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CVE-2026-32051

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Improper Authorization in OpenClaw Agent Tool Surfaces

CVE-2026-32051

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authorization

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation within Control Plane

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw releases before 2026.3.1 expose an improper authorization boundary where tokens limited to operator.write can still invoke owner-only gateway and cron tooling via agent runs. Authenticated callers who obtain write-scope credentials can therefore escalate into control-plane actions intended only for project owners.

Affected context

The weakness appears when scoped-token deployments rely on agent executions to mediate privileged tooling. If the environment grants operator.write scope to automation or staff accounts yet expects owner-only protection on specific tool surfaces, the inconsistent gating during agent run orchestration leaves a path for privilege escalation. This is most acute in multi-tenant or SOC-style deployments where gateway and cron endpoints orchestrate broader platform changes.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Agent-run interfaces within scoped-token OpenClaw deployments
  • Required access: Authenticated token possessing operator.write scope
  • Trigger point: Invocation of gateway/cron tool surfaces during agent execution
  • Why exploitation is possible: Tool-surface authorization checks diverge from owner-only policy when routed through agent contexts

Why this happens

The defect stems from inconsistent policy enforcement between direct owner invocations and agent-mediated tool calls, allowing lower-scope tokens to ride owner privileges. This aligns with CWE-863, where the authorization decision logic fails to validate that the caller's scope matches the protection level of the targeted function.

Potential impact

  • Could schedule or cancel cron jobs controlling production workflows
  • May alter gateway configurations affecting traffic routing or federation links
  • Can perform administrative control-plane updates leading to lateral privilege expansion
  • Might mask malicious activity by executing actions under legitimate automation tokens

General mitigation guidance

Design agent tooling so downstream surfaces re-check caller scope, even when

invoked through privileged orchestrators. Partition control-plane entry points

so owner-only functions require explicit owner credentials or out-of-band

approval. Adopt least-privilege token issuance, ensuring automation scopes map

strictly to the minimum operational needs while defaulting to deny on tool

surfaces that lack matching authorization metadata.

How teams detect issues like this

Monitor audit logs for agent-initiated gateway or cron calls tied to non-owner

scopes, flagging deviations from expected scope-to-surface mappings. Enforce

policy-as-code rules or SAST policies that detect handler paths where owner

gating is bypassed. Periodic entitlement reviews combined with simulated agent

runs can validate that authorization contracts remain intact.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jr6x-2q95-fh2g
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-in-agent-runs-via-owner-only-tool-access

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, any remote caller with valid operator.write tokens in a scoped deployment can trigger it.

Attackers must already hold authenticated operator.write scope; no owner credentials are needed.

Reconcile authorization checks so agent-mediated calls enforce the same owner-only gates as direct invocations, ideally via centralized policy.

Adopt policy-driven authorization that propagates scope evaluation across orchestration layers, and routinely test agent pathways for parity with direct access controls.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.