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CVE-2026-31941

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

SSRF in Chamilo LMS Social Wall Open Graph Fetcher

CVE-2026-31941

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Internal network access and potential information disclosure via forged server-side HTTP requests

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Chamilo LMS contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Social Wall feature, where a user-controlled URL is fetched server-side without proper network-level validation.

An authenticated attacker can abuse this behavior to make the Chamilo server issue arbitrary HTTP requests to internal services, probe internal ports, or reach cloud metadata endpoints under certain network configurations.

Affected context

This issue occurs in Chamilo LMS deployments that:

  • Expose the Social Wall feature to authenticated users
  • Allow the read_url_with_open_graph endpoint to accept arbitrary URLs via the social_wall_new_msg_main POST parameter
  • Run Chamilo on infrastructure that has network access to internal services or cloud metadata endpoints

The vulnerability is most relevant where the application server can reach internal-only HTTP services, such as database admin consoles, internal APIs, or instance metadata services.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP endpoint backing the Social Wall, specifically the read_url_with_open_graph handler.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated user account with permission to post or interact with the Social Wall.
  • Trigger point: Supplying a crafted URL in the social_wall_new_msg_main POST parameter that points to an internal or sensitive HTTP endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server performs two HTTP requests to the user-supplied URL without restricting hostnames, IP ranges, or protocols, allowing the attacker to pivot the server as a proxy to internal network resources.

Why this happens

The vulnerability stems from the application trusting a user-supplied URL and using it directly in server-initiated HTTP requests without applying network or destination validation.

This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where an attacker can cause the server to send crafted requests to unexpected locations by controlling parameters used in outbound requests.

Conceptually, the bug class is: "unvalidated user-controlled URL in server-side HTTP client calls," lacking checks such as internal IP blocking, allowlists, or metadata endpoint protections.

Potential impact

  • The attacker may scan internal IP ranges and ports reachable from the Chamilo server.
  • The attacker may access internal HTTP services not directly exposed to the internet (e.g., admin panels, internal APIs, or monitoring endpoints).
  • The attacker may retrieve sensitive configuration or credentials from cloud instance metadata services, depending on the environment.
  • The attacker may use the server as a stepping stone for further reconnaissance or lateral movement within the network.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically focuses on reducing trust in user-controlled URLs and constraining outbound requests:

  • Introduce strict URL validation, including allowlisting of permitted domains or paths and rejection of raw IP addresses and internal hostnames.
  • Implement network-level egress controls or service-level policies that prevent the application from reaching sensitive internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
  • Normalize and parse URLs server-side, then enforce rules against private IP ranges (e.g., RFC1918), loopback, link-local, and metadata service addresses.
  • Where possible, isolate components that need outbound HTTP access into tightly controlled network segments and run them with least-privilege network permissions.
  • Prefer design patterns that avoid fetching arbitrary user-specified URLs altogether, or limit them to a curated set of safe remote resources.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection often combines code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis rules or linters that flag usage of HTTP client libraries where request targets are derived directly from user input without validation.
  • Code review checklists that require scrutiny of any feature that fetches external URLs or processes Open Graph or preview metadata.
  • Application-layer monitoring that looks for unusual outbound traffic patterns originating from the Chamilo server to internal IP ranges or metadata endpoints.
  • Web application firewalls (WAF) or reverse proxies that apply SSRF-specific rules, such as blocking requests to known internal address spaces or metadata URLs.
  • Periodic security tests and fuzzing of URL-accepting parameters to identify unprotected SSRF vectors.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/commit/e3790c5f0ff3b4dc547c2099fadf5c438c1bb265
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/commit/ea6b7b7e90580c9b01dc4bcafe4ad737061e0ead
github.comgithub.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms/security/advisories/GHSA-q74c-mx8x-489h

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but it typically requires an authenticated account in Chamilo with access to the Social Wall. Once authenticated, the attacker can submit crafted URLs that the server will request on their behalf, including internal or otherwise unreachable resources.

The attacker generally needs valid application-level credentials and the ability to interact with the Social Wall feature. No direct network-level access to internal services is required, because the server issues the requests.

The safest pattern is to avoid fetching arbitrary user-supplied URLs. If URL fetching is essential, restrict destinations using domain allowlists, robust URL parsing, and explicit blocking of internal networks and metadata endpoints, combined with network egress controls.

Treat all user-controlled URLs as untrusted, enforce strict validation and allowlisting, and design network architecture so that application servers cannot reach sensitive management planes or internal-only services without explicit, policy-controlled paths. Incorporate SSRF checks into code review, threat modeling, and automated testing pipelines.

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