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CVE-2026-31952

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

SQL Injection in Xibo CMS DataSet Filtering API

CVE-2026-31952

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89, CWE-184

Impact:

Authenticated Database Compromise and Data Tampering

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Xibo CMS versions 1.7 through 4.4.0 contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the API routes used for filtering DataSets.

An authenticated user with specific CMS privileges can inject crafted filter parameters to read or modify arbitrary data in the Xibo database.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in the Xibo CMS API endpoints responsible for filtering DataSets, used by the web-based content management system.

It affects deployments where authenticated users can access these APIs through features tied to DataSet or Layout management.

The risk is elevated in environments where CMS users have broad dataset access or where the CMS database contains sensitive operational or customer data.

Because exploitation occurs through application-level API calls, traditional network-layer protections alone are unlikely to block it.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Xibo CMS web API routes for DataSet filtering.
  • Required access: Valid, authenticated user account with either:
  • "Access to DataSet Feature" privilege, or
  • "Access to the Layout Feature" privilege.
  • Trigger point: Supplying specially crafted values to the API filter parameter used in DataSet queries.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled filter values are concatenated into SQL statements or bound unsafely without robust validation or parameterization, allowing injection of additional SQL fragments that the database interprets as part of the query.

Why this happens

This issue is a classic CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

The CMS API uses client-supplied filter parameters to construct SQL queries for DataSet filtering, but fails to fully neutralize or parameterize those inputs.

As a result, meta-characters such as quotes, wildcards, or SQL operators are not consistently handled, enabling an attacker to alter the structure and logic of the underlying query.

The mention of CWE-184 (Incomplete Input Validation) reflects that any validation present is either insufficient in coverage or applied too late, allowing unsafe values to reach the database layer.

Potential impact

  • An authenticated user may read arbitrary records from the Xibo CMS database, including data unrelated to their normal permissions.
  • Attackers could modify or delete DataSet content, layouts, or other CMS-managed records.
  • Integrity of digital signage content can be compromised, leading to unauthorized or malicious content being displayed.
  • Application behavior may be disrupted, potentially causing denial of service for signage operations through destructive queries.
  • In some environments, SQL injection could be combined with database-specific features to further escalate privileges or access sensitive configuration data.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on robust query construction and strict handling of user-supplied filter parameters:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, including filter expressions and dynamic search conditions.
  • Treat filter parameters as untrusted input and confine them to data values, not SQL syntax; avoid directly embedding them into ORDER BY, WHERE, or JOIN clauses without strict whitelisting.
  • Apply allow-list validation for filterable fields, operators, and sort directions, mapping API inputs to predefined, server-side constants instead of passing raw user strings to SQL.
  • Centralize query-building logic in a data access layer that enforces parameterization and input constraints by default.
  • Apply least-privilege to the database user account used by Xibo CMS so that, if injection occurs, the scope of damage is limited to required tables and operations.
  • Log and monitor unusual query patterns involving DataSet filtering to support operational detection and incident response.

How teams detect issues like this

Identifying and managing this class of vulnerability typically involves a combination of code- and runtime-focused approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or linters to flag string concatenation or interpolation used to build SQL queries, especially when incorporating request parameters such as filters, search terms, or sort fields.
  • Code review: During manual review, pay attention to controller and API handler methods that accept filter or search arguments and trace their flow into query-building functions; look for the absence of parameter binding or whitelisting patterns.
  • Abstraction enforcement: Use ORM features or centralized query builders that enforce parameterization and restrict raw SQL usage; periodically audit exceptions to these abstractions.
  • Runtime monitoring: Enable SQL query logging in non-production environments and sample production logs (with appropriate privacy controls) for anomalous queries containing repeated quotes, comment markers, or concatenated clauses suggestive of injection attempts.
  • Security testing: Run automated and manual security testing (DAST, API fuzzing) targeting filter-related endpoints to detect injection behavior, such as error-based responses or unexpected data leakage when special characters are supplied.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dasgarner/xibo-cms/commit/b8d25fe6cb0232b645c3850afdc2499b0e46c1e6
github.comgithub.com/xibosignage/xibo-cms/commit/87e0a26b0c06e349561a6becdc00f3bb01259736
github.comgithub.com/xibosignage/xibo-cms/commit/ed213cb4f42d4f50cf8012e01e95bb70127fc6a4
github.comgithub.com/xibosignage/xibo-cms/releases/tag/4.4.1
github.comgithub.com/xibosignage/xibo-cms/security/advisories/GHSA-rq92-f6fv-3629

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but it requires an authenticated session. Any user who can reach the Xibo CMS API over the network and holds the necessary privileges can attempt exploitation via crafted API requests.

The attacker needs a valid Xibo CMS account with either the "Access to DataSet Feature" privilege or the "Access to the Layout Feature" privilege. Anonymous or unauthenticated users cannot directly exploit this flaw.

The most reliable fix is to refactor all affected queries to use parameterized statements or ORM methods, combined with strict whitelisting of allowed filter fields and operators. Remove or heavily constrain any use of dynamically constructed SQL based on raw client input.

Adopt a development standard that forbids raw SQL string concatenation with user input, enforce this with static analysis and code review checklists, and centralize query logic in vetted helper functions or repositories. Pair these practices with principle-of-least-privilege database accounts and regular security testing of API endpoints that accept filter or search parameters.

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