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CVE-2026-30967

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Improper Authentication in Parse Server OAuth2 Adapter

CVE-2026-30967

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Account Takeover / Authentication Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Parse Server's generic OAuth2 authentication adapter can accept any active token from the provider as valid for any user when the useridField option is not configured.

In this misconfiguration scenario, the server verifies that a token is active but does not confirm that it belongs to the user specified in authData.id, allowing attackers with any valid OAuth2 token from the same provider to impersonate other users.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in Parse Server deployments that:

  • Use the generic OAuth2 authentication adapter (oauth2: true)
  • Do not configure the useridField option
  • Rely on an OAuth2 provider's token introspection endpoint for token validation

Under these conditions, the server only checks whether a token is active, not whether it was issued for the specific user being logged in, which weakens user identity binding for OAuth2-based logins.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Parse Server authentication endpoint(s) using OAuth2.
  • Required access: Possession of any valid OAuth2 access token from the same identity provider used by the target Parse Server.
  • Trigger point: A login or authentication flow where the attacker submits their valid token together with arbitrary authData.id values.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The OAuth2 adapter, without useridField configured, trusts the token's active status from the introspection endpoint but does not verify that the token's subject or user identifier matches the Parse user indicated by authData.id.

Why this happens

The core issue is an authentication design flaw that fails to bind the validated OAuth2 token to the correct user identity.

In the affected configuration, Parse Server uses the OAuth2 provider's token introspection endpoint only to check whether a token is active, satisfying the "token validity" requirement but omitting a check that the token's subject or user ID corresponds to the application user being authenticated.

This maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where the system incorrectly implements authentication logic so that possession of any valid token is treated as proof of identity for arbitrary users, instead of enforcing a strict association between token claims and the user account.

Potential impact

  • Attackers with any valid OAuth2 token from the same provider can log in as other users.
  • Full account takeover of arbitrary user accounts, depending on application authorization logic.
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive data tied to victim accounts (profiles, application data, API keys).
  • Potential privilege escalation if high-privilege or administrative accounts can be impersonated.
  • Abuse of victim accounts for actions such as data modification, transactions, or API abuse.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on binding tokens to user identities and making authentication decisions based on strongly verified claims:

  • Configure the OAuth2 adapter with a useridField (or equivalent) that explicitly maps a stable user identifier from the token (such as sub, user_id, or a provider-specific field) to the Parse user.
  • Ensure the authentication flow verifies that the identifier in the token's claims matches the user being authenticated, rejecting mismatches.
  • Favor a least-privilege approach for tokens: constrain scopes to only what is needed and avoid reusing generic tokens for multiple services without clear subject binding.
  • Treat token introspection responses as one part of a broader validation process that also checks user identity, token audience, expiration, and issuer.
  • Reduce trust in external identity data by validating expected claims format and enforcing strict schema for identity mapping configurations.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this class of vulnerability through:

  • Configuration review: Systematically inspecting Parse Server configuration for OAuth2 adapters, flagging any deployment with oauth2: true that lacks a defined useridField or equivalent identity mapping.
  • Code review: Examining authentication middleware and OAuth2 adapter integration to confirm that token validation includes subject/user ID checks, audience checks, and issuer verification rather than relying solely on "active" status.
  • Static analysis and policy enforcement: Applying rules or policies that require identity binding fields and claim verification whenever OAuth2 token introspection is used, and alerting on configurations that omit these checks.
  • Runtime monitoring: Logging authentication attempts, including token issuer, subject, and mapped user ID, and alerting on suspicious patterns such as one token being used to authenticate different user IDs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.22
github.comgithub.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.2-alpha.9
github.comgithub.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-fr88-w35c-r596

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any attacker who can reach the Parse Server's OAuth2 authentication endpoints and who possesses a valid OAuth2 token from the same provider can attempt to exploit this issue.

No special application privileges are required. The attacker only needs a valid OAuth2 token issued by the same identity provider used by the vulnerable Parse Server instance.

The most robust fix is to enforce strong token-to-user binding by configuring the OAuth2 adapter with an explicit useridField (or equivalent) and verifying that the token's user identifier matches the Parse user being authenticated, alongside standard token validation checks (issuer, audience, expiry).

Future prevention should focus on designing authentication flows around explicit identity binding: always verify that token claims map unambiguously to application users, enforce secure defaults in authentication adapters, document required configuration fields like user ID mappings, and include authentication logic reviews and automated configuration checks in security testing and CI pipelines.

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