Summary
Shopware's store-api.order endpoint contained an insufficient authorization check on filter types used by unauthenticated customers in the deepLinkCode flow.
Under certain conditions, this could allow a user to access order data belonging to other customers via crafted requests that bypass proper ownership validation.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Shopware's public Store API, specifically the store-api.order endpoint that supports deep link access via deepLinkCode.
It is relevant where:
- The Store API is exposed to unauthenticated users (typical for storefronts)
- Deep link functionality for order access is enabled
- Backends rely on deepLinkCode and filter parameters to determine which order to return
In these setups, insufficient validation of filter types for unauthenticated requests can lead to cross-customer data exposure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public-facing Store API (
store-api.orderendpoint) reachable over the network. - Required access: No prior authentication required; ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the Store API.
- Trigger point: Invocation of the deepLinkCode-based order retrieval logic with manipulated filter parameters or types.
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks tied to deep link order retrieval do not fully constrain which orders can be queried by an unauthenticated caller, allowing filters that are not properly bound to the requesting user or deep link context.
Why this happens
This issue stems from incomplete authorization enforcement in the order retrieval logic used by the Store API's deep link mechanism.
Instead of strictly binding the returned data to the authenticated principal or to a scoped, validated deepLinkCode token, the implementation allows filter types or parameters that can expand the query beyond the intended order.
This aligns with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the system performs access decisions either too late, on the wrong attributes, or without ensuring that the requesting party is authorized to view the targeted resource.
Potential impact
- Exposure of order details belonging to other customers
- Leakage of personally identifiable information (PII) contained in orders (names, addresses, contact data)
- Disclosure of order history, product choices, and pricing information
- Increased risk of social engineering or account takeover attempts leveraging leaked order data
- Potential regulatory or compliance issues due to unintended customer data disclosure
General mitigation guidance
Mitigations should focus on strengthening authorization logic and reducing the trust placed in client-supplied filters:
- Enforce strict ownership checks for every order fetch, ensuring that the returned order is explicitly bound to the authenticated customer or a validated, narrowly scoped deep link token.
- Design deep link mechanisms as opaque, hard-to-guess tokens with server-side mapping, avoiding any reliance on user-controlled filters to select resources.
- Normalize the access control layer so that all code paths (including special flows such as deep links) pass through a central authorization guard rather than embedding ad-hoc checks.
- Restrict the set of allowed filters and query parameters for unauthenticated contexts, whitelisting only those necessary for the intended use case.
- Apply least-privilege data exposure by returning only the minimal order details required for the deep link scenario, even when authorization succeeds.
How teams detect issues like this
Effective detection strategies focus on both design-time and runtime indicators of missing authorization:
- Static analysis and code review:
- Flag endpoints that return sensitive resources (orders, customers, payments) without passing through a shared authorization component.
- Look for conditional branches that treat deep link or "public" flows differently and verify they still enforce resource-level checks.
- Review any use of client-controlled filters on sensitive collections and confirm that filters are constrained by the caller's identity or token scope.
- Automated testing:
- Implement security tests that attempt to access resources belonging to other users with both authenticated and unauthenticated sessions.
- Add regression tests for deepLinkCode and similar mechanisms to ensure they cannot be used to enumerate or query arbitrary orders.
- Logging and monitoring:
- Log order access events with caller context, and monitor for unusual patterns such as one client accessing large numbers of distinct orders.
- Organizations may incorporate these checks into CI/CD pipelines using security-focused linters or API contract validation tools that enforce consistent authorization patterns.

