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CVE-2026-31998

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.6)

Authorization Bypass in OpenClaw Synology Chat Channel

CVE-2026-31998

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized Agent and Tool Invocation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw versions 2026.2.22 and 2026.2.23 contain an authorization bypass in the Synology Chat channel plugin when a direct-message policy (dmPolicy) is configured as an allowlist with an empty allowedUserIds set.

In this misconfigured state, the plugin fails open and treats all Synology senders as authorized, allowing attackers with basic Synology sender access to trigger unauthorized agent dispatch and downstream tool actions.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in OpenClaw deployments that:

  • Use the Synology Chat channel plugin for interacting with agents
  • Configure the direct-message policy (dmPolicy) in an allowlist mode
  • Leave the allowedUserIds configuration empty or unset

In such setups, the plugin interprets the empty allowlist as "allow everyone," instead of "deny all," causing authorization checks to be effectively skipped for Synology senders.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Synology Chat channel endpoint integrated with OpenClaw.
  • Required access: Ability to send messages as a Synology Chat user to the OpenClaw-connected channel or bot (no special OpenClaw privileges required).
  • Trigger point: Sending a message that causes the Synology Chat plugin to evaluate dmPolicy with an empty allowedUserIds configuration.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authorization logic implements a fail-open behavior when the allowlist is empty, treating the lack of explicit entries as implicit approval for any sender instead of rejecting them by default.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization and stems from flawed authorization logic in an allowlist-based policy.

Instead of treating an empty allowlist as "no one is authorized," the Synology Chat channel plugin interprets an empty allowedUserIds set as a permissive state and bypasses authorization checks.

This fail-open design in the access control implementation allows any Synology sender to be treated as authorized when dmPolicy is configured in allowlist mode without explicit entries.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may trigger unauthorized agent dispatch flows.
  • Attackers could invoke downstream tools that agents are configured to use (e.g., integrations, automations, or external APIs).
  • Attackers can cause unexpected actions or data retrieval via tools that trust the agent's identity.
  • Increased risk of data exposure, unintended changes, or operational disruption through automated workflows.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict, fail-closed authorization behavior and hardening configuration handling:

  • Treat empty allowlists as "deny all" by default, ensuring that no user is authorized unless explicitly listed.
  • Introduce explicit configuration validation that flags or rejects dmPolicy configurations using allowlist mode without any allowedUserIds entries.
  • Implement layered authorization checks so that agent dispatch and sensitive tool actions re-validate caller privileges instead of relying on a single gate.
  • Favor least-privilege defaults for new channel integrations, requiring administrators to explicitly add authorized users or groups.
  • Provide clear documentation and UI/UX cues that highlight the security implications of empty allowlists or permissive policies.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for this class of authorization flaws through:

  • Configuration audits that scan for dmPolicy entries set to allowlist with empty or null allowedUserIds and flag them as violations.
  • Code review patterns focused on:
  • Authorization branches that treat empty collections or null values as "allow."
  • Missing fail-closed defaults in access-control logic.
  • Static analysis rules to identify authorization functions where allowlist collections are not checked for emptiness before granting access.
  • Centralized logging and monitoring of agent dispatch events, with alerts when:
  • New or unexpected Synology users begin triggering agent runs.
  • Tool actions originate from users or channels that are not explicitly associated with authorized identities.
  • Periodic policy validation in CI/CD pipelines to prevent vulnerable dmPolicy configurations from being deployed.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/0ee30361b8f6ef3f110f3a7b001da6dd3df96bb5
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7655c0cb3a47d0647cbbf5284e177f90b4b82ddb
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-gw85-xp4q-5gp9
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-in-synology-chat-plugin-via-empty-alloweduserids

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in environments where Synology Chat is reachable, any user who can send messages through the Synology Chat instance connected to OpenClaw may be able to exploit the issue, provided the affected dmPolicy configuration is in place.

The attacker needs Synology Chat sender access to the OpenClaw-integrated channel or bot, but does not need direct access or credentials for OpenClaw itself. Exploitation depends on the plugin's misconfigured dmPolicy.

Adopt a fail-closed authorization model: ensure that an empty allowlist results in no authorized users, add explicit checks for empty allowedUserIds, and require at least one valid identifier before the configuration is accepted or activated.

Design access control logic with explicit, fail-closed semantics; validate and lint configuration for dangerous defaults; enforce least privilege on channel policies; and incorporate authorization-focused code reviews and automated policy checks into the development and deployment pipeline.

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