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CVE-2026-31170

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Command Injection in ToToLink A3300R stun-pass Parameter

CVE-2026-31170

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Router

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection flaw in ToToLink A3300R firmware v17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 allows attackers to execute arbitrary system commands through the stun-pass parameter in /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi.

When this web interface endpoint processes attacker-controlled input without proper sanitization, an unauthenticated remote user may gain full control over the router's operating system.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in the web management interface of ToToLink A3300R devices running firmware v17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 when the /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi endpoint accepts the stun-pass parameter.

It manifests where router configuration values are passed into shell commands or scripts without adequate validation or escaping.

The issue is most relevant when the management interface is reachable from untrusted networks (e.g., WAN exposure, port forwarding, or compromised internal clients).

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface on the router, specifically the /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi endpoint.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to send HTTP requests to the management interface; authentication may not be required if the endpoint is exposed or insufficiently protected.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted stun-pass parameter data in a request that causes the backend to construct and execute a shell command.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application embeds the stun-pass value directly into a command line or shell script without robust quoting, sanitization, or use of safe command execution APIs, enabling injection of additional shell metacharacters and commands.

Why this happens

The core issue is improper handling of externally supplied input that is incorporated into system-level command execution.

Instead of treating the stun-pass value as opaque data, the backend logic likely concatenates it into a shell command or uses an API that invokes a shell, such as system()-like calls, without neutralizing special characters.

This corresponds to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), where user-controlled data effectively becomes part of the command syntax executed with the router's privileges.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the router's web or system service.
  • Full compromise of the router, including configuration modification and firmware tampering.
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device.
  • Traffic interception, redirection, or DNS tampering affecting all connected clients.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks on internal networks or as part of a botnet.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command construction from user-controlled data and reducing the consequences of any remaining flaws.

General patterns include:

  • Avoiding shell invocation for configuration tasks; prefer dedicated system APIs, libraries, or configuration interfaces that treat input as data, not commands.
  • If system commands are unavoidable, using parameterized execution that bypasses the shell and passes arguments as separate, non-interpreted parameters.
  • Applying strict server-side validation on stun-pass and similar parameters, constraining them to expected character sets and lengths, and rejecting input containing shell metacharacters.
  • Running web and CGI components with least-privilege accounts and limiting their access to only necessary system resources.
  • Restricting management interface exposure to trusted networks and enabling additional protections such as firewalls, VPN-only access, or management ACLs.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and researchers can detect similar weaknesses by:

  • Performing static analysis to flag direct use of user-controlled parameters in command-building functions (e.g., system, popen, shell wrappers) without sanitization or argument separation.
  • Reviewing CGI scripts and router web interface code for string concatenation into shell commands or calls that implicitly spawn a shell.
  • Applying dynamic testing and fuzzing against CGI endpoints, observing for anomalous behavior, unexpected responses, or system changes when special shell characters are sent in parameters like stun-pass.
  • Using configuration and policy checks to ensure that management interfaces are not unintentionally exposed to the internet, thereby reducing the practical attack surface of such bugs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Svigo-o/TOTOLINK-Vul/tree/main/totolink-a3300r-stun-pass-cmd-injection

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's management interface is accessible from untrusted networks, such as being directly exposed to the WAN or reachable via port forwarding; otherwise, exploitation is generally limited to local network attackers.

Public reports indicate that exploitation may not require authentication if the vulnerable endpoint is not adequately protected, but the exact requirements depend on the router's configuration and any access controls in place.

Replace shell-based command construction with APIs that treat inputs as data, enforce strict validation on all externally supplied parameters, and avoid any direct concatenation of user input into command lines.

Adopt secure coding practices for embedded web interfaces: design configurations around safe system calls, apply centralized input validation frameworks, minimize the need for shell commands, and integrate code review and automated security testing focused on command execution paths.

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