-32258

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79) in Winter CMS

CVE-2026-32258

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Stored Cross-Site Scripting

CWE:

CWE-79

Impact:

Session compromise, unauthorized backend actions, and administrative interface manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Winter CMS contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in custom Markup Styles, which are compiled by the LESS parser and rendered without adequate sanitization. An authenticated backend user with the backend.manage_editor permission may be able to inject script content that executes when backend pages are viewed.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Winter CMS backend environments where users with the

backend.manage_editor permission can create or modify custom Markup Styles.

These styles are processed by the LESS parser and subsequently rendered across

backend pages without sufficient output sanitization. Risk depends on the

ability to create malicious styles and on other users viewing affected pages.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Winter CMS administrative backend
  • Required access: An authenticated account with the backend.manage_editor permission
  • Trigger point: Creation or modification of a custom Markup Style followed by rendering of a backend page
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled style content is compiled and rendered without adequately neutralizing script-capable content

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from treating administrator-controlled Markup Style

content as trusted after processing it through the LESS parser. The resulting

content is rendered in backend pages without an appropriate context-aware

sanitization or output-encoding boundary. This maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, commonly known as

cross-site scripting.

Potential impact

  • Malicious script may execute in the browser of an authenticated backend user
  • An attacker could perform actions available to the affected user's account
  • Backend session information or other accessible data could be exposed
  • Administrative workflows and displayed content could be manipulated
  • The vulnerability could support follow-on compromise if a highly privileged user views the affected page

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating custom styles as untrusted input and

enforcing safe rendering boundaries.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Applying context-aware output encoding and sanitization before rendering styles
  • Restricting accepted Markup Style syntax to a narrowly defined allowlist
  • Separating legitimate stylesheet features from script-capable or markup-capable content
  • Limiting the backend.manage_editor permission according to least privilege
  • Requiring review or approval for custom backend assets
  • Using browser security controls such as a restrictive Content Security Policy where practical
  • Preventing unsafe content from being rendered across all backend pages by default

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this weakness through:

  • Static analysis of code paths that render user-controlled styles or markup
  • Code review signals involving dynamic HTML or CSS generation without contextual encoding
  • Tests that submit script-capable input through custom style management features
  • Monitoring audit logs for unexpected Markup Style creation or modification
  • Policy checks requiring allowlisted style syntax and security review for backend extensions
  • Automated application security testing focused on stored input rendered in authenticated interfaces

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wintercms/winter/commit/d28f0b9474af79cfaa80eeb9d691f7a7c4469720
github.comgithub.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-vgp4-2fc4-qff2

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires an authenticated backend account with the

backend.manage_editor permission or equivalent ability to manage custom

Markup Styles.

The described trigger is in the backend. Impact depends on whether an

authenticated backend user views a page where the stored content is rendered;

it is not necessarily exposed to unauthenticated public visitors.

Treat custom styles as untrusted input, constrain them to an allowlisted

syntax, and apply context-aware sanitization or encoding before backend

rendering.

Apply least-privilege permissions, test stored-input rendering in authenticated

interfaces, review dynamic asset pipelines, and enforce security policies that

prevent unsafe content from reaching browser execution contexts.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.