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CVE-2026-31903

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts

CVE-2026-31903

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Denial of Service and Brute-Force Account Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A missing rate limiting control on authentication requests in the WebSocket API allows attackers to send an unbounded number of login attempts.

Under sustained abuse, this can lead to denial-of-service conditions that interfere with legitimate charger telemetry, or enable brute-force attempts to gain unauthorized access.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in systems that use a WebSocket-based API for authentication or session establishment and do not enforce per-identity or per-origin limits on login attempts.

It is most relevant where WebSocket connections are used to carry charger telemetry or control messages, and where authentication failures do not trigger backoff, lockout, or throttling.

The issue is present when the server accepts repeated authentication attempts without adequate delay, blocking, or enforcement policies, allowing abuse of shared infrastructure resources.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or semi-public WebSocket endpoint handling authentication or session setup.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to connect to the WebSocket service (e.g., internet, VPN, or internal network access depending on deployment).
  • Trigger point: Sending a high volume of authentication requests over one or more WebSocket connections, or systematically iterating credentials.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server lacks mechanisms to limit authentication frequency, track failed attempts, or enforce lockouts, enabling both volumetric DoS using login flows and high-speed brute-force guessing.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

The authentication logic does not incorporate controls such as rate limiting, exponential backoff, lockout after repeated failures, or per-client throttling.

In a WebSocket context, long-lived connections can be abused to rapidly send authentication messages without incurring connection setup cost, amplifying brute-force and DoS potential.

By failing to treat authentication attempts as a sensitive and finite resource, the design allows unlimited retries and resource consumption.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may cause denial-of-service by flooding authentication requests, degrading or blocking legitimate charger telemetry processing.
  • Legitimate telemetry messages could be delayed, dropped, or mis-routed due to resource exhaustion in backend services.
  • Brute-force attacks may succeed in guessing credentials and gaining unauthorized access to accounts or control interfaces.
  • Compromised access could allow viewing or manipulating charger data, configurations, or control commands, depending on the system's authorization model.
  • Infrastructure resources such as CPU, memory, or connection pools can be exhausted, impacting other services sharing the same environment.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining authentication attempts and limiting the impact of abusive clients:

  • Introduce rate limiting on authentication requests per IP, user/account, device identifier, and/or WebSocket connection.
  • Apply progressive delays or exponential backoff after consecutive failed attempts to slow brute-force attempts.
  • Implement temporary lockouts, step-up verification, or additional verification challenges after repeated failures.
  • Separate telemetry and control channels from authentication-heavy endpoints to reduce cross-impact on critical data flows.
  • Enforce least-privilege access for authenticated sessions so that any compromised account has minimized operational impact.
  • Design WebSocket handlers to enforce server-side timeouts, message quotas, and per-connection resource budgets.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine runtime monitoring with development-time controls:

  • Use static analysis and code review checklists to verify that all authentication flows apply rate limiting and failed-attempt handling, including WebSocket-specific paths.
  • Inspect server configuration and gateway policies (e.g., API gateway, reverse proxy, WAF) for authentication endpoints lacking throttling rules.
  • Monitor authentication logs and telemetry for unusually high failure rates, repeated attempts from the same client or network range, or spikes in login volume.
  • Establish alerts based on thresholds for failed logins per account, IP, or device to detect ongoing brute-force activity or DoS attempts.
  • Employ automated security testing or fuzzing that stresses authentication endpoints to validate that throttling and lockout behavior triggers as expected.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-078-08.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-078-08

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the WebSocket API is exposed over a network (such as the public internet or a corporate VPN), an attacker can remotely send large numbers of authentication attempts to exploit the lack of rate limiting.

The attacker generally only needs network-level access to the WebSocket endpoint; no prior authentication is required if the authentication mechanism itself is the target of abuse.

Implement consistent, server-side rate limiting and failed-attempt handling on all authentication flows, including WebSocket-based ones, and introduce lockout or step-up verification for repeated failures so that unlimited retries are no longer possible.

Treat authentication as a security-critical resource in design reviews, mandate rate limiting and lockout requirements in your architecture standards, and enforce them through code review, automated tests, and gateway policies that specifically cover real-time protocols like WebSockets.

Find out what's already
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