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CVE-2026-31828

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

LDAP Injection in Parse Server LDAP Authentication Adapter

CVE-2026-31828

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

LDAP Injection

CWE:

CWE-90

Impact:

Authentication and Authorization Bypass Leading to Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Parse Server's LDAP authentication adapter contains an LDAP injection flaw where user-supplied identifiers are interpolated directly into Distinguished Names (DNs) and group search filters without proper escaping.

In deployments that rely on LDAP group-based access control, an attacker with valid LDAP credentials can manipulate these queries to bypass group membership checks and escalate privileges to restricted roles.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Parse Server environments that:

  • Use the LDAP authentication adapter for user login
  • Rely on LDAP group-based access control for restricting privileged roles or features
  • Construct bind DNs and group search filters using user-controlled authData.id values

It is most relevant where LDAP is the primary identity provider and group membership is trusted as the enforcement mechanism for administrative or high-privilege access.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application login / authentication endpoint that uses LDAP via Parse Server.
  • Required access: Valid LDAP credentials for any user account; no administrative rights are required.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted authData.id values during the LDAP authentication flow.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The adapter interpolates authData.id directly into LDAP DN strings and group search filters without escaping special characters (e.g., commas, parentheses, wildcards), allowing an attacker to alter the logical structure of LDAP queries and group checks.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper neutralization of special elements used in LDAP queries, matching CWE-90: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an LDAP Query ('LDAP Injection').

Instead of treating user identifiers as data, the adapter concatenates authData.id into LDAP Distinguished Names and search filter strings, allowing attacker-controlled characters to change filter semantics, DN scope, or evaluated group memberships.

This pattern arises when LDAP query construction uses string interpolation or concatenation without:

  • Escaping or encoding LDAP meta-characters
  • Using parameterized or template APIs that separate data from LDAP query syntax

Potential impact

  • Bypassing LDAP group membership checks that gate administrative or restricted features
  • Escalation from a regular authenticated LDAP user to roles intended only for privileged groups
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive application data or management endpoints protected by LDAP groups
  • Potential abuse of elevated privileges to modify application configuration or user permissions

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating LDAP identifiers and filters as structured data rather than raw strings:

  • Apply robust escaping/encoding for all user-controlled values used in LDAP DNs and search filters, using well-tested LDAP utility functions rather than custom logic.
  • Avoid building LDAP queries via raw string concatenation; prefer APIs or helper functions that clearly separate query structure from data parameters.
  • Enforce strict validation on user identifiers (e.g., authData.id), constraining them to expected character sets and formats before passing them to LDAP operations.
  • Implement defense-in-depth by enforcing authorization at the application level, not solely relying on LDAP group checks to control highly sensitive operations.
  • Limit the privileges of LDAP accounts used by the application so that even if queries are manipulated, the account cannot access unnecessary groups or directories.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this pattern using a combination of static and operational checks:

  • Static analysis: Define rules that flag direct string interpolation or concatenation of request parameters (e.g., authData.id) into LDAP DN or filter strings (common patterns: "cn=" + userInput, filter: "(&(objectClass=person)(uid=" + userInput + "))").
  • Code review: Examine authentication and identity integration modules for:
  • Manual construction of LDAP DNs and filters
  • Lack of explicit escaping or encoding when including user-controlled data
  • Absence of centralized LDAP helper utilities
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor authentication and LDAP logs for anomalous filters containing unexpected special characters, nested expressions, or patterns not typical of normal IDs.
  • Policy enforcement: Include secure LDAP query construction guidelines in development standards and enforce them via pre-merge reviews and automated linting where possible.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.26
github.comgithub.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.2-alpha.13
github.comgithub.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7m6r-fhh7-r47c

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If Parse Server is exposed over the network and configured with the LDAP authentication adapter, any remote user who can reach the authentication endpoint and has valid LDAP credentials can attempt to exploit the injection via crafted login data.

No. The issue is exploitable with standard, non-privileged LDAP credentials. The flaw lies in how the application uses the provided identifier in LDAP queries, allowing a regular user to impersonate or appear as a member of restricted groups.

The safest approach is to eliminate raw string-based LDAP query construction and instead use well-vetted helper functions that:

  • Properly escape or encode all user-controlled values before inserting them into DNs or filters
  • Centralize LDAP query building so it can be consistently hardened and reviewed.

Prevention focuses on secure design and review practices:

  • Adopt a strict rule that no user input is ever concatenated directly into LDAP queries or DNs.
  • Standardize on LDAP utility libraries that handle escaping and construction, and ban ad-hoc string interpolation patterns.
  • Include LDAP query construction in security code reviews and automated checks, and document guidance for developers integrating external identity providers.
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