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CVE-2026-32228

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Authorization Bypass / Incorrect Authorization

CVE-2026-32228

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass / Incorrect Authorization

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Workflow Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An authorization flaw in Apache Airflow allows UI/API users with asset materialize permission to trigger DAGs they are not explicitly authorized to access.

Under certain configurations, this can let a lower-privileged user initiate execution of workflows belonging to other teams or environments, potentially impacting data, infrastructure, or downstream systems.

Affected context

This issue occurs in Apache Airflow environments where:

  • Fine-grained permissions are used to control access to DAGs and assets
  • Users are granted asset materialize permissions, but should not have access to all DAGs
  • DAG execution can be indirectly triggered via asset-related operations (e.g., materialization)

In such setups, the permission model can inadvertently allow users to trigger DAGs outside of their intended scope.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Airflow web UI and Airflow REST API endpoints related to assets/materialization and DAG triggering.
  • Required access: Valid Airflow user account with asset materialize permission, but without direct access to some target DAGs.
  • Trigger point: Initiating an asset materialization or related operation that results in triggering a DAG.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authorization layer does not consistently enforce DAG-level access checks when DAG execution is initiated via asset materialization, allowing users with specific asset permissions to indirectly trigger unauthorized DAGs.

Why this happens

The root cause is an incorrect authorization check (CWE-863) in the logic that connects asset materialization to DAG execution.

Instead of verifying that the calling user has explicit permission to access and trigger a given DAG, the system relies on broader or indirect permissions (such as asset materialize) to authorize the operation.

This creates a gap between the intended security policy (per-DAG access control) and the implemented checks, enabling privilege escalation through alternative execution paths.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized triggering of DAGs owned by other teams or projects
  • Execution of workflows that access sensitive data or infrastructure
  • Unintended modification of datasets or data products through unauthorized runs
  • Disruption of scheduled or controlled deployment pipelines
  • Increased blast radius if DAGs perform administrative or high-privilege operations

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening authorization boundaries and ensuring consistent permission checks:

  • Enforce per-DAG authorization checks for all execution paths, including asset-based or indirect triggers.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege when assigning asset materialize permissions; avoid broad grants to generic roles.
  • Isolate high-risk DAGs (those with sensitive data or infrastructure access) behind more restrictive roles and approval workflows.
  • Design access control such that asset-level permissions do not implicitly grant DAG-level execution unless explicitly intended.
  • Regularly review permission mappings and role definitions to ensure they reflect the actual security policy.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines access review, logging, and policy enforcement:

  • Enable detailed audit logging of DAG trigger events, including the initiating user, source endpoint (UI/API), and associated assets.
  • Periodically review logs for patterns where users without explicit DAG access are causing those DAGs to run.
  • Use static or configuration analysis to identify code paths and configuration options where asset operations can trigger DAGs without explicit DAG permission checks.
  • Incorporate automated policy checks in CI/CD that flag new features or endpoints triggering DAGs without clearly defined authorization gates.
  • During security reviews, verify that every DAG execution entry point (UI buttons, API endpoints, asset hooks) enforces the same permission model.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apache/airflow/pull/63338
lists.apache.orglists.apache.org/thread/s7c75txgt4qf2rofcn43szfwgcrzy0nj
openwall.comopenwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/17/8

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited remotely via the Airflow web UI or API, but only by authenticated users who already have valid credentials and specific asset-related permissions.

The attacker must have an Airflow account with asset materialize permission (or equivalent asset-related capabilities) but does not need direct access to the targeted DAGs. They cannot exploit this anonymously.

The safest pattern is to unify authorization checks so that every DAG execution path—whether direct or via assets—verifies explicit DAG-level permissions for the requesting user. Additionally, revisit the role design to ensure asset permissions do not implicitly grant broader execution rights.

Adopt a consistent access-control model where resources (DAGs, assets, connections) have clearly defined permissions and all code paths use shared authorization routines. Combine this with least-privilege role design, comprehensive audit logging, and regular security reviews of new UI/API functionality that can trigger workflow execution.

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