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CVE-2026-31880

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

Reflected XSS (CWE-79) in Combodo iTop Universal Search

CVE-2026-31880

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Scripting

CWE:

CWE-79

Impact:

Client-Side Code Execution and Account-Context Actions

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Combodo iTop versions before 3.2.3 contain a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in the universal search feature. When attacker-controlled search input is returned to a user's browser without adequate output encoding, injected script may execute in the context of the iTop application.

Affected context

The issue occurs in iTop deployments that expose the universal search functionality and reflect search-related input into an HTML response without sufficient context-aware encoding. Risk depends on whether a victim can be induced to follow a crafted link or request and on the privileges available to the victim's browser session.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web-based universal search functionality
  • Required access: Ability to submit or influence search input; victim interaction may be required
  • Trigger point: Rendering of a search response containing attacker-controlled data
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input is reflected into a browser response without adequate output encoding or equivalent sanitization for its rendering context

Why this happens

The vulnerability is caused by treating user-controlled search data as trusted content when generating an HTML response. If the application reflects that data without context-appropriate output encoding, the browser may interpret it as executable markup or script rather than ordinary text. This behavior maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, commonly known as cross-site scripting.

Potential impact

  • A victim's browser session may execute attacker-controlled script
  • Sensitive information accessible to the victim may be exposed
  • Unauthorized actions could be performed using the victim's application privileges
  • Users may be redirected to deceptive content or shown manipulated interface elements
  • Administrative accounts could experience greater impact if targeted

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that reflected input is treated as data rather than executable content.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Applying context-aware output encoding at every HTML, attribute, URL, or script rendering boundary
  • Using framework templating features that escape output by default
  • Validating search parameters against an appropriate input schema without relying on validation alone
  • Reducing trust in browser-provided values and avoiding unsafe HTML rendering paths
  • Applying a restrictive Content Security Policy as a defense-in-depth control
  • Limiting application privileges so compromised user sessions have minimal reach

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis rules for unsafe response construction and unescaped template variables
  • Code review checks for reflected request parameters in search results and error messages
  • Dynamic testing that submits special-character test values and verifies correct encoding in responses
  • Browser-based security testing for unexpected script execution or DOM changes
  • Policy enforcement requiring contextual output encoding and secure templating patterns
  • Neutral automated code-review or software composition tools that identify common XSS patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Combodo/iTop/commit/7bfa14a8744cc599caf0ed347022f8267793d6d9
github.comgithub.com/Combodo/iTop/security/advisories/GHSA-6qgh-xqjr-4pv7

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, exploitation may be possible through a crafted web request or link when the universal search endpoint is reachable and a victim processes the resulting response.

Authentication requirements depend on the iTop deployment and search access controls. In many cases, the key condition is that a victim with access to the feature loads attacker-influenced content.

Ensure all reflected search data is encoded for its specific output context and use secure-by-default templating rather than constructing HTML with raw input.

Combine contextual output encoding, input validation, secure code review, automated testing, Content Security Policy defense in depth, and least-privilege account design.

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