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CVE-2026-31242

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Broken Access Control in mem0 Memory Reset API

CVE-2026-31242

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-306, CWE-862

Impact:

Catastrophic Data Loss and Denial of Service

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The mem0 v1.0.0 server exposes a memory reset endpoint (DELETE /memories) without any authentication or authorization checks, allowing anyone to trigger a destructive operation.

An unauthenticated attacker can send a single DELETE request that issues a DROP TABLE SQL command, wiping the entire memory table and causing catastrophic data loss and denial of service for all users.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of the mem0 v1.0.0 server that:

  • Expose the HTTP API (including DELETE /memories) over a network-accessible interface
  • Rely on the server to enforce access controls for administrative or destructive operations
  • Use a backing SQL database to store all memory data in a single table

In such setups, the memory reset capability is reachable without session checks or role validation, meaning any network client can attempt the operation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible mem0 HTTP API
  • Required access: Ability to reach the mem0 server over HTTP(S); no prior authentication required
  • Trigger point: Sending an HTTP DELETE request to the /memories endpoint
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The endpoint lacks authentication (CWE-306), so the server does not verify the caller's identity.
  • The endpoint lacks authorization checks (CWE-862), so the server does not ensure the caller is permitted to perform a global reset.
  • The handler directly executes a DROP TABLE SQL statement as part of the reset logic, applying to all stored memory data.

Why this happens

The core issue is a broken access control design where a highly privileged, destructive operation is exposed as a public API without any identity or permission checks.

According to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), critical functions must require the caller to authenticate; here, the DELETE /memories endpoint is callable by anonymous users.

Simultaneously, per CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), even authenticated sessions should be checked for appropriate privileges, but the implementation performs no role or scope validation.

Abstractly, this reflects an insecure pattern where administrative operations are implemented as "just another endpoint," with business logic directly issuing DROP TABLE on the main data store, rather than being gated behind robust access control and separated operational workflows.

Potential impact

  • Complete deletion of the memory database table via DROP TABLE
  • Immediate loss of all user data stored in the memory service
  • Full denial of service for all users until the database is restored or rebuilt
  • Potential breach of availability-related SLAs and reliability commitments
  • Operational downtime while backups are restored and services are reconfigured

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict access control for destructive operations and reducing the blast radius of reset capabilities.

Recommended patterns include:

  • Require strong authentication for administrative endpoints:
  • Place reset and drop-like operations behind authenticated admin interfaces or service accounts.
  • Use short-lived tokens or mTLS for machine-to-machine control paths.
  • Enforce fine-grained authorization:
  • Introduce role- and scope-based access control so only explicitly privileged roles can trigger global resets.
  • Distinguish between user-scoped deletions and system-wide maintenance operations.
  • Constrain destructive operations:
  • Replace direct DROP TABLE usage with safer logical deletions or soft-reset mechanisms that can be rolled back.
  • Implement confirmation flows or multi-step operations for irreversible actions.
  • Architectural isolation:
  • Separate admin/control-plane APIs from public data-plane APIs, ideally on distinct network paths and credentials.
  • Limit database privileges of the main application user to exclude schema-level operations when possible.
  • Defense in depth:
  • Employ network-layer controls (firewalls, API gateways) to restrict who can reach sensitive endpoints.
  • Enable regular, automated backups and practice restore procedures to minimize impact when data loss occurs.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both design-time and runtime approaches to identify missing access control on critical endpoints.

Static and design-time detection:

  • Use static analysis or API linting rules to flag HTTP handlers that:
  • Accept destructive verbs (DELETE, POST to /reset, /admin, /truncate, etc.) without authentication/authorization checks.
  • Call database methods that issue DROP, TRUNCATE, or mass-delete operations directly from request paths.
  • During code review, treat:
  • Any endpoint affecting all users or full tables as high-risk and verify explicit access control logic.
  • Inline SQL performing schema or bulk data operations as requiring additional architectural justification.
  • Define security-focused API review checklists requiring:
  • Authentication for all endpoints by default, with explicit exceptions documented.
  • Role or policy checks on endpoints capable of data-wide or schema-level changes.

Runtime and operational detection:

  • Configure API gateways or WAFs to:
  • Require authentication on non-idempotent or high-risk paths, alerting when anonymous clients call them.
  • Log and alert on DELETE requests that are not tied to a specific resource identifier (e.g., bulk or global deletes).
  • Monitor database logs for:
  • Unexpected DROP TABLE or TRUNCATE statements originating from application accounts.
  • Sudden spikes in delete volume that could indicate abuse of reset-like endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mem0ai/mem0
notion.sonotion.so/CVE-2026-31242-35d1e1393188819c9ebec0e684b4e656

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the mem0 API is exposed over a network, an attacker can exploit the issue remotely by sending an unauthenticated DELETE request to the /memories endpoint.

No. The core problem is the absence of authentication and authorization on the memory reset functionality, so any network client that can reach the server can trigger the destructive operation.

Introduce strong, default-on access control for all administrative or destructive endpoints: enforce authentication for the API, apply role-based authorization checks specifically for global reset capabilities, and avoid direct schema-level operations such as DROP TABLE in request handlers.

Adopt an "access-control-by-design" approach where all endpoints are authenticated by default, require explicit decisions and reviews to expose any unauthenticated routes, separate admin and public APIs, and incorporate security reviews, static analysis, and API gateway policies that specifically target high-impact operations like global deletes and resets.

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