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CVE-2026-31255

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Command Injection in Tenda AC18 SetSambaCfg Interface

CVE-2026-31255

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Router Firmware

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the Tenda AC18 router (firmware V15.03.05.05_multi) allows untrusted input in the guestuser parameter of the /goform/SetSambaCfg endpoint to be concatenated into system command lines.

When this interface is exposed to an attacker, crafted guestuser values can execute arbitrary system commands with the router's underlying OS privileges.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web management interface of Tenda AC18 devices running firmware V15.03.05.05_multi, specifically in the Samba configuration handler at /goform/SetSambaCfg.

The issue arises when the guestuser parameter is processed and incorporated into shell commands without adequate validation or escaping.

Risk is highest when the administration interface is reachable from untrusted networks (e.g., WAN exposure, weak Wi‑Fi credentials, or compromised internal hosts).

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) request to the router's /goform/SetSambaCfg endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send requests to the management interface (often via LAN, but potentially WAN if exposed or misconfigured)
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted guestuser parameter as part of the Samba configuration request
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is directly embedded into shell or system command strings without proper sanitization, quoting, or parameterization, enabling injection of additional commands

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

The application constructs system-level commands by concatenating the guestuser parameter into a command string, treating it as trusted data.

Special characters (such as command separators, pipes, or shell metacharacters) are not neutralized, allowing an attacker to break out of the intended argument context and append arbitrary commands.

This pattern stems from designing firmware features around direct shell invocation for configuration tasks instead of using safer, parameterized APIs or structured configuration mechanisms.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary commands on the router's underlying operating system
  • Full compromise of the router, including configuration tampering and persistent backdoor installation
  • Interception, redirection, or modification of network traffic routed through the device
  • Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network devices
  • Enrollment of the router into botnets or use in large-scale DDoS campaigns

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command construction with untrusted input and reducing the privileges of components that must interact with the OS:

  • Replace shell-based configuration calls with parameterized system APIs, libraries, or direct file/daemon configuration interfaces instead of concatenated shell commands.
  • Strictly validate and normalize all web parameters (such as guestuser) against a whitelist of allowed characters and formats (e.g., alphanumeric usernames with limited symbols).
  • Enforce robust input encoding or quoting when interacting with any command execution layer, ensuring user-controlled data cannot alter command structure.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to web management processes, limiting the impact of command execution and segregating critical services where possible.
  • Minimize exposure of the management interface (e.g., disable WAN management by default, segment administration networks) to reduce reachable attack surface.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection strategies typically combine firmware/code analysis with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Scan source or decompiled firmware for patterns where HTTP parameters are passed into functions like system, popen, or equivalent shell invocation utilities via string concatenation.
  • Code review: Flag any handler code that builds shell commands from web parameters (such as guestuser) without strict validation, canonicalization, and escaping.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish secure coding standards that prohibit direct shell calls with user input and mandate use of safer APIs, supported by automated checks in build pipelines.
  • Runtime monitoring: Observe router logs and process activity for unexpected shell invocations or anomalous command arguments originating from web handlers, where such telemetry is available.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/izxnfirh8148/CVE_REQUESTS_references/blob/main/Tenda_AC18/Tenda_AC18_3th/README.md

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but only if the router's management interface or the vulnerable endpoint is accessible from untrusted networks (for example, if remote management is enabled or port forwarding exposes it). Otherwise, an attacker generally needs a foothold on the local network.

The attacker must be able to send HTTP(S) requests to the /goform/SetSambaCfg endpoint. In many deployments, this requires access to the LAN or Wi‑Fi network, though misconfigurations can expose the interface more broadly.

The most robust pattern is to remove shell command construction entirely for configuration tasks by using dedicated system APIs or libraries. Where shell interaction is unavoidable, strictly validate all inputs, constrain them to safe character sets, and pass them as arguments to execution APIs that avoid invoking a shell.

Adopt a defensive design approach that treats all external input as untrusted, enforce whitelist-based validation, and ban direct string concatenation into shell commands via coding guidelines. Combine these with automated static analysis in the build process to catch violations early and periodic security reviews of management interfaces.

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